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Abstract
The missing middle refers to the empirical fact that most employment in developing countries
is located in either small-sized or large-sized firms. In this thesis,we investigated the missing-
middle phenomenon in a developing country, Vietnam. The first chapter consists of an intro-
duction. The second chapter provides an overall picture of related literature. The third chapter
focuses on the development of a theoretical model designed to capture the effect of corruption
on the missing-middle formulation. The fourth chapter provides empirical evidence on the ex-
istence of a distinct distribution of firm size in Vietnam and some insights into the underlying
mechanism of the phenomenon, focusing on corruption and productivity. The fifth chapter fo-
cuses on the industry efficiency score. In general, the fourth chapter is empirically oriented,
whereas the third and fifth chapters are theoretically oriented. In particular, in the third chapter,
we develop a theoretical model to capture an effect of corruption in the development of firms.
The model incorporates the increasing costs of large-sized firms, compared to smaller ones.
This model shows the firm size distribution (FSD) normally observed in developing economies
along a continuum of infinitesimal firms in the market. In the fourth chapter, we discuss the em-
pirical relationship between firm size and production efficiency, inefficiencies associated with
scale, and the relationship between firm size and the likelihood of paying bribes, using firm-
level data from Vietnam. Our analysis indicates that middle-sized firms production efficiencies
tend to be lower than the efficiencies in small-sized or large-sized firms in most manufacturing
industries. In addition, the least-efficient firm size differs across sectors, indicating the neces-
sity of sector-by-sector analyses to study the underlying mechanisms of the missing-middle
phenomenon. Moreover, our results show that as firm size increases, the likelihood of paying
bribes also increases. This finding, together with our productivity analysis showing that small-
sized firms produce more efficiently compared to middle- or large-sized firms, indicates that
corruption can be one of the reasons for firms to decide not to grow. We analyzed production
efficiency at the aggregate level and provide an approximation proposition that simplifies the
computation and interpretation of various industry inefficiency measures proposed in the liter-
ature. Moreover, we extended the proposed framework to the meta-technology approach. We
found a difference between the group-frontiers and the meta-frontiers. In addition, the meta-
technology efficiency (MTE) scores were highest for small-sized firms, in particular, firms with
fewer than 50 employees. This finding confirms the differences in the characteristics of firms
operating environment across size groups.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Firm size distribution (FSD) has been a particular concern of economists for nearly a century.
On entering markets, firms face a selection process that causes less efficient firms to decrease
their size and eventually exit, while more efficient firms start to grow. Survivors will then
choose to allocate resources to maximize their profit in the given macro environment and within
a certain size group. In other words, the accumulation of the underlying dynamics that results
from a firm’s decision regarding entry, development, or exit evolves into a certain firm size
distribution. FSD is, therefore, an endogenous choice for firms, and an analysis of FSD could
provide a possible interpretation of the behavior of firms in the market, given their opportunities,
constraints, and efficiency levels. FSD could also contribute an explanation to the industrial
concentration of an economy, which in turn represents the level of competition in the market. If
small firms grow at a high rate, the increase in number of firms will lead to an improvement in
market competitiveness. Conversely, a larger proportion of large firms may create monopolistic
and oligopolistic markets in which a few giant firms employ a large number of employees and
exercise significant market power. Consequently, small changes in the distribution of these
firms can have considerable macroeconomic impact on labor policies, labor market evolution,
and job creation and destruction.
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in FSD analysis. In recent studies, many impor-
tant features of the FSD of developed economies have been confirmed. First, empirical studies
have provided evidence of the existence of a relatively stationary distribution of firm size under
1
1.1. BACKGROUND
various economic scenarios. Further, different measures of size do not alter the distribution in
these scenarios. Such a distribution exhibits a robust right skew over time, regardless of changes
in diversified regulatory environments, waves of mergers and acquisitions, and surges of firm
entry and exit. More importantly, some significant FSD laws in developed economies have also
been identified. One is Gibrats law, also known as the law of proportionate effect. According to
this law, the probability of a given proportional change in size during a specified period is the
same for all firms in an industry, regardless of the initial size at the beginning of the period. As
a result, firm size can be explained purely by its idiosyncratic accumulation of multiplicative
random shocks. In the literature, this law has provided a benchmark for both empirical and
theoretical studies of FSD in developed economies. Another law is Zipf’s law, in which the
frequency of a certain size firm is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table.
The FSDs of developing economies are characterized with quite different features. That is,
while FSDs of developed countries are characterized by the Pareto law or log-normal distribu-
tion, the size structure of firms in developing countries tends to deviate from such a distribution.
In particular, a concentration of infinitesimal firms co-exits with a handful of large-sized firms
and an under-representation of middle-sized firms. This phenomenon in developing countries
is called the “missing middle”. The missing middle was first documented in Liedholm and
Mead (1987). In addition, Tybout (2000) found a large spike in the size distribution for the
small-sized category, which drops off quickly in the middle-sized category among the poor-
est countries. (See also Little et al. (1987) for South Korea and Steel and Webster (1992) for
Ghana). The presence of the missing-middle phenomenon and how it is defined have been
extensively discussed in the literature (see Hsieh and Olken, 2014, Tybout, 2014a,b).
Because the missing middle is more evident in developing nations, we imagine there are some
reasons that particularly apply to developing nations, but not so much to developed nations,
likely because the business environment varies across nations, and particularly between de-
veloping nations and developed nations. In particular, we emphasize the mis-allocation of re-
sources among firms as a source of differences in aggregate productivity, which may lead to
such a FSD. One possible explanation is that this mis-allocation takes place because of govern-
ment policies or other barriers that distort the way resources are allocated across heterogeneous
production units.
2
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1.2 Research questions and Objectives
Given the background and overview of the research problem, we identified an imminent need
to conduct an analysis on the existence of the missing middle in a developing country as well
as to explore the fundamental driving forces by which it is generated. The central research
question addressed in this thesis, therefore, was to examine the missing middle phenomenon in
a developing country.
To answer the above research question, the thesis focused on (a) developing a theoretical frame-
work that could provide a plausible explanation for the missing-middle phenomenon; (b) em-
pirically examining the two factors affecting FSD indicated in the theoretical model(corruption
and productivity) using the micro data of Vietnam; and (c) providing further insights into the
calculation of productivity at the aggregate level to explore the linkage between this measure
and the missing middle.
Tybout (2014b) claimed that the missing middle is at least partly policy-induced and stated that
when policies are imperfectly enforced, producers tend to stay small in order to avoid different
constraints, such as financial constraints, human resource limitations, corruption, or regulatory
burdens. In developing countries, business constraints are different across firm size.The middle-
sized group tend to face the largest burdens. Another factor affecting the FSD is the firm’s
productivity level. Although it is difficult to measure how well a firm is managed, production
efficiency can be evidence of the quality an organization’s management. As indicated in Tybout
(2000), in developing countries, firms perform poorly in several respects: “(1) markets tolerate
inefficient firms, so cross-firm productivity dispersion is high; (2) small groups of entrenched
oligopolists exploit monopoly power in product markets; and (3) many small firms are unable
or unwilling to grow, so important scale economies go unexploited.”.
Intuitively, the missing middle exists because there is a burden or barrier against entering a mar-
ket segment, particularly for a middle-sized firm. At the same time, an element favors larger
size firms. Hence, the phenomenon might exist in a developing country because of the combi-
nation of these two factors. Further, these two factors could be more striking in a developing
country than in a developed country because of environmental factors, production technology,
or the efficiency of market structures.
To understand these aspects further, first,we devised a theoretical framework that could plau-
3
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sibly explain the formulation of the missing middle in the firm size distribution of a develop-
ing country. Second, we thoroughly investigated the missing middle phenomenon in Vietnam.
Vietnam is an interesting case because it is a transitional, developing country. Over the last
two decades, since the emergence of the Doi moi (Renovation) process, the country has moved
from bureaucratic, centralized management based on state subsidies toward a multi-stakeholder,
market-oriented economy and has experienced a period of continuous high economic growth.
However, Vietnam has yet to become a tiger in Asia as expected. Investigating the firm size
distribution of Vietnam could shed light on the underlying mechanism as well as on factors
that result in the mis-allocation of resources and hinder firm growth. As in other developing
countries, studies on FSD in Vietnam are scarce. The few studies conducted have been limited
to empirical studies only and none provides a comprehensive picture of the FSD or presents the
characteristics of the FSD of Vietnam. Thus, there was an opportunity to investigate the FSD
of Vietnam, from both empirical and theoretical perspectives.
In general, the main objectives of the thesis were (a) to provide a tractable dynamic model
of the missing-middle formulation within a canonical framework from the literature, focusing
on productivity and corruption; (b) to draw a comprehensive picture of the FSD of Vietnam
as well as to report empirical evidence of the missing-middle phenomenon in Vietnam; (c) to
study possible effects of corruption and productivity on the FSD of Vietnam; and (d) to further
investigate aggregate-level productivity measures and locate a possible linkage with the missing
middle.
1.3 Data
In this section, we present an overview of the two datasets used in the thesis1.
The first dataset is the enterprise census. In Vietnam, the census has been conducted annu-
ally since 2000 and covers all registered firms in Vietnam2. In this paper, we focused on the
nine-year period from 2000 to 2008. We excluded recent years (2009 to present) because the
Vietnamese economy has suffered from the effects of the global financial crisis and because a
30% reduction in the corporate income tax rate for qualifying entities was implemented in the
1More detailed descriptions can be found in the data section in each chapter.
2In the enterprise census, an enterprise is defined as “an economic unit that independently keeps a business
account and acquires its own legal status.”
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fourth quarter of 2008 and all of 20093. In addition, small-sized and middle-sized firms involved
in labor-intensive production and processing activities may have benefited from the subsequent
tax reduction under Decree 60/2011. In addition, we excluded inconsistent data from our sam-
ple, such as observations that were recorded twice for the same firm in the same year, those with
negative or zero revenue values, or those with an implausibly large number of employees. We
included 14 sectors of the manufacturing industry that had at least 200 observations for each
year, and the number of observations ranged from approximately 3,350 to 29,700 per industry.
The information from this dataset was used in investigating the firm size distribution of Vietnam
as well as in productivity calculations.
The second dataset was the small and medium manufacturing enterprise survey. The survey was
conducted by the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) in collaboration with the
Vietnamese Institute of Labor Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA), the Department of Eco-
nomics (DoE) of the University of Copenhagen, and UNU-WIDER with the Royal Embassy of
Denmark in Vietnam. The survey has been conducted every two years since 2005. Over 2,500
enterprises across ten provinces have been surveyed. Surviving firms are interviewed each sur-
vey year (tracer survey). In comparison to the first dataset, the survey provides comprehensive
information on all forms of SMEs including private firms, collectives, partnerships, private
limited enterprises and joint stock enterprises. Joint ventures were excluded from the sample
because of the high degree of governmental and foreign involvement in ownership structures.
The dataset excludes all state-owned firms as well as firms in other sectors such as the service
sector. More importantly, this survey contains information on both formal and informal firms.
Our initial sample contained 9567 observations, which included all firms in the SME survey
covering four years: 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011. We excluded all firms for which we did not
have information on firm size, wages and total assets. We also discarded firms for which we did
not have information on firm age. The final sample consisted of 8421 non-state manufacturing
firms in ten provinces of Vietnam. Employees in our analysis included both regular full-time
and casual employees. The information of this dataset was later used to investigate the effects
of corruption on the formation of the FSD in Vietnam.
3See Circular No. 03/2009/TT-BTC published in January 2009 by Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance.
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1.4 The Significance and Contributions of the Thesis
The Significance of the Thesis
FSD analysis is a multifaceted topic that has attracted the interest of scholars since at least the
beginning of the 20th century. The FSD formulation represents the dynamics of the economy
because simply knowing the size or growth of individual firms may not facilitate in understand-
ing of the status and development of the dynamic process of a country as a whole. Previously,
theorists have proposed that individual firm growth resulting from competitive pressures and the
economic environment seems to have marginal effect on the FSD formation. Based on Gibrat’s
models, individual firms are normally assumed to grow at a random rate based on Gaussian
models. Recent research, however, has shown that firm growth is a much more complex pro-
cess and that FSD and growth distribution do not seem to be purely dynamic. Most firms remain
in the same size group in the distribution for a long time while few others grow rapidly. Such
size stagnancy should be investigated to provide a comprehensive understanding of firm dynam-
ics and growth. Thus, in this thesis, we explored the opportunity to provide some insights into
the issue.
In particular, the thesis focused on the FSD of developing countries. Despite the long history
of FSD analysis in developed economies, few researchers have examined the FSDs and their
distinct features in developing economies. These studies provide evidence of the missing middle
phenomenon. The phenomenon indicates the absence of a robust and dynamic SME sector
in many developing countries, particularly in the least developed countries. This structural
imbalance has arisen despite various SME promotion programs in these countries. According
to these studies, the cost of suboptimal size - that is, a firm that is too large or too small - can
be significant4. Thus, the analysis of this phenomenon may illuminate ways to tackle sources
of inefficiency and enhance economic development in developing countries.
No adequate explanation of the FSD in developing markets exists in the literature. Most re-
searchers have considered small domestic market and poor infrastructure to be major problems
that determine the concentration of small-sized firms and dis-economies of scale in developing
countries. However, the underlying assumption in most studies is that firms respond identically
to country-wide shocks. Little is known about the firm level performance as well as about the
4According to Riahi-Belkaoui, 1994, up to 25% of the cost that a large manufacturing firm has to pay are
organizational slack due to communication problems, bureaucratic inefficiencies and other dis-economies of scale.
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dynamics within one industry. Consequently, policy analysis in many important areas (for ex-
ample, corporate governance) in developing economies rests on shaky foundations. We have
neither a complete picture of the FSDs of developing countries nor a thorough understanding
of the dynamics of firms behavior that can plausibly explain the FSD formulation. Therefore, a
need exists for an analysis that addresses the specific problems encountered by small firms that
leads to the lack of domestic enterprises in the middle range.
Finally, productivity and efficiency represent manifestations of the business environment in
developing nations. Recent literature has documented empirically how distortions of business
environments can affect aggregate productivity though mis-allocations of resources from more
productive to less productive firms. Tybout (2000) stated, “given the fundamental importance
of efficiency and productivity growth, improvements in the way that we measure these concepts
should be a priority”. In developing countries, firms that are more efficient commonly have “too
little” output or employment allocated to them because of various distortions in their economies;
thus, the gap in aggregate productivity is a sign of such mis-allocation of resources. Analysis
on productivity at the aggregate level, thus, can shed light on the mis-allocation of resources,
which may possibly explain the missing middle. The thesis contributes to the literature in this
respect.
Major Contributions of the Thesis
In the thesis, we filled in the gap in the literature by providing evidence of the existence of the
missing middle and by offering a comprehensive analysis of factors that may constitute a plau-
sible explanation of the phenomenon. The major contributions of the thesis involve empirical
findings, theoretical modeling and statistical estimation theory.
The first contribution is in the theoretical perspective. In the thesis, we have developed a theo-
retical framework whereby corruption acts as the barrier that prevent small firms from growing
to a bigger size group. In particular, the model describes the process of market selection, tech-
nology accumulation and fixed cost as the main determinations of the FSD formulation. The
model has extended the powerful insights of continuous-time mathematics into environments
where firms have heterogeneous technology and dynamically decide to enter or exit the mar-
ket while facing various financial constraints. Thus, the innovation of this study was to apply
continuous-time mathematics to describe the dynamic decision making of firms and FSD within
a model that included the constraints that firms face. It is clear from the current literature that
there is an urgent need for better ways to model a firm’s dynamic decision making. The thesis
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is a contribution towards this undertaking.
The second contribution involves the empirical perspective. Using the micro data of manufac-
turing firms in Vietnam, we draw a comprehensive picture of the FSD of a developing country.
We provide evidence against uni-modality of the FSD and show the evidence of the missing-
middle phenomenon in Vietnam. We also examined the underlined mechanism behind the miss-
ing middle by looking at the relationship between the phenomenon and factors indicated in the
theoretical framework, such as corruption, efficiency, and returns to scale. First, we used a
unique firm-level dataset, which included both informal and formal companies, to examine
what characteristics of firms are the important determinants of bribery in a developing nation.
We found that as firm size increases, the likelihood of paying bribes also increases. In addition,
the formality of firms also matters in the sense that the likelihood of paying bribes is higher
for formal firms, which tend to be larger. In addition, we compared our results to the extant
literature by examining the missing middle at the sectoral level of a developing country. Our
analysis shows that middle-sized firms production efficiencies tend to be lower than the effi-
ciencies of small-sized or large-sized firms in most manufacturing industries. Further, the least
efficient firm size differed across sectors, which indicates the necessity of sector-by-sector anal-
yses to study the underlying mechanisms of the missing-middle phenomenon. To the best of our
knowledge, we do not know of any other studies that link the missing middle and production
efficiencies across different firm sizes in various sectors of a developing country. Finally, we
investigated the inefficiencies associated with scale across different sectors and among different
size groups in each sector. We found that large-sized firms in most sectors tended to suffer
from inefficiencies associated with scale; however,the possibility of increasing returns to scale
may exist in part of the production functions in which many small firms operate. Our analysis
indicates that one of the problems, in Vietnam, at least, is how to activate some resources that
these large-sized firms hold but tend to only partially utilize in production.
The third contribution of the thesis involves the statistical perspective. The thesis used the
polynomial-time algorithm developed bySoleimani-Damaneh and Reshadi (2007) to identify
inefficiency associated with scale under non-convex technology. Relaxing the convexity as-
sumption of the production set becomes critical in an investigation of local non-convexities as a
technological explanation for the missing middle. In addition, we looked at industry efficiency,
which is compatible with the entry and exit of firms. We devised an approximation theorem that
includes the different specifications introduced in the literature to the same basic optimization
program to calculate for efficiency score. This program is linear and can be solved using stan-
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dard simplex methods. This technique introduced advantages in terms of both computation and
interpretation. The computational advantage is obvious. The interpretational advantage comes
from the fact that we needed to discuss a simple basic model to which we could refer for any
type of aggregate analysis. As all industry inefficiencies are approximately equal regardless of
the underlying technology, what seems to matter at the industry level is the efficiency decompo-
sition. In the thesis, we also discuss efficiency decomposition whereby industry efficiency can
be decomposed into the sum of aggregate technical efficiency and re-allocative efficiency.
1.5 Limitations of the Thesis
The research was confined to the analysis and investigation of the missing-middle phenomenon.
The literature has indicated a variety of factors that might affect the FSD in general and the miss-
ing middle, in particular. Many factors, including financial constraints, regulatory framework,
and property rights, can affect the formation of FSDs in developing countries. However, to
keep the thesis within manageable proportions for rigorous investigation, only two factors are
discussed in this thesis:corruption and productivity. In addition, because of time and resource
constraints, the theoretical model developed in the thesis is limited with restricted assumptions.
The limitations of the thesis will be discussed in further detail in the conclusion chapter.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The thesis follows the doctoral thesis structure suggested by the University of Queensland. The
thesis begins with a brief outline of the firm size distribution formulation and the missing-
middle phenomenon. In this section, the overall outline and organization pattern of the thesis
are discussed. The thesis contains six chapters. The chapters are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
Chapter 1: Introduction. In the first chapter,we explore the research background, research
questions, identify the research objectives,describe the data, and summarize the significance
and contributions of the thesis. The limitations and the general outline of the thesis are also
presented.
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Introduction. The chapter explores the research background, research questions, identifies the
research objectives and describes data, summarizes the significance and contributions of the
thesis. The limitations and the general outline of the thesis are also presented here.
Chapter 2: Literature Review. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is devoted
to identifying major concepts in the thesis. The second part focuses on the related literature.
The chapter shows that FSD is a complex issue that requires an integrated analysis of various
factors.
Chapter 3: Theoretical model. In this chapter we develop a theoretical framework to capture
the effect of corruption on the development of firms. The model captures the increasing costs
of large-sized firm groups, compared to the costs of the smaller ones, which leads to the con-
centration of a continuum of infinitesimal firms in the market. In particular, the chapter extends
the model presented in Luttmer (2007) to a framework that could be applied to a developing
economy. We used the model to describe firm dynamics - entry, exit, and growth, which, on the
one hand, being consistent with empirical evidence in developing countries, while, on the other
hand, allowing for heterogeneity in the characteristics of firms.
Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis - Corruption and Productivity. In this chapter, we investigated
empirically the relationship between firm size and production efficiency and the relationship
between firm size and the likelihood of paying bribes using firm-level data from Vietnam. Our
analysis indicates that middle-sized firms’ production efficiencies tend to be lower than the effi-
ciencies of small-sized or large-sized firms in most of the manufacturing industries. In addition,
as firm size increases, the likelihood of paying bribes also increases.
Chapter 5: Productivity at the industry level. This chapter provides analyses of the total ineffi-
ciency at the industry level. We provide an approximation theorem that basically report all the
different specification of efficiency scores in the aggregate level introduced in the literature to
the same basic optimization program. This program is linear and can be solved using standard
simplex methods. This technique introduces advantages in terms of both computation and in
terms of interpretation.
Chapter 6: Conclusion. This chapter provides the summary and implication of the thesis. The
objective of the chapter is to consolidate the answers to the research questions. In the chapter,
we synthesize all major findings from Chapters 2 through 5 and present the research implication
to researchers and policy makers. Further details regarding major contributions and limitations
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of the thesis are also discussed. Finally, future research directions are suggested.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Theoretical Concepts
2.1.1 The definition of a firm
The diversification of theories that model FSD largely results from the complexity and multi-
plicity of the definition of a firm. Such complexity gives rise to different approaches to mod-
eling FSD. Therefore, it is worth presenting a brief summary of the definition of a firm and its
“efficient boundary” in the literature.
How may a firm be defined? For centuries, scholars have asked and answered the question.
First, in 1776, Adam Smith, in Wealth of Nations defined a firm in terms of the division of
labor. Later in the 1890s, Marshall defined a firm as a profit-maximization production function.
This approach remains the neo-classical view of a firm to this day.
Such a view, however, cannot explain why firm sizes vary even when operating in the same
industry where they face similar optimization problems. It also does not explain why certain
economic activities are carried out by the market while others are organized under the hier-
archic structure within a firm. A firm is still a “black box” transforming inputs into outputs.
Alternatively, a firm is just a profit-maximizing (or cost-minimizing) mechanism, operating in
the exogenous business environment that lies beyond its control.
Recent approaches to defining a firm are presented in the following section.
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The first approach to defining a firm is associated with the transaction cost theory, in which
a firm is considered an internal process that replaces the external price mechanism. In 1937,
Coase, in his article “The Nature of the Firm”, suggested that the existence of a firm is fun-
damentally a matter of contracting costs. According to Coase, the main reason for firm es-
tablishment is to escape from the costs associated with using the market mechanism such as
costs in identifying what parties to deal with, establishing terms and conditions, conducting
negotiations, and concluding, monitoring and enforcing contracts. These costs can be avoided
by binding employees under employment contracts and having them follow orders from man-
agers. The upper limit of firm size occurs where internal costs within a firm, which rise due to
diminishing returns to management equal costs of making the transaction in the open market.
Later, Williamson (1975) suggested that a firm governance structure is influenced by the de-
gree of uncertainty, the frequency of transactions and the degree to which durable, transaction-
specific investments are required to realize the least-cost supply. With transactions that occur
frequently, long-term arrangements should be established, especially when one party needs a
particular resource and has to make especially large investments in the transaction. Because
they are more vulnerable to opportunistic manipulation by the second party, the investment
party will try to arrange coverage for such an event. Firm formation, in this case, can solve a
problem, which is well-documented in the literature as the “hold-up” problem.
Although the transaction-cost approach has not been formalized into theoretical models, it of-
fers an “empirical success story”, which has been demonstrated by many studies (see Masten,
2000, Boerner and Macher, 2002, Saussier, 2000). Transaction cost theory, however, has been
criticized for failing to consider the demand side. According to the theory, a firm is considered
simply “a nexus of contract” and the trade off between external and internal coordination costs
determines the optimal boundaries of the firm.
The second approach to defining a firm follows the property rights theory. According to the
theory, a firm is defined in terms of the ownership of property rights associated with it (see
Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990, Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Proponents
of this approach are aligned with transaction cost theory but further develop the definition by
taking into consideration both costs and benefits of integration. Thus, a firm is defined as a set
of assets under common ownership and its boundaries are determined by the optimal allocation
of residual rights of physical assets (Hart and Moore, 1990).
The third approach to defining a firm is a knowledge-based view of the firm in which firms
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are considered groups of capacity (see Penrose, 1959, Richardson, 1972). In the view, the
knowledge, learning, and capacity development aspects of a firm are major elements. A firm
is considered a collection of productive resources including tangible assets and human capital
(not just the resources themselves, but also the services they render). The administrative and
managerial authority over the use of such resources defines the efficient boundaries of a firm
(Penrose, 1959). Richardson (1972) further expanded the discussion by defining a firm as the
coordination of capacities among industrial systems. In Richardson’s setting, a firm is a network
and a firm’s boundaries are influenced by varying degrees of specific production activities which
are underpinned by firm-specific capacities.
The fourth approach to defining a firm follows the evolutionary theory. A firm, according
to the theory, is defined based on bounded rationality and routines. In other words, a firm
is an entity that processes, stores, and produces knowledge in a set of routines. According
to Nelson and Winter (1982), “a firm can be understood in terms of a hierarchy of practiced
organizational routines, which defines lower order bureaucratization skills and higher order
decision procedures for choosing what is to be done at the lower level”.
Evolutionary theory, therefore, not only provides a definition of a firm but also sheds light on
the explanation of firms’ heterogeneity (firms are heterogeneous when they have different sets
of routines that are either tacit or that incur high costs to transfer). The theory also stimulates the
investigation of firms’ dynamics through examining processes of searching and selection and
the transformation of routines into activities. The theory, however, does not provide clear insight
to deal with conflicts within firms, for example, capital - labor conflicts, corporate governance,
and the issue of entrepreneurship (Witt, 1998).
Finally, there are other less influential approaches to defining a firm, such as incentive-system
theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, Holmstrom, 1999) and adaptation theory1 (Klein,
2000a; Klein and Murphy, 1988, ).
From the preceding discussion, it is clear, the definition of a firm has evolved over time. Instead
of being considered merely a black box, a firm can be understood in a much wider perspective,
encompassing a more ecological view in which firms interact with other agents and have their
own internal functions.
Nevertheless, only partial answers concerning the nature of the firm, its boundaries, and its
1A further detailed discussion on these two approaches can be found in Gibbons (2005).
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internal organization are available. Why a firm chooses a certain type of organization or makes a
certain decision regarding mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or outsourcing is, largely unknown.
In this thesis, we define a firm as a collection of assets including both physical and human
capital. This definition is an extension of the firm definition in property rights theory: our
definition includes labor as a part of the firm operation process.
2.1.2 The Measure for Firm Size
Firms are heterogeneous, differing along in various dimensions including firm size. The choice
of measure used to determined firm size can have a significant impact on the analysis of firm
size distribution. In this section, we identify and discuss one plausible measure of firm size.
In the literature, many possible ways to measure firm size have been presented. The size of
a firm can be proxied by financial or stock market value , sales or revenue (Basu,1997), total
assets (...), value added production (Basu, ), total number of employees or even the economic
capital including debt plus equity.
From an economic point of view, in general, one would expect those measures to be proportional
to each other in the same business model. Kirchhoff and Norton (1995) used Standard & Poor’s
COMPUSTAT data to compare three measures of firm size (number of employees, assets and
total sales) and obtained similar results over a seven-year period, showing that if the distribution
holds for one of the variables, it also holds for the others.
There are, however, obvious differences in the ability of variables to capture the internal pro-
cesses of a firm. For instance, sales can be influenced by marketing or financial decisions and
are vulnerable to inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. The total asset variable does not cap-
ture all aspects of size dynamics because many firms have substantial intangible assets that are
difficult to measure and rarely appear on balance sheets. The total assets variable also does not
take into account a firm’s liabilities. The revenue measure, in contrast, can capture fluctuations
in price and quantities sold in the market.
Among firm size measures, the number of a firm’s employees is the most widely used indicator
of organizational complexity and the most suitable measure for distribution analysis (Penrose,
1959). The number of employees measure reflects internal processes involving all of a firm’s
adaptations to changes, such as organizational restructuring and seasonal operational activities.
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Measuring size by the number of employees is also preferable because it is not sensitive to infla-
tion and exchange rates and can be considered a direct indicator of domestic firm size. Further,
this measure can directly link to macro-economic issues such as job creation, employment and
unemployment.
However, we acknowledge certain drawbacks associated with using the number of employees
as a measure of firm size. The measure is not able to capture improvement in quality, such as the
increase of productivity, the degree of integration and other make-or-buy decisions. In addition,
according to our measure, the number of employees is limited to only domestic laborers. In
other words, in multi-national enterprises, workers working in branches abroad are not counted
according to our measure.
Despite these disadvantages, however, the number of employees is, however, still the most
accessible and appropriate measure for analyzing the distribution of firm size
2.2 Firm Size Distribution Literature
2.2.1 Specific Features of Firm Size Distribution
Empirical evidence from different databases has confirmed that the firm density distribution is
leptokurtic, stable, and highly skewed to the right. This old and intriguing observation is clearly
a robust pattern confirmed by many scholars (Coad, 2009, Cabral and Mata, 2003).
One of the most influential findings in the FSD literature is Gibrat’s law or the law of Propor-
tionate Effect2. According to the law, the probability of a given proportional change in size
during a specified period is the same for all firms in a given industry - regardless of their size
at the beginning of the period (Mansfield, 1962). Firm size, therefore, is dependent on random
shocks that are independent of each other and of the initial size of the firm.
Gibrat’s law predicts that firm growth is a purely random process, independent of firm size. In
other words, “the probability of a given proportionate change in size during a specified period is
the same for all firms in a given industry, regardless of their size at the beginning of the period”
(Mansfield, 1962). As a result, the market concentrates as large firms increase their power in
2The details of Gibrat’s law are presented in the Appendix.
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the market and as the FSD converges to a log-normal distribution over time.
Much research effort has focused on determining the validity of Gibrat’s law. Empirical studies
of Gibrat’s law are difficult to compare because there are significant differences in samples used
and methodologies applied3. In a survey on Gibrat’s law, Santarelli et al. (2006)4 summarized
the difficulty of drawing a clear conclusion about whether Gibrat’s law is valid or can be re-
jected. In general, recent evidence has shown that Gibrat’s law tends to hold when using data
with a large enough number of firms (see Geroski and Gugler, 2004, Hart and Oulton, 1996),
and the law tends to be rejected when all firms are included because of the more rapid growth
rate of small, young firms5.
Regarding the shape of the FSD, the literature has provided evidence supporting both the log-
normal and Pareto distributions.
First, many studies have indicated the shape of FSD can be approximated by the log-normal
distribution6. Quandt (1966) provided evidence of the superiority of the log-normal distribution
over all three versions of the Pareto distribution. More recently, Ishikawa (2007) showed that
the log-normal distribution can be deduced from the non-Gibrat’s law. Other studies, however,
have provided evidence of the deviation of FSD from the log-normal distribution, especially
in the right tail and in disaggregated datasets. For example, Cefis et al. (2008) showed that
the log-normal distribution fits FSD well, except for the upper tail, when using the dataset of
the Netherlands. In the same vein, Marsili (2005) reported that deviations from the log-normal
distribution in different sectors were witnessed even when the law held at the aggregate level.
One possible explanation, according to Dosi (2007), is that such a FSD shape may be the result
of statistical aggregation effects alone, rather than the result of any mechanism with deeper
economic meanings.
3The methodology used to test Gibrat’s law also varies over time from the simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
technique (Mansfield, 1962) to Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Geroski et al., 2003), Unit Root test (Oliveire and
Fortunato, 2006), General Method of Moments (Oliveire and Fortunato, 2004) or Heckman’s equation (Calvo,
2006).
4The survey included 60 empirical studies. According to the results, the law can be tested using either: (a) all
firms in a given industry, including those that have already exited during the studied period; (b) firms that survived
over the entire period; (c) firms that are large enough to overcome the minimum efficient scale of a given industry.
Moreover, these three populations can all be tested using either static analysis or dynamic analysis.
5Many studies have shown significant negative correlation between firm growth and size (Evan, 1987, Mans-
field, 1962) and between firm growth and age (Evan, 1987). Average cost increases for sizes below some minimum
levels but is quite stable for sizes above it (Mansfield, 1962).
6The log normal distribution is concave to the origin on the log-log scale . This implies the existence of more
middle-sized firms and fewer large firms in the FSD than would be predicted by the Pareto distribution.
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Another set of studies has focused on the empirical test of whether FSD is Pareto distributed7
Axtell (2001) found that the size distribution of US firms is well approximated by the Pareto
distribution. Axtell’s conclusion was supported by many other studies (see Fujiwara, 2004,
Hart and Prais, 1956). More recently, Cirillo and Husler (2009) found the size distribution
followed the Pareto law in 40% of the largest Italian firms, and Marsili (2005) found the Pareto
distribution in the upper tail of the FSD in the Netherlands.
Another feature of the FSD in many developed countries is Zipf’s Law8. Zipf’s law is evi-
denced in several economies including the United State (Axtell, 2001), France (Giovanni and
Levchenko, 2008), European countries (Fujiwara, 2004) and Japan (Okuyama, 1999). In gen-
eral, Zipf’s law tends to fit well with size distributions that exclude small firms from the dataset9.
2.2.2 Influential factors
Given particular features of the FSD, various factors may be attributed to differences in firm
size evolution and thus play a role in FSD formulation.
The literature includes several important factors that affect firm size and growth. For example,
Storey (1994) specified three groups of firm growth determinants: (a) entrepreneurial resource
factors (such as education, management experience, training, age, etc.); (b) firm-related factors
(such as product, sector, legal form, location, size, ownership, etc.); and (c) strategy-related fac-
tors (such as workforce training, technological sophistication, market adjustment, competition,
exporting, etc.). (see Storey, 1994, for a detailed discussion on firm growth determinants)
7In 1896, Pareto was the first to find this systematic distribution of personal incomes. Later, a series of studies
showed Pareto Law is consistent over time, across countries and across size distributions as diverse as individuals,
cities and firms. Compared to the log-normal distribution, the Pareto distribution puts more weight on the lower
tail (there are more small firms than predicted by the log-normal distribution) and the upper tail decays much less
rapidly (Coad, 2009). If FSD follows the Pareto law, its coefficient (the slope of the Pareto curve) can be considered
to represent the degree of concentration of larger firms and the structure depends on the interaction among firms
rather than external effects or individual firm behaviors (Krugman, 1996).
8Zipf’s Law appears when the Pareto distribution exponent equals unity. Zipf’s law implies that the frequency
of the variable is inversely proportional to its rank. That is, the nth most common event appears roughly 1=n times
as often as the most common one. Zipf’s law gives rise to a flatter tail distribution, implying a few large firms
account for a major share of overall economic activity. Further discussion on power law, Pareto distribution and
Zipf’s law can be found in the Appendix.
9Zipf’s law can be tested by obtaining the tail index and comparing it with the benchmark value of unity using
various econometric methodologies. These include OLS on the log-log scale (Axtell, 2001), the Rank   1=2
estimator (Gabaix and Ibragimov, 2011), and the Maximum Likelihood technique (Hill, 1975).
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Among these factors, firm-related factors, such as the decomposition of output or the sector
within which a firm operated were important in predicting the size of a firm. Many researchers
have also stressed the importance of a negative correlation between growth and size. (see
Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002, Liedholm and Mead, 1987). According to Liedholm and
Mead (1987), small, young firms are more likely to grow. In addition, estimation results in
McPherson (1996) indicated that age is the variable with the most predictive power for employ-
ment growth.
In this review, however, we focus on other factors that have recently added to the literature and
strongly influence modeling FSD in the economy.
2.2.2.1 technology
We focus on two proxies for the technology factor: productivity and economies of scale.
With regard to productivity, a natural assumption is that firms with the highest productivity
will grow while firms with the least productivity will decrease in size and eventually exit. The
relationship between firm size and productivity in the literature, however, encompasses many
facets. On the one hand, many researchers have found a positive correlation between increase
in productivity and the concentration of employment in large firms. For example, Bartelsman
and Doms (2000) studied the distribution and growth of productivity of developed countries.
Bartelsman and Doms reported that productivity levels were widely dispersed and highly per-
sistent across sizes and noted the large productivity gap between the largest and smallest firms.
Leung et al. (2008) investigated the US - Canada difference in the distribution of employment
over firm size and confirmed that a larger average size supports higher productivity at both the
plant and firm level. Diaz and Sanchez (2008) used a stochastic frontier model to investigate
small-sized and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in Spain and found that these firms
tended to be less efficient than their large-sized peers.
On the other hand, other studies have provided evidence that small firms are sources of dy-
namism and productivity growth in many OECD countries.
The second proxy for technology involves economies of scale and dis-economies of scale. The
effects of self-reinforcing mechanisms on industrial structures introduced by economies of scale
is an important cause of nonlinear interactions in economic systems (Arthur, 1988). When there
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are economies of scale, the firm can choose different optimal investment strategies (Wagener,
2003) which result in different industrial structure (Gustavasson, 2002). In fact, when FSD
is described by the number of firms economies of scale can be a crucial factor in addition to
other factors such as entry and exit that determines the FSD (see Baumol et al., 1983, 1988).
Crosato et al. (2009) investigated the data from a micro-survey in Italy, using nonparametric
estimates, and found that firms in the concave part of the Zipf plot of Italian firm distribution
overwhelmingly experienced increasing returns to scale, while firms in the linear part were
mainly characterized by constant returns to scale.
2.2.2.2 Mergers and Acquisition
External growth through integration and disintegration is another important channel of firm
development. In the literature, many studies have been dedicated to analyzing the contribution
of mergers and acquisitions (hereafter M&A) to FSD development. M&A activities, in these
studies, tend to shift the FSD toward larger sizes, leading to a departure from the log-normal
distribution.
Ijiri and Simon (1974) showed that M&As can contribute to a deviation of FSD from the Pareto
distribution because external growth is more constrained by firm size (and less random) com-
pared to internal growth. Ijiti and Simon provided empirical evidence that the growth rate of
firms resulting from M&A activities does not follow Gibrat’s law. Similarly, Singh (1975)
concluded that bigger firms usually acquire small firms while large-scale actors tend to merge
among themselves, creating a size-strong segment in the upper tail of FSD. In addition, Hannan
and Freeman (1977) found the effect of mergers was significant and suggested that without the
M&A effect, small firms would have grown much faster than large ones. More recently, using
data from manufacturing firms in the Netherlands, Cefis et al. (2008) documented such a shift
in FSD. They showed that the effects of M&A were not uniform; in fact, middle-sized firms
increased in number, outweighing the increase in the upper tail group, and therefore, the market
concentration of the economy decreased. In other words, as long as M&A are more effective
than internal growth in achieving size than internally growth and are sustainable, we can expect
higher growth rates of larger firms.
M&A, in sum, are the main contributors to the variance in firms’ growth because they are the
mechanisms behind most rapidly growing cases; thus, the effect of M&A challenges the validity
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of Gibrat’s law and the Pareto shape of the FSD.
2.2.2.3 Policy-related factors
Government intervention can have profound impacts on firms’ activities. For example, poli-
cies that distort trade patterns can result in a “premature” shift of resources to products that
require more capital-intensive production arrangements. Further, policies that discriminate
against small- and medium-sized firms in terms of credit allocation can have negative impacts
on the development of these firms. Guner et al. (2008) examined the costs associated with size-
dependent policies that distorted production scale. They found that the effects of this class of
policies are large as such a policy lead to sizable reductions in output per firm and a significant
increase in the number of establishments. On the other hand, such an intervention can result in
an increase or decrease in productivity depending on whether the firms are efficient. In the bad
case, firms who receive external supports may artificially increase their efficiency, relative to
other firms and thus, may replace efficient firms that do not receive any external supports. As a
result, such a policy can cause inefficient firms to supplant efficient firms in the market and this
may result in the increase in market concentration.
2.2.2.4 Stochastic factor
Another finding in the empirical literature related to firm size and firm growth is the high degree
of variance left unexplained by firm growth and size regression analyses. According to Coad
(2009), the levels of R-squared frommost regressions on firm growth are surprisingly low (often
approximately 5%). These findings indicate that randomness10 makes a significant contribution
to firm growth and size determination.”.
In the literature, there are many studies that provided evidence supporting of predictions made
by Gibrats law of proportional effect in which all firms, irrespective of size, grow by some
random draw from the distribution of growth rates.
Later, researchers extended the idea by stating that firm size follows a random walk. Geroski
(1999) noted: (a) there is significant contribution of randomness to firm size growth; (b) the
10Geroski (1999) defines randomness as “an event with an unknown form or a known fact whose date of
occurrence is undetermined
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effects of such a shock can be permanent to firms with growth patterns showing some noise
rather than following a deterministic trend; and (c) firm growth is idiosyncratic in that, the
growth rates of any two randomly chosen firms are uncorrelated. This latter fact is somewhat
interesting. We normally expect to see a proportional change in firm growth rates and any
variations of the economic environment.
Recently, with the development of economic theories, the principle of randomness seems to be
more evident and serves as a better explanation of FSD in modern economies where turbulent
competition and rapid technological development are dominant characteristics. As a result,
many stochastic studies have recently published in the FSD literature.
2.2.3 Different Theoretical Approaches to modeling FSD
As mentioned in the preceding section, FSD formulation can be attributed to various factors.
As a result, many theories have been developed to explain the shape of FSD. This section is an
overview of related theories. Table 1 provides a summary of all related theories.
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Table 1: Summary of Theoretical Model of the FSD of Developed Countries
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Size Distribution 
Internal Growth External Growth 
Behaviorism 
models 
(Penrose, 1959, 
Robinson, 1958, 
Lucas, 1978, 
Hansberg and 
Wright, 2007…) 
Stochastic 
models – 
Gibrat’s law 
 
Financial 
Constraint 
models 
(Cabral and 
Mata, 2003, 
Angelini and 
Generate, 
2008…) 
 
Learning and 
Selection 
models 
(Jovanovic, 
1982, Emerson 
and Pakes, 
1995, Klette 
and Kortum, 
2002, Luttmer, 
2007, Lutmmer, 
2010…) 
Other theory 
 
 
 
Impeded 
growth 
(Kelacki, 
1945, Steindl, 
1965, Sutton, 
1997…) 
Regular 
entry flow 
(Simon, 
1955, Ijiri et 
al., 1977…) 
Minimum 
size 
(Levy and 
Sorin, 1996, 
Axtell, 
2001…) 
Exponential 
age 
distribution 
(Coad, 2010) 
. Neo-classical 
theory 
 
. Evolutionary 
theory 
(Marshall, 
1920, Alchain, 
1959…) 
 
. Managerial 
theory 
(Marris, 1963) 
 
. Population 
ecology 
theory 
(Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977) 
 
. Stage-
growth theory  
(Mueller, 1972) 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
(M&A) 
(Ijiri and Simon, 
1974, Singh, 
1977, Hannan 
and Freeman, 
1977…) 
Quasi-
Integration 
(Blois, 1972, 
Adamantios, 
1987…) 
Other dis-
integration 
. Outsourcing 
(Holmstrom 
1979, 
Grossman and 
Helpman, 
2002,…) 
 
. Licensing & 
Franchising 
(Monye, 1996, 
Goswami, 
2011…) 
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2.2.3.1 Stochastic Models
The stochastic model approach was developed simultaneously with other theories relating to
FSD such as neo-classical and behaviorism theory. The major objectives of the stochastic
models are (a) to prove the existence and persistence of stochastic factors, and (b) to investigate
the concentration level of firms that gives rise to a certain FSD.
Gibrat was the first and probably the most influential scholar in this school of thought. Gibrat
(1931) documented the Law of Proportionate Effect, also known as the Gibrat’s law in which
stochastic factors are used to explain the log-normal distribution of the FSD, showing increasing
mean and variance among a fixed number of firms. Gibrat’s law has become the most influen-
tial hypothesis and is used extensively in later stochastic models of FSD. However, in Gibrat’s
model, there is no steady state because the probability of the existence of a firm size in a certain
interval approaches zero in any given size interval, a generation of stochastic models has been
developed, incorporating different assumptions to impose the steady state into Gibrat’s model11.
These models generate either the log-normal or Pareto distribution or similar types of distribu-
tion (e.g., Yule distribution, extended Katz distribution, Waring distribution). More recently,
Coad (2010) proposed an alternative approach to prove that FSD is stationary by integrating
the log-normal distribution of a Gibrat-type growth process over the exponential distribution of
firms’ age. Such an approach also results in the stationary Pareto FSD.
The stochastic approach, however, has been criticized in the literature because of its assumption
that firm growth follows a random walk and that exogenous shocks to the growth rate of a firm
and thus random elements determine the fate of the firm.
2.2.3.2 Learning and Selection Models
In contrast to stochastic models, researchers developed learning and selection models by using
economic shocks to explain productivity growth, capital accumulation, and the skew of FSD.
This approach emphasizes the learning capacity of firms and their ability to conduct innovations.
Selection, then, occurs when firms realize their actual productivity on entering the market. The
11Gerrit (2005) summarized these studies and found three additional assumptions in these models: (a) the
negative correlation of the average growth rate of a firm and its size (impeded growth) (Kalecki, 1945, Steindl,
1965, Suton, 1977); (b) the inclusion a constant stream of small firms entering into the market at the minimum firm
size (Simon, 1955, 1960). The relatively regular flow of newly created firms; (c) the existence of a minimum firm
size boundary below which firms cannot decline (Axtell, 2001).
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main characteristic of these models is that they simultaneously take into consideration firm
dynamics and levels of efficiency, through which the chances of firms’ survival are determined.
Jovanovic (1982) assumed that firms enter a market without knowing their true productivity.
Later, firms get to know their capacities through the production process and over time, the less
efficient firms realize their inefficiency, produce less, and eventually exit. Small young firms
tend to have less experience and respond more sensitively to market signals. Therefore, smaller,
younger firms have higher probabilities of failure and more variable growth rates. The effect
of selection on the evolution of the industry, however, eventually vanishes because technology
shocks do not have permanent impacts.
Klette and Kortum (2002), following the same trend, developed a general equilibrium model
of heterogeneous firms in which the stochastic process of innovation was the key element for
firm heterogeneity and simultaneous entry and exit. In Klette and Kortum’s model, the “Schum-
peterian force of creative destruction” shows how firms’ innovations occur at their competitors’
expense. This model predicts the exit of firms and shows FSD is driven by the expansion of
commodity varieties.
Under the same flow of destructive creation, Luttmer (2010) developed a model to capture the
thick-tailed FSD with high entry and exit rates and relatively young ages of large firms. In
Luttmer’s model, firm growth stems from the creation of new products of both incumbents
and new entrants. Relatively young large firms emerge from firms that have better blueprints
and implement these blueprints more quickly. Their growth rates, however, are predicted to
eventually slow to a low development phase at some random time. This results in the Pareto-
type tail of FSD.
2.2.3.3 Behaviorism Models
Studies on behaviorism models have emphasized the knowledge assets and processes of co-
ordination within a firm. For example, Penrose (1959), one of the leading protagonists of
the school, stated that firm growth is led by the internal learning-by-doing process of man-
agers and thus is constrained by the limitation of available managerial attention. In such
a setting, fast-growing firms accumulate much higher operating costs, compared to those of
lower-growing competitors. This situation is commonly known in the literature as the “Pen-
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rose effect”12.Robinson (1958), Garicano and Hansberg (2004), on the other hand, relied on the
rigidity of the managerial talent factor to explain FSD in the economy. They argued that the
shape of FSD depends more on the distribution of managerial talents. Hansberg and Wright
(2007) also related the industrial FSD to the intensity of industry-specific human capital. The
limitation of human capital resource leads to more diminishing returns to human capital, which
increases the scale dependence of firm size. As a result, industries such as the manufacturing
sector, with a small share of human capital, tend to have much thinner tails. This approach,
however, has been criticized for a lacks of empirical support for the existence of a link between
the knowledge structure and firm growth (Carrizosa and Agusti, 2006).
In addition, many related theories have provided a part of the explanation behind the emergence
of a certain firm size. These include other firm-growth theories, including classical economic
theory and theories on external growth of firms (integration versus outsourcing, franchising, and
licensing).
2.3 The Missing Middle and the Firm Size Distribution in
Developing Economies
As mentioned, the major part of the literature on FSD has been based on studies conducted in
developed economies. It is a well-known fact that profound differences in the business environ-
ment exit between developed and developing economies.
Given such differences, a sharp empirical contrast also exists between FSDs in developed and
developing economies. While the size distribution in developed countries can be approximated
by either the log-normal distribution or the Pareto law or a combination of the two, the develop-
ing economies’ FSD is characterized by the missing middle where middle-sized firms account
for the smallest proportion of the total number of firms.
Liedholm and Mead (1987) documented the missing middle first by presenting evidence to
support the claim that most employment in developing countries is located in either small or
12Another hypothesis proposed by Penrose is that a firm is considered to be the accumulation of resources
(i.e. brand names, internal knowledge of technology, trade contracts, machinery, etc.) and is bounded by the
administrative capacity. All administrative skills and other inimitable knowledge such as working routines define
the competencies as well as the size of a firm. The uniqueness of such competency results in the heterogeneity of
firms in the market.
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large-sized firms.
Later, Tybout (2000) reexamined the phenomenon. He found that in the context of the poor
performance of manufacturing industries, FSDs of developing countries tend to exhibit dualism
in which many micro firms coexist with a handful of modern large-scale firms and a missing
proportion of moderate-sized firms. Tybout argued that strong business regulation can be the
underlying reason behind the disproportionate presence of small entrepreneurs.
Similar evidence of the phenomenon was documented in Little et al. (1987) for South Korea
and Steel and Webster (1992) for Ghana in the 1980s. More recently, Alfaro et al. (2008)
reexamined the Melitz (2003) model using data from 79 economies. In the study, Alfaro et al.
generated the bimodal distribution and specified the level of distortion that formulated such a
distribution.
Recently, Hsieh and Olken (2014) studied data from India, Indonesia and Mexico and presented
the following results: (a) many small firms exists but not so many middle-sized or large-sized
firms, and in this sense, there is no missing middle, (b) large firms rather than small firms
seemingly incur the large fixed costs, and (c) there is no evidence of discontinuities in regulatory
obstacles across different firm sizes.
In response to the findings by Hsieh and Olken (2014), Tybout (2014a,b) suggested that a better
test of the missing middle is to ask whether the share of middle-sized firms, as opposed to small-
or large-sized firms, is smaller than the share that one would observe in an undistorted economy.
One sign would be a concentration of small firms.
In general, studies on FSDs of developing countries have provided evidence that firm size distri-
butions are more skewed to the right compared to the FSDs of developed economies. The high
level of concentration of micro firms in developing countries, in conjunction with the existence
of some large-sized firms indicates the presence of an underlying mechanism.
The missing middle phenomenon in developing countries, is emerging as exciting research fo-
cus for industrial organization scholars. The interest in missing middle research shows that
forces, other than those traditionally mentioned in the economic literature, might be at work.
Researchers have proposed various explanations, mainly examining the differences in the busi-
ness environment between developed and developing countries. In this section, we focus on
some potential factors that have been explored in the literature. The following section summa-
rizes some influential factors found among the scarce literature that could explain the dual FSDs
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in developing economies.
2.3.1 Financial constraint
Many surveys carried out in developing countries have shown that access to finance is consid-
ered the most serious problem for SMEs. A low level of financial development skews the FSD
by increasing the relative share of small firms. Cabral and Mata (2003) found that firms with
limited financial capacity are forced to choose sub-optimal sizes, the optimal size can only be
reached if financial constraints are removed. In other words, the evolution of the size distribu-
tion is determined by eliminating firms’ financial constraints.
However, upon closer inspection, access to credit is not usually a major constraint to micro
firms in developing countries because most SME credit facilitation programs are targeted at the
micro-finance level. Business people can also easily borrow small amounts from friends and
relatives. The medium-size firms, seeking to expand their operations, on the other hand, face
a severe lack of access to medium- and long-term credit because commercial banks, hampered
by limited resources, may choose to lend to large firms only, to reduce risk and save costs per
unit loaned.
As a result, many authors have suggested that the lack of financing is one of the most important
factor responsible for the missing middle (see Chowdhury et al., 2013, Gibbons, 2011, Schiffer
and Weder, 2001). Marchiavello (2010) developed an incomplete contract model to explaining
the missing middle. In his model, firms produce goods that can be used by customers or sold in
the spot market. Both firms and customers, then, must borrow from external investors. Under
circumstances of poor contract enforcement, firms may choose to integrate to maximize the
returns in vertically related projects. Here, financial constraints act as a barrier to the creation
and expansion of firms, resulting in an increase of vertical integrations and a surge in the number
of large firms, hence, the emergence of the “missing middle” in the economy. More recently,
Khan (2014) concluded that the major cause for the SME missing middle in Bangladesh was a
continuing lack of access to financing.
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2.3.2 Regulatory burdens
An emerging body of empirical evidence shows that various tax or regulatory policies can have
significant impacts on firm size. In developing countries, the burdens of business regulations
are dense and unpredictable (Brunetti et al., 1997). It is also not unusual for governments in de-
veloping countries to provide size-dependent policies, for example giving special incentives or
allowing special tax breaks to large-sized projects or firms. In addition, labor market regulations
often vary by firm size.
Given these facts, many authors have suggested that the missing middle emerges, in part, be-
cause taxes and regulations are enforced only among formal-sector firms. Dhammika et al.
(2010) provided a framework in which the government imposes differentiated tax levels on
firms when the government faces fixed administrative tax collection costs. As a result, the gov-
ernment finds it optimal to exempt small firms from taxation even though some firms refrain
from growing beyond the cut-off level to avoid paying taxes. Giovanni and Goyette (2009) de-
veloped a model in which tax distortion, particularly, uneven tax auditing, in association with
financial constraints, explain the distortion of the FSD. Cai andManish (2013) also extended the
Lucas (1978) mode to investigate the effects of size-dependent labor regulations in India. Cai
and Manish showed that, the missing middle in Indian manufacturing industries were resulted
from size-dependent regulations.
2.3.3 Corruption
Of concern is, another explanation for the missing middle, corruption. Many studies have shown
that burdens of bribery can reshape the patterns of firm’s growth in developing countries, result-
ing in a U-shaped distribution of firm size.
In the context of high-level corruption, large-scale firms may enjoy advantages by lobbying civil
servants. This is not only because large firms can effectively maintain contact with officials be-
cause of their long-term relationships but also because costs of dealing with regulation burdens
may be fixed while the pay-offs increase with the scale of operation. As a result, micro-firms
and small firms are reluctant to join the formal sector, fearing regulatory and corruption bur-
dens. In such an environment, middle-sized firms, which are big enough to be visible to officials
but too small to enjoy economies of scales, are the most vulnerable to these constraints.
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Rausch (1991) presented a a Lucas (1978)-type model that generated the missing middle in
FSD attributable to entrepreneurs’ decision to operate in, either the informal or the formal sec-
tor. In the informal sector, firms avoided regulations (e.g. minimum wage) and rent-seeking
activities. However, in order to avoid interacting with the government, they had to remain be-
low a certain size threshold. Thus, those firms that decided to formally register always operated
well above the threshold because it never payed to be just large enough to suffer regulations.
Emerson (2001) also illustrated such an explanation using the Cournot-type oligopoly model.
In Emerson’s model, the number of formal firms was endogenized as a function of rent-seeking
activities, which in turn depended on the level of corruption in the country. The higher the
degree of corruption, the fewer opportunities emerge for larger firms. Giovanni and Goyette
(2009) suggested the existence of the missing middle was based on higher governmental rent in
Uganda.
2.3.4 Some other factors
Other factors noted in the literature may indicate the missing middle in firm size distribution.
One plausible explanation is that limitation to infrastructure access can segment markets and
insulate local producers in developing countries, resulting in weak competition and smaller
average firm size. Eifert (2007) developed a framework in which a low provision of intermediate
inputs such as electricity motivated incumbent firms to bargain with the electricity supplier for
preferential treatment. Under weak conditions they colluded together to extract surplus from
consumers, resulting in even greater market concentration, lower total output and higher prices.
In another explanation for the missing middle, Dasgupta (2010) developed a model that could
generate a dualism by considering agents’ optimal choice between the traditional and modern
sector. Dasgupta concluded that the dual structure was therefore not stationary but dynamic, and
further that such a dual distribution would eventually converge to the uni-modal distribution as
the economy grew.
Marchiavello (2010) explored the relationship between the missing middle and both the finan-
cial constraint and vertical integration. Marchiavello developed a model in which vertical in-
tegration was more likely among intermediate levels. Contract enforcement can help to reduce
vertical integration once there is no barriers in financial market. In addition, the missing middle
tend to arise in industries that favored vertical integration.
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Bakhtiari (2013), in contrast, relied on the outsourcing decision of firms to explain the narrowing-
down pattern of the firms in the middle of the distribution. According to Bakhtiari, small firms
tend to choose outsourcing to avoid extra overhead costs and risks associated with large-scale
production. The model developed by Bakjtiari can also accommodate outsourcing decisions of
large-scale as long as their sizes are not too large. In contrast to Dasgupta’s model, Bakjtiari ’s
model predicted the long-term bimodal distribution of firms in the economy. This explanation,
however, is open to criticism because it fails to explain why the phenomenon happens only in
developing countries because same forces exist in developed economies.
2.4 Corruption and Firm Size Distribution
Corruption is one of the most pervasive obstacles to economic and social development. As
mentioned in the previous section, that has been considered as one possible explanation for
the missing middle in many developing countries. Since in the later chapters of the thesis, we
analyzed the effect of corruption on firm size distribution, this section is, therefore, devoted to
providing an overview on the corruption situation as well as its effect on firm size distribution.
Bureaucratic corruption is pervasive throughout the world. The relationship between corruption
and economic growth has been broadly studied in the literature. Many studies provided empiri-
cal evidence on the negative impact of corruption on economic growth and development Knack
and Keefer (see 1995), M‘eon and Sekkat (see 2005). Other studies also investigated the princi-
pal transmission mechanism through which corruption reduces investment and hence, hampers
economic growth Mo (see 2001a). However, most of these papers use indexes on the perception
of corruption. Few studies, however, investigate the issues using micro-firm data. McArthur
and Teal (2004), which examine the effect of corruption on the performance of African firms
with data from the Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/1. They find that firms paying bribes
experiences a 20% reduction in output per worker and that firms in countries with higher cor-
ruption are 70% less efficient. Svensson and Fisman (2007), on the other hand, showed that an
increase of 1% in the bribe rate can decrease firms’ growth by 3%.
The incidence of corruption, however, tend to vary considerably across countries, conditional
on other social and economic factors. Neeman et al. (2008) found the existence of negative
relationship between corruption and growth only for countries with a high degree of financial
openness. Aidt et al. (2008) also provided evidence that in countries with high quality of po-
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litical institutions, corruption tended to be more harmful to growth. Such a finding forms the
basis of what Wedeman (2002) termed the ”East Asian paradox”: many countries in East and
South-east Asia such as China, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, have grown remarkably
well in spite of high levels of corruption. The general idea is that corruption facilitates beneficial
trades that would otherwise not have taken place. In doing so, it promotes efficiency by allow-
ing individuals in the private sector to correct pre-existing government failures of various sorts.
Whether these countries are affected by corruption and whether corruption does have negative
impact on economic development? One possible answer may lie in the effect of corruption on
the firm size distribution.
The effect of corruption on firms can be classified into different categories. First, corruption
may change the effective marginal tax rate faced by firms. Svensson (2003) estimated that that
each USD 1.00 in firm profits per employee leads to about USD 0.004 in additional bribes paid,
for a marginal bribe rate of 0.4 percent on profits.Romer (1994) also viewed corruption to be
the tax that hinders the entry of new technology and new goods. Second, many studies showed
that argued that the uncertainty with corruption makes it more costly than an equivalently-sized
tax. In addition, Sequeira and Djankov (2010) suggested that about 46 percent of South African
firms located in regions in which overland costs to the port of Maputo are 57 percent lower go
the long way around to Durban to avoid higher bribe payments. This represents another type of
corruption distortion: changes in firms’ optimal choice of production to avoid corruption.
In the mid-1980s, the sociologist Hernando de Soto organized a very interesting social experi-
ment in Peru (de Soto, 1990). He was concerned about the enormous size of the informal sector
of the economy wanted to understand why. He conducted a simple experiment by completing
one task: obtain all the permits and approvals needed to start a small two-sewing machine gar-
ment factory in a Lima town legally and record the time and effort required in doing this. The
result of the experiment was striking. It took about 300 days of 6 hours per day or 32 times the
monthly minimum wage to complete the task. It is now easy to see why most firms prefer to
stay in the informal sector in such a corrupted market.
In a related literature on informality, Johnson et al. (2000) provided evidence that firms in Rus-
sia and Ukraine tend to hide their activities as compared to managers from Poland, Slovakia and
Romania because they face higher tax rates, worse bureaucratic corruption, a greater incidence
of mafia protection and have less faith in their court system. Ingram et al. (2007) showed that
formality is negatively correlated with the rate of taxation and corruption using data from the
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World Bank on firms from six African countries which include Uganda. Dabla-Norris et al.
(2008), using the World Business Environment Survey data, showed that informality is nega-
tively related to firm size and that, although heavier regulations may conduct to higher infor-
mality, this needs not be so in countries with strong rule of law.
In the literature, research that directly investigates on the impacts of corruption on different
firm size groups has been scarce13. Meanwhile, size has been proven to be a significant factor
in firm growth and performance. On the one hand, studies on large companies, or SMEs, and
their effect on growth produced contrasting findings. On the other hand, there have been few
comparative studies that provide information about all three types of companies at the firm
level. Furthermore, the heterogeneous effect of corruption on firm growth based on size remains
largely unexamined.
In this thesis, we focus on analyzing the impact of corruption as a barrier for the development of
firms. In particular, firms in the market may be forced to pay bribes to officials as civil servants
have some discretionary powers to enforce rules that can affect firms’ business. Cumbersome
officials can defer granting licenses or permits, slow down the operation process, restrict access
of credit or create bureaucratic delays until receiving bribes. Officials, in this sense, act as price
discriminators who try to extract the highest possible bribes subject to the constraint of being got
caught or the possibility of firm exit. The distortion caused by such activities can be considered
an extra tax on profits of enterprises. In fact, small firms face two contradicting forces: on
the one hand, firms want to grow to take advantage of economies of scale and better access to
finance, on the other hand, small firms can save costs as they become invisible to officials and
thus can escape from giving bribes. In the context of heavy regulatory and corruption burdens
in developing countries, small firms may prefer to remain small until there exists large enough
productivity shocks so that the first effect overwhelms the second one.
13Among studies on the impact of corruption on firm size, Beck et al. (2005) provided evidence that financial,
legal, and corruption constraints depended on firm size, and that smallest firms were most constrained in 54 coun-
tries in the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). Athanasouli et al. (2012) provided evidence that small
and medium firms display a higher engagement in corrupt practices. However, their performance is less correlated
with corruption than that of large firms
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2.5 Conclusion
Taken as a whole, the literature on the size distribution falls into one of two categories. One
strand of statistically based research focuses on the distributional properties of firm size. The
other strand consists of recent research integrating the size distribution of firms into standard
economic theory. However, the dearth of empirical research persists.
Despite researchers’ various attempts in the last century, theories of modeling FSD have not
yet reached a convergence on the factors that cause the missing middle. Such a diversification
in the literature confirms the complexity of the issue. This chapter provided a summary of the
controversial debate.
The most important findings of this chapter are summarized as follows:
 The definition of firm is multiple and complex;
 The FSD evolves from a complex process that is affected by both internal and external
factors and firm size may follow a random walk;
 The FSD of developed economies can be approximated by either the Pareto or log-normal
distributions or a combination of the two, and in many cases, can be approximated by a
straight line with downward slope in accordance with Zipf’s law;
 Many theoretical models have been developed to capture the mechanism behind the FSD
formation, but as yet no complete and satisfactory explanation exists for the emergence
of the FSD;
 A significant difference exist between FSDs of developed and developing countries. The
FSD in developing countries exhibits the missing middle, whereby a small number of gi-
ant firms co-exists with many small firms and the medium-sized firms are under-represented.
Such a dual structure has been attributed to distinct characteristics of the business envi-
ronment in developing countries such as regulatory framework, access to finance, and
corruption levels, among others;
 Many factors have been identified to explain the missing middle. However, no unified
agreement as been reached on the factors that can satisfactorily explain empirical findings.
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Given the preceding summary and discussion, the thesis focused on examining the “missing
middle” phenomenon in a developing country - Vietnam.
Vietnam was a relevant case to study because Vietnam is a transitional developing country.
Over the last two decades, with the emergence of the “Doi moi” (Renovation) process, Vietnam
has experienced a period of continuously high economic growth. However, to date, Vietnam
has failed to become a tiger in Asia as expected. One of the possible explanations for this
failure is the under-representation of medium-sized firms, a segment commonly contains the
most dynamic and growth-oriented firms. Serious consideration, therefore, should be given to
clarify the mechanism behind such a bias in FSD because this under-representation of middle-
sized firms underpins the mis-allocation of resources and hinders firm growth.
As in the case for other developing countries, studies on the FSD in Vietnam are scarce. Re-
lated studies, if any, have been limited to empirical studies only. None gives a comprehensive
picture of the FSD or tests for the validity of Zipf’s law in the Vietnamese situation. Therefore,
this research was a timely and essential opportunity to investigate the FSD in Vietnam, both
empirically and theoretically.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MISSING MIDDLE - A PHENOMENON OF FIXED
COST
3.1 Introduction
As noted in the previous chapter, firm density is leptokurtic, stable, and highly skewed to the
right. Moreover, the FSDs of developed countries are commonly characterized by either the
log-normal or Pareto distribution and tend to follow Zipf’s Law. Firms in developing countries,
however, operate in different business environments characterized by dense burdens of business
regulations, corruption and financial restrictions. This environment in developing countries
leads to the deviation of FSDs from the log-normal, Pareto distribution or Zipf’s law. Inter-
estingly, in many developing countries most employment is located in either small-sized or
large-sized firms, resulting in the well-studied empirical fact that the distribution of firm size in
developing countries tends to exhibit a missing middle.
The missing middle phenomenon was first documented in Liedholm and Mead (1987). In ad-
dition, Tybout (2000) found a large spike in the size distribution for the small-sized category,
which dropped off quickly in the middle-sized category among the poorest countries. Tybout
argued that strong business regulations could be a reason for the existence of too many small
firms1.
1See also Little et al. (1987) for South Korea and Steel and Webster (1992) for Ghana. The presence of the
missing middle phenomenon and how we define it have been intensively discussed in the literature (see Hsieh and
Olken, 2014, Tybout, 2014a,b).
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Given the missing middle is more evident in developing nations (see Tybout, 2000), one would
expect to find some explanation that particularly applies to developing nations, but not so much
to developed nations. In this study, our objective was to identify possible reasons for the missing
middle phenomenon, which is more evident in developing countries than in developed countries.
The difference in our approach from the approach documented in previous literature2 is that
rather than looking at taxes or regulations themselves, we studied corruption as a manifestation
of the business environment in developing nations.
No matter how we define government corruption, it is higher in developing nations, compared
to developed nations. According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception In-
dex report, most developing countries are at the bottom of the corruption list (e.g., Indonesia,
Tanzania), in contrast, developed economies such as New Zealand, and Denmark are in the top
20.3
In this chapter, our main goal is to develop and present a theoretical model that could capture
the impact of corruption on FSD formulation in developing countries.
As stated in (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006), “Corruption is generally defined as the abuse of public
power for private gain (Alvaro, 2006)...[or] an arrangement that involves an exchange between
two parties, the “demander” and the “supplier”, which has an influence on the allocation of
resources and involves the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends” .
Two major approaches to modeling corruption have been discussed in the literature. The first
is the agent-principle model type in which information asymmetry and the problem of enforce-
ment cause the principal (the government) to hold the agent fully accountable for its actions (See
Brandt and Svendsen, 2013, Groenendijk, 1997). The second approach is the “resource alloca-
tion” model type in which corruption is considered a production cost (See Ernesto and Rossi,
2007, Tullock, 1993). The first model type is normally used to explain the grand corruption
type or legislative corruption (corruption that occurs at the highest levels of government re-
quiring significant subversion of the political, legal and economic systems). The second model
type seems to best explain petty corruption (corruption that occurs at a smaller scale within
2A more detailed discussion on different factors that have impacts on FSD formulation can be found in the
literature chapter
3Evidence exists that corruption levels are significantly higher for developing and transitional countries (e.g.,
Nowak, 2001). Some studies (see He, 2000, CIEM, 2006)4 suggest that the high level of corruption in these
countries is perhaps due to “(i) abuse of power by public officials, (ii) arbitrary decisions related to policies and
administration, (iii) weak accountability of officials and government agencies, and (iv) weak state implementation
and monitoring.”.
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established social frameworks and governing norms).
Between the two types of corruption, the second one is particularly common in developing
countries and in situations in which public servants are significantly underpaid. As Jain (2005)
stated, “corruption can be analogous to a tax, ...[and] such change in costs will cause a shift
of the market equilibrium”. To function in the market, Firms may be forced to pay bribes to
officials because civil servants have some discretionary powers to enforce rules that can affect
firms’ operation. Officials, in this sense, act as price discriminators who try to extract the highest
possible bribes subject to the constraint of being caught or the possibility of firm exit. Small
firms, facing such coercion, may refrain from getting bigger to escape the rent-seeking activities
of civil servants.
In this chapter, we follow the “resource allocation” model type to assess the impacts of petty
corruption on the firm development process and on the FSD formulation of the Vietnamese
economy. The model captures the increasing costs of middle-sized firms, compared to the costs
of small-sized and large-sized firms. This increasing cost for middle-sized firms leads to the
concentration of a continuum of infinitesimal firms in the market as well as a considerable
number of large-scale firms. In particular, we extend the model presented in Luttmer (2007).
Luttmer noted that the model is more applicable to a developed economy such as the one in
the United State. With our model, in contrast, we seek to develop a framework that could be
applied to a developing economy. Economic growth in the model is generated from firm-specific
preference, technology shocks, and the selective survival mechanism of successful firms. Our
model integrates the firm dynamics model based on Gibrat’s law and the theory of corruption
to generate a general equilibrium and balanced growth that is consistent with salient features of
the particular FSD of Vietnamese economy.
In this combined framework, productivity drives firm growth. Market penetration costs intro-
duce important non-homogeneities into the process. The fixed cost, which is assumed to be
fixed in Luttmer’s model, is assumed to be a function of size in our model. This assumption
captures the empirical fact that corruption and other regulatory burdens tend to increase for
medium-sized firms in developing countries. A further discussion of fixed cost is included to
emphasize the difference between the two models.
In addition, in the model, the analyzed economy is a monopolistic competition market. Time is
assumed to be continuous.
38
3.1. INTRODUCTION
On the consumption side, following Dixit-Stiglitz, we assume that there is a continuum of
infinitely-lived consumers and each of them supplies inelastically one unit of labor at every
point of time. Consumers have a “taste for variety” in the sense that they prefer to consume
a diversified bundle of goods. In the economy, we consider a representative consumer with
preferences over rates of dynastic consumption. The consumer maximizes the utility derived
from the composited good made up by a continuum of differentiated goods. Her preference
over these commodities are additively separable. The consumer will consume the same amount
of commodities of the same type and with same prices. The consumer faces a standard present
value budget constraint in which income consists of claims from firms and labor wages.
On the production side, firms are monopolistic competitors. There are many producers, and
each has a certain market power but to a certain extent, the free entry condition limits firms’
profit opportunities. Firms produce differentiated goods using linear, constant return-to-scale
technologies. Firms have heterogeneous productivities that evolve stochastically over time.
Potential entrepreneurs must pay certain costs to enter the market whereas incumbents must
pay a fixed cost per unit of time to continue. All costs are measured by labor.
Active firms in the market are subject to firm-specific, permanent shocks to both productivity
and demand for their differentiated commodities. In particular, the states of consumers’ tastes
and firms’ productivities are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion which has a mean
and variance growth rate independent of size. Later, these processes translate into the selection
mechanism of firm distribution of productivity over time, which is crucial for the development
of the stationary FSD in the economy.
Technologies available to entrants are assumed to develop at an exogenous rate, which later
determines the economic growth rate. A stationary FSD arises as productivity and demand
shocks improve the productivity of existing firms at an average rate that is not too high compared
to the rates encountered by potential entrants. One possibility is that the logarithm of firm size
follows the Pareto distribution.
The general equilibrium in the economy, then, is characterized by the following sequences: (a)
consumers maximize their inter-temporal utility by choosing a series of dynastic consumptions
of a composite good, subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint (b) firms maximize their
profits taking the price index as given; (c) a closed-form stationary distribution of firm size
results; and; (d) labor and goods markets clear.
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Related to the costs of firms, a proportional increase in both entry and fixed cost lowers the
output level, thus reducing the number of firms and the variety of goods. These events lower the
average size and profitability of firms and also slow down the selection mechanism by which
productivity improves overtime. These changes, however, do not affect the shape of the size
distribution. On the other hand, a fluctuation in fixed cost alone can change the shape of the
FSD given that such a variation is not uniform across different size groups. As fixed cost
increases, the value of the firm decreases and the exit barrier increases. This situation also leads
to a decrease in the size density for the middle-sized group. In other words, the increase in fixed
cost implies a smaller number of firms in the middle-sized group, which is empirically the case
in many developing countries.
The importance of the findings rests on the asymmetry of the growth opportunities for small
firms and large firms in a developing market. This study is one of the few to to provide evidence
for the inverse relationship between growth and the initial firm size (i.e. violations of Gibrats
law). Evidence for this violation is cited as justification for differential treatment for small busi-
nesses, an issue that raises attention in both academic and policy circles. Further, the detailed
calculation of the model, which is not available in Luttmer’s paper is provided in the Appendix.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The second section is devoted to the set up of the
model, including the description of consumers and firms in the economy and the decision of
firm entry and exit. In the second section, we report on the firm size distribution. The third
section focuses on the competitive equilibrium and balanced growth path. The fourth section
provides further discussion on fixed cost. Conclusions are presented in the last section.
3.2 Model set up
3.2.1 Preferences
Let us assume that the economy is populated by a mass L of identical individuals who work,
consume and own firms5. The economy can be represented with a single representative con-
sumer who is an aggregate of many consumers with distinct individual preferences for each va-
5Although labor force only comprises of a part in total population, in developing countries, where the popu-
lation tend to be young, labor force contribute a major proportion of the total population. Moreover, in long-term,
there is a strong correlation between the changes in population and total labor supply.
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riety of goods and maximizes the utility derived from the dynastic consumption stream fCtgt0
of the continuum of differentiated goods. The utility is given by6:
(E[
Z 1
0
 exp( t)[Ct exp( t)]1 dt])
1
1  ; (1)
where the discount rate  is assumed to be positive and the population growth rate  is assumed
to be non-negative. The population size at time t is Nt = H exp(t) where H is the initial
population. The population is equal to the total supply of labor in the market.
Let ct(u; p) denote the consumption of a product type u at price p. At some  2 f0; 1g,
consumption for the composite goods is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator
of the set of differentiated goods which are available at
Ct =
Z
u1 ct (u; p)dMt(u; p); (2)
where Mt is the measure of commodities that are available at time t, defined on the set of
commodity types u and price p and dMt is the density of particular goods of type u at price
p. The level of ct(u; p) is chosen to minimize the cost to acquire Ct, which implies, at the
equilibrium:
pct(u; p) = Pt(uCt)
1 ct (u; p): (3)
Then, the price index is:
Pt = [
Z
up
 
1  dMt(u; p)]
 (1 )
 : (4)
and the demand for the good type u is:
ct(u; p) = [
Pt
p
]
1
1  :[uCt]: (5)
Along the balanced growth path, per capita consumption and real wages grow at a common rate
of . In particular, Ct exp( t) = C exp(t) and wt = w exp(t), respectively. The interest
rate is also assumed to be constant at r = + .
6This type of utility function allows us to model many different consumers’ preferences. In particular such
a function can be used to model various characteristics such as preference towards variety, substitutability versus
complementarity, and multiplicity of price equilibria, just by adjusting  and Ct. Preferences over commodities
are additively separable with weights that define the type of commodities
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The following assumption is adequate to ensure that the present value of aggregate consumption,
labor and utility are finite.
Assumption 1. The growth rate  and  satisfy   0 and +  > + : where +  = r
and r is the interest rate in unit of the composited good7.
3.2.2 Production
A firm is distinguished by its unique access to technology to produce particular differentiated
goods. Assume that at time t, each firm of age (a) has a productivity level of zt;a. The firm
that was set up at time t uses Lt;a units of labor to produce zt;aLt;a units of the commodity of
quality ut;a. Given the price pt;a, the revenue of the firm is Rt;a = pt;azt;aLt;a=Pt. Substituting
into equation (3), the revenue can be re-written as:
Rt;a = C
1 
t+a (Zt;aLt;a)
; (7)
where Zt;a = (u
1 
t;a z

t;a)
1= .
We can see that Zt;a combines the state of preferences and technology and represents the pro-
ductivity level of the firm. In this model, we simply refer Zt;a to productivity. Zt;a is assumed
to evolve independently across firms according to:
Zt;a = Z exp(Et+ Ia+ ZWt:a); (8)
where E and I denote the productivity growth rate of new entrants and the productivity growth
of incumbents, respectively, Z is the initial condition and [Wt;a]a0 is a standard Brownian
motion8. The Brownian Motion assumption arises because the continuous time limit of the
7The optimal consumption growth satisfies the Euler condition:
r = + (DCtCt   )
= + [(+ )  ]
= + ;
(6)
where r is the constant interest rate in unit of the composited good.
8Brownian motion was first observed by a English botanist, Robert Brown who realized the haphazard zigzag
movement of microscopic pollen grains suspending in a drop of water. A satisfactory explanation for such phe-
nomenon was given by Einstein in 1905 but it was not until 1923 that Nobert Wiener provided a clear picture of
the Brownian Motion stochastic process by setting the modern mathematical foundation for such a process. Today,
Brownian Motion and its generations and extensions occur in various areas of pure and applied science including
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firm growth rate is assumed to be a discrete random walk. The formula implies the geometric
Brownian motion form of productivity9:
dZt;a
Zt;a
= Edt+ Ida+ ZdWt;a: (9)
The assumption of geometric Brownian motion implies that the expected growth rate of firms’
productivity is similar for all incumbent firms and is size independent. This, together with the
assumptions on production technology and Dixit-Stiglitz demand specification, causes the iden-
tical expected growth rates of sales per consumer across all incumbent firms. The specification
also guarantees the high persistence of firm-level shocks and implies the validity of Gibrat’s
law, in which the productivity growth rate is independent of the current firm size. Moreover,
as we will show later in this chapter, the geometric Brownian motion also leads to the Pareto
distribution of firm size along the balanced growth path.
In the market, firms first choose variable labor to maximize profit t;a = Rt;a wt+aLt;a, where
firm revenue is given by Eq. (7). Taking the first derivative and rearranging, the optimal choice
for this profit maximization problem is:"
Rt;a
wt+aLt;a
#
=
"
1

#
(
Zt;a
wt+a
)=(1 )Ct+a: (10)
This, together with Eq. (7) and (8) implies that along the balance growth path, the revenue and
labor of a firm are independent of calendar time.
In addition, we also assume that in each time period, an incumbent with size s must pay fixed
cost F (s) units of labor to maintain operation. In this chapter, we assume that the fixed cost
not only covers the lump-sum taxes/fees as well as any direct and indirect expenditures to im-
plement the regulations that each firm must pay to the government but also includes the amount
of bribes paid to officials10. In other words, fixed cost refers to the level of corruption and reg-
ulatory burdens faced by each firm in the market.In contrast to Luttmer (2007)’s setting, fixed
cost in our model is a function of size11.
economics, communication, biology, physics, etc. (Taylor and Karlin, 1998)
9Such process can evolve in case that both ut;a and zt;a are geometric Brownian motions.
10The fixed cost can represent the cost to preserve acquired information (see Luttmer, 2007) or the cost of a
managerial fixed factor (see ?).
11A detailed description and analysis on fixed cost is provided in Section 3.5.
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Then, along the balanced growth path, the revenue net fixed and variable cost can be written
as12:
Rt;a   wt+a(Lt;a + F (sa)) = wt+a(exp(sa)  F (sa)); (11)
where:
sa = S[Z] +

1   [ln(
Zt;a
Zt;0
)  Ea]; (12)
exp(S[Z]) = (1  )  C
w


Z
w
=(1 )
: (13)
We see that, S[Z] relates the de-trended productivity of a firm to its size and thus exp(S[Z])
represents the size of firm with productivity of Z(exp(Et)) at time t and Z is the de-trended
initial productivity of the firm.
Moreover, because both revenue and variable cost are proportional to wt+a: exp(sa), we can
consider sa a measure of firm size, relative to wage rate, and sa evolves with age according to
dsa = da+ dWt;a; (14)
where "


#
=

1  
"
I   E
Z
#
: (15)
 and  in Eq. (15) represents the trend and variance of firm size. As long as incumbents
have higher productivity growth rate than do new firms, firm size will have a positive growth
trend. The variance of firm size moves in the same direction with the change in the variance of
productivity (Z). Moreover, the trend and variance of productivity shocks tend to be magnified
when goods are close substitutes.
In the market, the aggregate supply of labor grows at the rate of  and incumbents must pay a
fixed cost F (s) to operate in the market. The number of firms in the market also grows at the
rate of  at the balanced growth path, and entry and exit generate a time-invariant distribution
of labor input and productivity.
In addition, considering Eq. (7), because the per capita consumption growth rate is , an aggre-
12The detailed calculation can be found in the Appendix.
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gate consumption growth rate is +. Moreover, because the number of firms grows at the rate
of , the growth rate of per capita consumption must equal the growth rate of average revenues
per firm. Taking the logarithm of Eq. (7) in both sides and rearranging terms yields:
 = E + (
1  

):13 (16)
3.2.3 Entry and Exit Decision
Exit Decision
Introducing idiosyncratic shocks in the model implies that firms have non-constant operational
profits and as a result, there is an endogenous exit margin. On the one hand, incumbent firms
must decide at each period whether to remain in the industry. The exit decision is now equivalent
to asking if the firm’s optimal value is non-positive. On the other hand, if there are shocks and
endogenous exits, firms are more eager to enter because they are not stuck with a particular
productivity level.
Readers should note that the existence of fixed cost guarantees the minimum size of firms be-
cause firms with not enough productivity are not able to cover the fixed cost and will eventually
exit the market. An additional assumption is needed:
Assumption 2. The fixed cost satisfies1 > F (s)  F > 0.
Assumption 2 ensures a minimum firm size below which the firm will exit because it cannot
cover the fixed cost to operate in the market. The assumption also ensures that the fixed cost
does not grow without bound.
Because the incumbent with size s must pay fixed cost F (s) units of labor every time period
to remain in the market, the value of a firm at time t with initial productivity Z exp(Et) is:
Vt[Z] = max
L;
Et[
Z 
0
exp( ra)(Rt;a   wt+a[Lt;a + F (sa)])da]; (17)
where revenue and productivity are defined in Eq. (7) and (8), respectively;  is the stopping
13An exercise to measure the magnitudes of impact of the increase in variety, technology progress and selection
to firm growth can be done using equation 16. The detail of the exercise can be found in the Appendix.
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time and the process is martingale (i.e. production and exit decision of a firm depends on
available information).
In addition, because wa = exp(a), when t = 0, substituting from Eq. (11) we have:
exp( ra)(R0;a   wa[L0;a + F (sa)]) = exp( (r   )a) exp( a)(exp(sa)  F (sa)
= exp( (r   )a)(exp(sa)  F (sa)):
Then, the value of a firm of size s can be written as:
V (s) = max

E[
Z 
0
exp[ (r   )a](exp(s)  F (sa))dajs0 = s]; (18)
where V (s) is the value of a firm size s.
To ensure that the firm value is finite, we need the following assumption:
Assumption 3. The preference and technology parameters satisfy +  > + + 1
2
2:
Assumption 3 implies that the interest rate is greater than + + 1
2
2. This, together with the
assumption of finite fixed cost, ensures that the revenue of firm is finite. Thus, Assumptions 2
and 3 are adequate to guarantee that the value of the operating firm is finite.
The firm solves the problem of choosing the optimal stopping time such that a reward function
is: f(t; x) = exp( t) (x) where  = r    and (x) = exp(s)  F (sa).
The solution of such a problem must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
(r   )V (s) =
(
(exp(s)  F (s)) + V 0(s)+ 12V 00(s)2 if s  b
0 otherwise
. (19)
with the following boundary conditions:
 Value matching condition: V (b) = 0. The firm value equals zero at the exit barrier b (i.e.
the firm exits at b);
 Smooth pasting condition: V 0(b) = 0. The value function is differentiable at b;
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 Firms’ Value Condition: V (s) < exp(s)
r [++2=2] . The value function cannot exceed the
value of the firm operating without fixed cost or V (s) must lie below exp(s)=[r   ( +
+ 2=2)].
The first equation of (19) is a linear, second order non-homogeneous differential equation of the
type:
ay00(s) + by0(s) + cy(s) = g(s): (20)
Solving the equation, we get the result shown in the following Proposition
Proposition 3.1. Given Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, a firm’s exit decision is dependent on
firm’s value and the exit threshold, which are respectively,
V (s) = 1r (

1+ )(exp(s  b)  1  1 exp( (s b)) ) for s  b:
exp(b) = ( 1+ )(1  +
2=2
r  ):
(21)
Proof. The detailed calculation of these equations can be found in the Appendix.
0 Because  > 0 and b is well defined (Assumptions 1 and 3), the value of a firm increases in the
interval (b;1), which depends on the  and . In other words, the value of the firm increases
as the difference between productivity growth rates of incumbents and new firms increases and
decreases as the variance of productivity shocks increases. Because new entrants have very high
productivity growth rate, compared to incumbents, the value of the incumbent firm will be very
close to the exit barrier b.
Entry Decision
In accordance with Luttmer (2007), we assume that firms enter the market as a result of a
drawn from the initial productivity level Z, which follows the exogenous J distribution. A
firm entering at time t will have initial productivity of Z exp(Et) and the initial size of S[Z].
Potential entrepreneurs who want to enter the market must pay an entry cost of E which is
linear at the entry rate. The zero profit condition implies
E =
Z
V (S[Z])dJ(Z): (22)
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Because S[Z] is proportional to E , at the equilibrium, if the entry cost E is very high, the
initial size and productivity of firms in the market must also be high.
The only condition needed to ensure the value of entry is finite is the following assumption:
Assumption 4. The initial productivity distribution satisfies
R
Z

1  dJ(Z) <1.
3.3 The Stationary Distribution
Considering a market containing numerous firms, the assumption of stochastic growth rate of
productivity guarantees that the probability distributions for individual firm size is the same as
the cross-section size distribution in the economy.
Along the balanced growth path, firms enter and exit at a constant rate, giving rise to a time-
invariant distribution of firm size so that the aggregate measure of firms (M ) expands at the rate
. Given that  is non-negative, the following assumption ensures that the mean of firm size
distribution is finite.
Assumption 5. The productivity parameters satisfy  > + 1
2
2:
Given that  + 1
2
2 is the drift of size variable, then, Assumption 5 implies that the size of
an incumbent does not grow faster than the population growth rate. If  equals zero,  must
be negative. Thus, with a positive population growth rate, the mean of productivity growth is
always positive.
Consider the measure of a firm, defined on a set of all possible age a and size s. This mea-
sure grows at the rate of . Let the density of the measure at time t be m(a; s)I exp(t) where
I exp(t) is the number of new firms attempting to enter per unit of time. Then, at each point
of time, there is a measure of new firms entering the market with the initial size of x. Upon
entering, each firm faces productivity shocks that cause firm size to evolve according to the
stochastic Brownian Motion process in Eq.(14). In other words, for each age level, a corre-
sponding density exists that describes how firms reach a certain level of productivity and thus a
certain size.
Given an initial distribution, the density, then, must satisfy the partial differential equation - the
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Kolmogorov Forward equation that is given by:
Dam(a; s) =  m(a; s)  Dam(a; s) + 1
2
2Dssm(a; s) 8a > 0 and s > b; (23)
subject to the following boundary conditions:
 First boundary condition:
lim
a#0
Z s
b
m(a; x)dx = G(s) G(b); (24)
where G denotes the size distribution among entrants when age goes to zero. The lower
bound of the size distribution is achieved when age goes to zero and the distribution re-
sembles the size distribution of new entrants. Such a distribution follows the productivity
distribution J among new entrants via J(Z) = G(S[Z]).
 Second boundary condition: 8a > 0,
m(a; b) = 0: (25)
A firm must exit when its size reduces to the threshold b and none should enter at a size
below b.
Because firms must pay at least a fixed cost F (s) to exist, the measure of firms has to be finite
in the equilibrium. The solution to Eq.(23), subject to the two boundary conditions, is given by:
m(a; s) =
Z 1
b
exp( a) (a; sjx)dG(x); (26)
where
 (a; sjx) = 1

p
a
[(
s  x  a

p
a
)  exp[ (x  b)=(2)](s+ x  2b  a

p
a
)]: (27)
Detailed calculation can be found in the Appendix.
Note thatm(a; s) reduces to exp( a) (a; sjx) as G is replaced by a distribution concentrated
at x and exp( a) (a; sjx) is the density of firm size and age among firms with initial size x.
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In general, m(a; s) represents the stationary density of the set of incumbents operating in the
equilibrium over different levels of ages and sizes. At the equilibrium, a firm is characterized by
a certain size and age. The firm enters the market with the initial productivity level Z at size x
and evolves following the realization of Eq.(14). The firm exits as its size falls below b and will
be replaced by a cohort of new firms entering at x. The density of each age level is described by
m(a; s). The marginal density ofm(a; s) with respect to s captures the size density of all firms,
independent of the age level.
Integrating m(a; s) over a gives us the density (sjx). Moreover, to compute the probability
density of firm size, we need to integrate (sjx) over s to find the corresponding normalizing
constants.
The resulted density is provided in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.2. 8x > b and a > 0, the firm size density given the initial size x, is the weighted
average of the density (sjx) and can be determined by integratingm(a; sjx) over all age a. In
particular:
(sjx) = [min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1exp[(s b)] ] [+  (exp((x  b))  1)] 1
= (exp[(x b) 1]
exp[(s b)]
 )
 1min[exp[[+](s b)] 1+ ;
exp[(+)(x b)] 1
+
]:
(28)
where  =  2 +
q
( 2 )
2 + 2=2 and  =

2 +
q
( 2 )
2 + 2=2 .
Proof. Detailed calculation can be found in the Appendix.
For any  > 0 and   0, the above firm size density, given initial size x, is a well-defined
density.
Moreover, because we have:
(sjx) / exp[ (s  b)][min(exp[(+ )(s  b)]; exp[( + )(x  b)])  1]; (29)
the size distribution follows a Pareto density with the tail probability of the form exp [ (s  b)].
In other words, given that s  x, the density is just approximated by a Pareto density with tail
probabilities of the form exp[ (s   x)] and  becomes the tail index of the conditional size
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distribution (sjx). Moreover, as long as new entrants enter with the same level of productivity,
the initial size distribution G will be just a point mass at x and (sjx) represents the firm size
density.
In addition, in an extreme case, if population growth goes to zero, the limiting distribution can
be obtained by letting x go to b. Then, the profitability process of firms becomes a Brownian
motion with a negative drift and a reflecting barrier at b and the resulting distribution of firm
size is a Pareto distribution with mean exp(b): 
 1 , given exp(s)  exp(b).
3.4 Equilibrium and the Balanced Growth Path
3.4.1 The Balanced Growth Path
Definition 1. On the Balanced Growth Path, per capita consumption (C), per firm revenue (V )
and real wages (w), grow at a constant rate of +. Firms enter and exit at constant aggregate
rates in such a way that the aggregate measure of firms expands at a constant rate of . The
distribution of size shifts to the right with constant steps and its shape is time invariant. The
interest rate (r), firm profit (), and labor distribution (m(s)) and other characteristics of the
firm’s cross-sectional distribution are constant.
Proposition 3.3. Under Assumptions 1 through 5, a balanced growth path exists for the econ-
omy.
Proof. From the setting of the model, we have the following:
 Pt = P ;
 Nt = H exp(t);
 rt = + ;
 Ct = wt = w exp(t), where  = E + 1  ;
 Zt;0 = Z exp(Et);
 Rt;a = C1 t+a (Zt;aLt;a) also grows at rate of .
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Given the value of r and , we can find the value of the firm through Eq. (21). This, together
with the zero profit condition determines S(Z)14. Thus, the stationary FSD of the economy is
described as in the previous section.
The next step is to determine I; C and w.
Assume that the amount of labor assigned to set up a new firm, the amount of labor assigned
to cover the fixed cost of an incumbent and the amount of labor assigned to production are,
respectively, LE exp t; LF exp t; L exp t.
Depending on the profit maximization condition as specified in Eq. (11) - (13), after simplify-
ing, we have: 264 LELF
L
375 =
264 EF (s) R1b m(s)ds
I
1 
R1
b
[ exp(s)  F (s)(   1)]m(s)ds
375 I; 15 (30)
The detailed calculation can be found in the Appendix.
Noting that from the labor market clearing condition, we have:
H = LE + LF + L:
Then, we can determine I, which is the rate that firms attempt to enter the market.
Second, from the firm profit maximization condition, specified in (11) - (13), we have
Rt;a
wt+a
= Lt;a + exp(sa): (31)
Since the total aggregate output Y equals the sum of firm revenues, the aggregate output,
14The firm’s productivity level is related to size through S(Z)
15The detailed calculation can be found in the Appendix.
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Y: exp (+ eta)t can be calculated as:
Y
w =
I
1 
R1
b [ exp(s)  F (s)(   1)]m(s)ds+ I
R1
b [exp(s)m(s)ds:
= I:[ 11 
R1
b exp(s)m(s)d(s)  (   1)
R1
b F (s)m(s)ds]:
(32)
This, together with the goods market clearing condition (C = Y ) enables us to find the ratio C
w
and thus C and w16.
3.4.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 2. The competitive market equilibrium for the economy is trajectory of a set of prices
fpig, a set of decision rules fC;Li; E; bg and the distribution of firms fm(s)g, where Li =
LE; LF ; L and E represent the decision of a firm to be active in the market (E = 1) or to exit
(E = 0)), such that:
 The representative consumer choose the sequences fCtg of the composite goods to maxi-
mize his or her utility given the inter-temporal budget constraint, as shown in Eq. (6);
 All active firms, at every age level, choose price p and labor L to maximize their profits
in equation (11), (12) and (13), taking the price index as given;
 Firms at age a make the decision E given the evolution of productivity following the
Brownian Motion in Eq. (8). In particular, firms enter the market if the productivity level
of the new entrants is such that the initial value of firms is greater than b, given that the
free-entry condition is satisfied in Eq. (22) and exit once the firms’ values fall below b;
 The stationary distribution of firms evolves according to equation (28) given b and I .
 The goods market clears as consumption equals total income;
 The labor market clears as H = LE + LF + L.
16C=w=w=1  can be determined using the zero profit condition.
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3.5 Further discussion on Fixed cost
In the preceding section, we developed and presented a stationary distribution that follows a
Pareto distribution. The underlying stochastic structure is such that the probability distribution
of individual firm size can be interpreted as the cross-sectional size distribution for the whole
continuum of firms. The derived distribution can be considered the cross-sectional distribution
of firm size in the economy. Such a distribution is developed with size measured by exp(s). In
other words, exp(s) is the size of any firms with productivity Z exp(Et) at time t given that
the initial size is greater than exit barrier b. As long as firm sizes of incumbents are larger than
the initial sizes, and as long as fixed cost does not change across firm size groups, the firm size
density exhibits a Pareto density. Moreover, if firms with much larger sizes than the exit barrier
b exist, then there will be fewer small firms than anticipated by Pareto distribution.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the business environment is significantly different be-
tween developed and developing economies. In a transitional, developing country, we expect to
see regulatory burdens and corruption costs differ across different firm size groups. In partic-
ular, medium-sized firms, in many cases, bear the largest burden compared to their small and
large peers. To capture such characteristics in the model, we modified the firm fixed cost (F )
to be a function of firm size; thus, fixed cost in this model captures the burden of corruption
as well as regulatory cost. Readers should note that even though the corruption tends to be
different across size groups, firms with similar sizes tend to have similar corruption costs. In
particular, the costs only tend to change dramatically once firms develop beyond certain sizes
(i.e, firms becoming large enough so they cannot be operating in informal sector). Therefore, it
is plausible to assume corruption as a part of fixed costs of firms.
In the literature, corruption and regulatory burdens have been modeled as either a fixed or a
variable cost. In this paper, we assumed these cost are a part of fixed costs to firms.
First, contrast to variable cost, the fixed corruption cost represents the contractual relationship
between the private interest and the government agent (Talvitie, 2012) in which the exchange
of bribes and favors occurs repeatedly over times. This is in line with the characteristics of
corruption in Asia17. Second, the regulatory burden is normally considered compulsory for
17In Asia, a stable government and informal institutions (i.e. informal norms, rules or customs of the society)
facilitate the long-term relationship between enterprises and governmental officials. Both agents in the corruption
transaction tend to cooperate to maximize their long-term benefits and refrain from short-term opportunism. It
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firms to operate in the market. These regulations include not only official taxes and fees but
also other direct expenses on compliance, including paperwork, or employee training as well as
indirect costs such as the value of time diverted to regulatory compliance by the owner, manager,
or employee. Moreover, as described in the previous chapter, the bribe values are not the same
across different firm size groups. In particular, the incidence of paying bribes is much higher
for formal or larger-sized firms. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the fixed cost that each
incumbent has to bear is a function of firm size. In particular, medium-sized firms must pay a
larger fixed cost, compared to small and large-sized firms.
Referring to the description of firms in previous section, from Eq. (21) we can see that the value
of the firm and thus the exit barrier b are dependent on the level of the fixed cost. As the fixed
cost increases, the value of the firm V (s) and the exit barrier (b) decreases. Thus, there exists a
non-linear relationship between firm growth and the initial firm size. This implies the rejection
of Gibrat’s law where, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning
of the period examined.
The increase in exit due to higher fixed cost also leads to a decrease in the size density (sjx) for
medium-sized firm groups. In other word, the increase in fixed cost implies a smaller number
of firms in the medium sized firm group, in accordance with empirical fact in many developing
countries reported on in the literature. Moreover, because firms are identified by differentiated
goods that they produce, a decrease in the number of firms also implies a fall in the number of
differentiated goods, holding other variables constant.
As a result, in a developing country, as fixed cost differs across firm sizes with medium-sized
firms paying larger amounts, compared to small- and large-sized firms, we may expect the more
frequent appearance of small and large-sized firms in the firm size distribution, compared to
medium-sized firms . Moreover, as fixed costs or the costs for corruption and regulations grow,
a concentration of small-sized firms in the distribution also grows, leaving a smaller proportion
of the medium-sized group.
is not uncommon in Asia that firms develop the relationship with civil servants by paying the periodic bribes to
maintain the long-term relationship. This is very similar to the repeated prisoners’ dilemma where both parties
agree to cooperate after repeated iterations.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
Empirical practice has shown that the FSDs in developing countries deviate from the patterns
observed in developed economies. In this chapter, a simple modification of the model developed
by Luttmer (2007) enabled us to explain such a diversion of the FSD in a developing country. In
the model, we considered corruption to be the fixed cost that each incumbent firm must pay to
continue operating in the market. In accordance with empirical fact, the fixed cost in our model
was assumed to be a function of size and was higher for medium-sized firms. As a result, the
FSD of the economy deviates from the Pareto distribution as evidenced by the concentration of
small firms, normally observed in developing economies.
This study has addressed a limited area of research within the domains of corruption, firm
size, and the distribution of firms. However, we note that the evolution of FSD in different
industries is presumably more complex than characterized by our study. The literature has
documented numerous empirical evidence on the complexity of forces that can affect the FSD.
These forces include, but not limit to, the growth of demand, cost and technology shocks,
regulatory framework and financial burdens (See Mazzucato,1999) for a survey of the forces of
growth in certain stages of the industry life cycle). However, analysis may provide a theoretical
rationale and some empirical evidence to highlight some underlying mechanisms that possibly
account for the typical distribution of firm size in developing countries and help to explain
the fluctuation of firm size in the long run. Providing a theoretical model to generate this
phenomenon would be a promising future research project. In addition, because in the presented
model, the decision of bribery was assumed to be exogenous to firms, endogenizing the bribery
decision of firms in the interaction with governmental officials and political elites is also an
another possible future study.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MISSING MIDDLE - PRODUCTIVITY AND
CORRUPTION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we developed and presented a theoretical model that captured the
impact of corruption on firm growth in a developing economy. We showed that corruption and
other regulatory burdens result in an increase in fixed cost for middle-sized firms, leading to the
decrease in the size density for middle-sized group. This model explains the missing middle in
the FSD of developing countries.
In this chapter, we employed a more empirical perspective to investigate the phenomenon in the
context of a particular developing country - Vietnam. Vietnam is a relevant case because it is
a transitional, developing country. Over the last two decades, since the emergence of the “Doi
moi” (Renovation) process, the country has moved from bureaucratic centralized management
based on state subsidies toward a multi-stakeholder, market-oriented economy. The country
has experienced a period of continuous high economic growth. However, Vietnam has yet to
become a tiger in Asia as expected. Investigating the firm size distribution of Vietnam could
shed light on the underlying mechanism of economic growth as well as on factors that cause the
mis-allocation of resources in the economy.
In accordance with the theoretical framework, in this study, we focused on two factors: corrup-
tion and productivity. One may wonder why we studied these two aspects, because they may
57
4.1. INTRODUCTION
seem unrelated. The reason for our choice was that these two aspects might represent the dis-
tortions driving the mis-allocation of resources of firms, which may cause the missing middle
phenomenon, if present in the economy.
In this paper, we argue that small firms may be reluctant to become formal to avoid a rise in
expected corruption costs. They can then substitute capital for labor to scale-up production
and wait for a productivity shock that will offset the cost of growing. Alternatively, a possible
differential in technology or in productivity among firm-size groups may reconcile the patterns
observed in the data. We wondered about the existence of a relationship between firm sizes
and production efficiency, which could be affected by the management of production in firms.
We anticipated that if firm size increased, management costs also increased, and that perhaps,
this relationship was not linear, because the management of a production process would involve
organizing various hierarchies and networks. Our analysis later in this chapter shows, middle-
sized firms tend to be less efficient in production. Our result indicates that middle-sized firms
may face some misalignment, or some management difficulty.
Business environments vary across nations. Although it is difficult to measure how good the
business environment is or how well each firm is managed, production efficiency can be evi-
dence of the quality of an organization’s management efforts. We provide empirical evidence
that available resources might be less efficiently used in developing nations, and this could be
an important factor contributing to the missing middle phenomenon.
Indeed, in our empirical analysis, we do not attempt to establish a link between corruption and
productivity; rather, we simply present evidence of potential productivity growth for small-
sized firms in Vietnam and one possible explanation of why they do not grow. For this purpose,
we used two data sets from Vietnam. The first data set that we used to measure productivity
and efficiency was the Enterprise Census conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam
(GSO). The Enterprise Census contains information on all registered firms in Vietnam. Our data
included capital, labor, and intermediate materials as inputs, and goods measured in monetary
terms as the output. Table 6 lists the sectors we study in this paper.1. The second data set,
the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) survey, which we used to analyze the relationship
between bribes and firm size, and obtain comprehensive information on all forms of small-sized
1These sector codes are based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes. We chose
these sectors because each sector based on the two-digit-level ISIC code has more than 200 observations per year;
thus, we could ensure robustness of the nonparametric estimations.
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and medium-sized firms2.
First, we investigated whether any evidence exists of the missing middle phenomenon in Viet-
nam. As mentioned previously, the missing middle has been acknowledged and discussed in
many papers since Liedholm and Mead (1987). Recently, Hsieh and Olken (2014) studied data
from India, Indonesia and Mexico and found (a) there are many small firms but not so many
middle-sized or large-sized firms, (b) large firms rather than small firms seemingly incur larger
fixed costs, and (c) there is no evidence of discontinuities in regulatory obstacles across different
firm sizes.
In response to the Hsieh and Olken (2014)’s findings, Tybout (2014a) (see also Tybout, 2014b)
suggested that a better test of the missing middle was to ask whether the share of middle-sized
firms, compared to the shares of small- or large-sized firms, was smaller than the share that one
would observe in an undistorted economy. One sign would be a concentration of small firms.3
In fact, we observed a concentration of small firms in Vietnamese data. In addition, we were
interested in exploring the underlying mechanisms for the observed firm size distribution. Our
data showed features consistent with the findings in Hsieh and Olken (2014) on three points
as mentioned previously, and our tests did not reject bimodality in the case of Vietnam for this
particular period.
Next, we studied production efficiency in each sector of the manufacturing industry by using
the frontier approach within a nonparametric model. To the best of our knowledge, we do
not know of any other studies that link the missing middle and production efficiencies across
different firm sizes in various sectors of a developing country. The analysis of the underlying
mechanisms for the observed firm size distribution has been less developed, perhaps because of
the unavailability of detailed data.4
2The survey was published in “Characteristics of doing business in Vietnam” conducted by the Central In-
stitute for Economic Management (CIEM) in collaboration with the Vietnamese Institute of Labor Science and
Social Affairs (ILSSA), the Department of Economics (DoE) of the University of Copenhagen, and UNU-WIDER
together with the Royal Embassy of Denmark, every two years since 2005. For details, see Rand and Tarp (2012).
3Furthermore, Tybout (2014a) indicated that it might be problematic to equate the missing middle with bi-
modality.
4Recently, there has been growing interest in the relationship between the firm size distribution and produc-
tivity in developed nations. Leung et al. (2008) investigated the US–Canada difference in the distribution of
employment over firm size and confirmed that a larger average size supported higher productivity at both the plant
and firm level. Crosato et al. (2009) investigated the data of a micro-survey in Italy and, using nonparametric
estimates, found that firms in the concave part of the Zipf plot of the Italian firm distribution overwhelmingly ex-
perienced increasing returns to scale, while firms in the linear part were mainly characterized by constant returns
to scale. Diaz and Sanchez (2008) use a stochastic frontier model to investigate small-sized and medium-sized
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In recent years, researchers have developed many methods to estimate production efficiency un-
der the frontier approach.5 Comparing average products across different inputs is a complicated
task. For example, Ray (2004) noted that measures of a firm’s productivity that rely on a single
input, disregarding other inputs, may fail to reflect total factor productivity. Considering this,
we used the frontier approach in our analysis.
Our analysis shows that in most of the manufacturing industries that we studied, middle-sized
firms’ production efficiencies tend to be lower than those of small-sized or large-sized firms.
Further, we showed that the level of minimum efficiency and the scale at which it occurs vary
across industries.
Further, our work indicates that the large-sized firms may be unable to fully utilize their inputs.
Hsieh and Olken (2014) claimed that the problem of economic development in low-income
countries is how to relieve the differential constraints faced by large firms. Our empirical anal-
ysis supports this view in concrete terms. Our analysis on inefficiency associated with scale
showed that the large-sized firm group includes most firms with lower average product and
larger production scales, compared to firms with the highest average product in their categories.
Our analysis indicated that one of the problems, in Vietnam, at least, is how to activate some
resources that these large-sized firms hold but tend to utilize incompletely in production.6
Because our second method was developed for measuring returns to scale, our work relates to
the literature regarding measuring returns to scale. Basu and Fernald (1997) used U.S. data to
estimate returns to scale and found that a typical industry appeared to have constant or slightly
decreasing returns to scale. Diewert et al. (2011) found a similar result using Japanese data for
the period of 1964 to 1988, provided explanations of the time variation in returns to scale in
light of economic occurrences and government policies at each time period. Using the French
data from the nineteenth century, Doraszelski (2004) showed that returns to scale vary across
industries and time. These researchers estimated returns to scale for the production function
of the entire industry. Using the data of large U.S. banks in the late 1980s, Miller and Noulas
(1996) conducted a data envelopment analysis and showed that larger and more profitable banks
manufacturing enterprises in Spain and found that these firms tend to be less efficient than their large-sized peers.
5The production frontier can be estimated using parametric estimate (deterministic or stochastic frontier anal-
ysis) or non-parametric one (data envelopment analysis or free disposal hull). For more details, see Kalirajan and
Shand (1994).
6For example, in Vietnam, Sector 17 (Textiles) and Sector 21 (Paper and paper products) include many large-
sized firms, previously or currently state-owned. As shown later in Figure 7.6, these industries exhibit this feature
more visually.
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had higher levels of technical efficiency, however, larger banks tended to be too focused on cost
considerations. Recently, Feng and Zhang (2014) investigated the returns to scale of large banks
in the United States over the period 1997 to 2010 by considering technological heterogeneity
and showed that most firms’ production levels exhibit constant returns to scale. Johannes (2005)
provided evidence on the differences in the evolution of firm size and productivity distribution
across nine sub-Saharan African countries and developed countries including the United States.
Banerjee and Duflo (2005) provided a survey and analyzed the causes of lower total factor
productivity (TFP), such as access to technology or human capital, in poor countries (which
they call “macro puzzles”).
The discussion in this chapter adds to the literature on firm size and productivity in developing
countries. Using Vietnamese data that include small-sized firms, we show that most manu-
facturing industrial sectors displayed similar features and thus, we demonstrate how the result
differs across different sectors. Specially, we show that productivity is different across different
firm sizes and middle-sized firms have lower efficiencies of production.
We found that the level of minimum efficiency and the scale at which minimum efficiency
occurs varied across industries, which indicated that an analysis of each industry was needed to
study underlying mechanisms for the observed firm size distribution. In addition, interestingly,
our data analysis of production costs and outputs indicated that middle-sized firms tend to have
lower production efficiency even before paying bribes or other fees.
In addition, we conducted a logit regression to study the relationship between firm sizes and the
likelihood of paying bribes. We used the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) survey, which
provides comprehensive information on all forms of small-sized and medium-sized firms7 and
analyzed the important factors involved in firms’ bribing activities, particularly in terms of the
relationship between firm size and the likelihood of paying bribes, by using a logit regression.
Our results regarding corruption indicated that as firm size increases, the likelihood of paying
bribes also increases. The formality of a firm matters in the sense that the likelihood of paying
bribes is higher for formal firms, which tend to be larger. We also analyzed the relationship be-
tween the likelihood of paying bribes and firm age. Our analysis showed that firms’ ownership
types and locations are important determinants of bribing activities. Interestingly, our analysis
7The survey was published in “Characteristics of doing business in Vietnam” conducted by the Central In-
stitute for Economic Management (CIEM) in collaboration with the Vietnamese Institute of Labor Science and
Social Affairs (ILSSA), the Department of Economics (DoE) of the University of Copenhagen, and UNU-WIDER
together with the Royal Embassy of Denmark, every two years since 2005. For details, see Rand and Tarp (2012).
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showed that firms often seem to pay bribes at the start of business; however, those that do are
increasingly likely to pay bribes over time.
In the literature, some studies (e.g., Dutta et al., 2013, Mishra and Ray, 2013) have indicat-
edthat small firms may refrain from becoming formal to hide themselves from the rent-seeking
activities of civil servants8. Our findings about informality and the likelihood of bribery are
consistent with the findings of previous studies.
Although it is believed that bribing activities are common, the dynamics of bribing activities
and firms’ growth have not yet been well understood. Using data from Greece, Athanasouli
et al. (2012) demonstrated that firm engagement in corruption is heterogeneous, and small and
medium firms display a higher engagement in corrupt practices. Using enterprise data for the
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, De et al. (2010) showed that bribes
appear to have a negative impact on firm-level productivity. Using firm-level data from Turkey,
Ayaydin and Hayaloglu (2014) studied the influence of corruption on firm growth. Wu (2009)
conducted a regression analysis with World Business Environment survey, and found that Asian
firms were more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition or corrupt court sys-
tems. Bai et al. (2013) used cross-industry heterogeneity in growth rates and a data set covering
formal companies in Vietnam to test empirically whether growth leads to lower corruption and
found that it does.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we used a unique firm-level
data set, consisting of both informal and formal companies to examine the characteristics of
firms that are important determinants of bribing in a developing nation. Second, from our
analysis, we provide evidence that firm size, formality, and firms’ ownership type are important
factors affecting the likelihood of bribes, while firm age negatively affects the likelihood of
bribes. One may question which factor occurs first (i.e., whether corruption determines if a
firm decides to grow to a different size or whether firm size leads to corruption). However,
our productivity analysis, showing that small-sized firms produce efficiently compared to other
size-groups, suggests that corruption could be one of the reasons for firms to decide not to grow.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe our first
data set and provide a summary of Vietnam’s firm size distribution and average products. The
8Using data from the World Business Environment Survey compiled by the World Bank for a large number of
developing and developed countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) studied the link between firm size and informality.
Further, see Dabla-Norris et al. (2008), Dutta et al. (2013), Mishra and Ray (2013).
62
4.2. FIRM SIZE DISTRIBUTION AT A GLANCE IN VIETNAM
third section involves our methodology for measuring productivity and efficiency, and presents
the analysis on production efficiency, and inefficiency associated with scale. The third section
also provides the empirical analysis on bribes and firm size. The last section concludes the
discussion.
4.2 Firm Size Distribution at a Glance in Vietnam
4.2.1 Census Data Description
In Vietnam, the Enterprise Census has been conducted annually since 2000. In the census, an
enterprise is defined as “an economic unit that independently keeps a business account and ac-
quires its own legal status.” In this paper, we focused on the nine-year period from 2000 to
2008. We excluded recent years (from 2009 to present) because the Vietnamese economy has
suffered from the effects of the global financial crisis, and because a 30% reduction in the cor-
porate income tax rate for qualifying entities was implemented in the fourth quarter of 2008 and
all of 20099. In addition, small-sized and middle-sized firms involved in labor-intensive pro-
duction and processing activities may have benefited from the subsequent tax reduction under
Decree 60/2011. We also excluded inconsistent data from our sample, such as observations that
were recorded twice for the same firm in the same year, those with negative or zero revenue
values, or those with an implausibly large number of employees. We included 14 sectors of
the manufacturing industry that had at least 200 observations for each year, and the number of
observations ranged from approximately 3,350 to 29,700 per industry.
Table 6 lists the sectors we studied.10 Table 8 provides the summary of the number of firms for
each year in each selected manufacturing sector.
Insert Table 6 Insert Table 8
9See Circular No. 03/2009/TT-BTC published in January 2009 by Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance.
10These sector codes are based on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes. We chose
these sectors because each sector based on the two-digit level ISIC code had more than 200 observations per year,
so that we can ensure robustness of the nonparametric estimations.
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4.2.2 Summary
To convey the features of our data, we start with a discussion of the figures for the whole
manufacturing industry. In the next sections, we present an analysis of each sector.11 For the
whole sample, the number of observations ranged from 9,143 (year 2000) to 27,918 (year 2008).
The number of sectors was 27.
Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 summarize the firm-size distribution for 2000, 2004 and
2008. Figure 7.1 shows the distributions of firm size measured by number of employees in each
firm. Figure 7.2 shows the distributions of employment share by firm size; specifically, showing
the percentage of firms having the number of employees contained in each value of the x-axis
relative to the total number of firms. Figure 7.3 shows the distribution ratios relative to capital
and labor, as well as the distributions of revenue ratios. To save space, we do not present the
figures for the other years, which are quite similar to the ones presented here.12
Insert Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3
To make the patterns more visible, in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, we classify firm size into
subintervals of 0 to 200 employees (column 1), 10 to 200 employees (column 2), 20 to 200
employees (column 3), 50 to 200 employees (column 4) and 200 to 3000 employees (column 5).
These two sets of histograms present the distribution of firm size in bins of 10 workers. In Figure
7.3, we take the maximums and the minimums of log(Value addedCapital ) (the first row), log(
Value added
Capital )
(the second row) and log(RevenueMaterial ) (the third row), for the entire period of 2000 to 2008, and
truncate the intervals into 50 bins.
The key observations in the figures include the following:
 From Figure 7.1, there are a large number of small firms compared to the number of other
sizes.
11Figure 7.1, Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 are similar with those in Hsieh and Olken (2014) for India, Indonesia
and Mexico.
12Figures of Average Product and Firm Size (similar to Figure 3 in Hsieh and Olken (2014)) are also available
upon request. In these figures, because we had many observations, we constructed the figures for each sector.
In some sectors, our figures show similar features with the ones shown in Hsieh and Olken (2014), although in
particular sectors such as Sectors 17 and 18, the relationship between log(valueaddedworker ) and size was U-shaped.
In this chapter, to study the relationship between sizes and productivity, we assessed the the efficiency scores
and inefficiency associated with scale for each sector of the manufacturing industry, instead of studying average
products of the whole manufacturing industry.
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 From Figure 7.2, the distribution of employment in each column is “flatter” compared
with the distribution shown in Figure 7.1.
 From Figure 7.2, the employment share for very small firms increased over time (from
2000 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2008).
 From Figure 7.3, the distributions of average products do not look bimodal.
Next, we present an empirical test to give detailed analyses of the firm size distribution. First,
We used the Dip test to investigate the null hypothesis H0 that the sample distribution has a
unimodal density, against the alternative hypothesis H1 that the sample distribution has more
than one mode.(for details, see Hartigan and Hartigan, 1985). According to the results of the Dip
test13, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level for all years. The Dip statistics
are all smaller than 0:05, which indicates the presence of bimodality or multimodality.14
Then, we conducted the bimodality coefficient test15. The test is designed to examine the rela-
tionship between bimodality, skewness and kurtosis of the distribution. The bimodality coef-
ficient (BC) statistics ranged from 0 to 1, with those exceeding 0.55 suggesting bimodality16.
The BC’s of all years are shown in Table 1. As shown, all BC statistics were higher than 0.55,
which indicates the existence of bimodality.
Table 1: The Bimodality Coefficients
Year ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08
BC 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.62 0.56
 - BC stands for the Bimodality Coefficients.
13The detailed result is presented in Table 11 of Appendix.
14A more detailed interpretation of this statistic is found in Freeman and Dale (2013). Finding out how many
modes were present in the distributions was not our aim in this paper, and so we did not consider this issue further.
15The logic behind the bimodality coefficient is that a bimodal distribution would have very low kurtosis, an
asymmetric character, or both, all of which increase this coefficient. The formula itself does not assume a particular
distribution. On the other hand, the value for the uniform distribution or the exponential distribution is 5=9. Values
greater than 5=9 may indicate a bimodal or multimodal distribution in the data.
16For more details, see page 1258 in SAS Institute Inc. (2008). The bimodality coefficient is m
2
0+1
m1+
3(n 1)2
(n 2)(n 3)
where m0 is skewness and m1 is the excess kurtosis. The BC test, however, has been criticized because of its
sensitivity to the skewness of the distribution. Thus, we also included the results of the Dip test, which has been
considered to be more robust (see Freeman and Dale, 2013).
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Further, we computed the BC’s for each sector, as shown in Table 2. Interestingly, the BC’s in
Sector 22, Sector 26, and Sector 29 indicate that these sectors’ firm size distributions are not
bimodal, unlike in other sectors. Sector 22 (Publishing, printing, etc.) includes many small
firms (i.e., many small printing stores) and fewer large firms. In contrast, the other two sectors,
Sector 26 (Nonmetallic mineral products) and Sector 29 (Machinery and equipment) contain
large firms with a need for large capital. In either case, firm size distribution tends to be non-
bimodal for these sectors.
Table 2: The Bimodality Coefficients in each Sector
Sector 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 28 29 36
BC 0.56 0.68 0.74 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.62 0.49 0.72 0.71 0.36 0.65 0.54 0.69
 - BC stands for the Bimodality Coefficients.
Overall, our result for the whole sample does not reject the hypothesis H1: The result shows
a bimodal distribution; thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the distribution is uni-modality.
17 Moreover, the result implies that the features of the firm size distributions vary substantially
across sectors. As our sectoral analysis of the BC indicates, there are some sectors for which
the bimodality is rejected18. In the next section, we discuss productivity and efficiency across
different sizes. Finally, Table 2 shows that the firm size distribution varies substantially across
sectors; hence, we conducted analysis of productivity and efficiency for each sector. Our results
in the next section indicate that the sectors rejecting bimodality in Table 2, particularly Sector 26
and Sector 29 show different features in productivity and efficiency compared to other sectors.
17We also checked the distributions against Zipf’s law and the hypothesis that they follow Zipf’s law was
rejected in our data set. The details of analysis are available upon request.
18 We also computed the BCs for each sector by year. Because the number of observations in each year for
each sector decreased, the results fluctuated. In the yearly results, the BCs tended to increase, and even for sectors
14, 26, and 29, the BCs were higher than 0.56 (except for sector 14 in 2008). Perhaps the interesting case was
sector 26. Although it showed the lowest score for any year, sector 26’s score for each year was higher than 0.56.
We further analyzed sector 26’s histograms of firm size distribution for each year and found that small firms grow
noticeably in this sector year by year. According to Anh et al. (2014), the industry of non-metallic mineral products
was one of the “sunrise” industries in Vietnam. This industry’s ranking in the share of total output has increased
from the eighth (in 2001) to the second in 2007, and continued to be the second highest after Food products.
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4.2.3 Productivity and efficiency analysis
This section consists of two parts. In the first part, we discuss the measurement of the efficiency
of production, using the efficiency score19. In the second part, we describe our analysis of the
inefficiency associated with scale at the firm level using nonparametric methods, which imposed
few if any assumptions on the data. In contrast to Hsieh and Olken (2014)’s investigation of the
average product of inputs of the economy, we examined the production efficiency of firms at a
sectoral level.
We considered the situation in which a firm uses capital, labor, and intermediate materials to
produce goods. All firm information came from the census data of Vietnamese manufacturing
industries. Real revenue was used as a proxy for output.20. Three inputs were included in our
estimation: intermediate inputs, labor, and capital. Labor was measured by the total income
of employees in a firm. This measure included total wages and other employee labor-related
costs such as social security, insurance and other benefits21. The intermediate material variable
includes costs such as fuel and the value of other materials. Capital was measured as assets to
be used in production. All variable values were adjusted to account for inflation to obtain a real
value.
In the following analysis, we construct a production function for each sector without imposing
any restrictions on the parametric relationship between inputs and outputs.
Our analysis relies on the following theoretical framework. Consider one sector in the man-
ufacturing industry. Firm i’s input and output combination is called a production unit, de-
noted by (xi; yi) with xi 2 IR3+ and yi 2 IR+. Then, we define firm i’s production set by
19To compute the efficiency scores, we use the R-package FEAR (see Wilson, 2008). We are grateful to Wilson,
who provided us with a license to use the software.
20At a firm level, prices and quantities may not be well measured, and revenue, instead of gross output or cost,
is normally used. In the literature, there have been some arguments that the elasticities of labor and capital, in a
revenue estimate, may be downward biased (Basu and Fernald, 1997). Klette and Griliches (1996) reported that
changes in sector prices are substantially diversified and correlated with changes in labor and capital. However,
according to Jacques and Jordi (2005), “the introduction of individual output prices into the production function
does not markedly affect the estimate...[and]... the estimation of a production function in terms of “physical
quantities” is, in fact, meaningless, unless we confine the analysis to a very precisely defined industry where goods
are so homogeneous that firm outputs can be well measured and compared across firms”. Accordingly, we used
this measure in the analysis.
21Alternatively, labor input can be captured by quantity measure such as number of employees or total hours
worked. This quantity measure, however, implicitly assumes uniform skill distribution across firms. In this analy-
sis, we used total income of a employee to account for differences in skill distribution across firms in the economy.
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	i = f(x; y) : x  xi; y  yig: The union of all the firm’s production sets in the sector,
S
i	
l
i,
is the production set of this sector. The surface of this set is the production function. Using
these data, we construct a production function for each sector.22 Next, we compute each firm’s
efficiency score, which is the minimal proportional reduction of all inputs while maintaining the
same output level within
S
i	
l
i. Figure (4.1b) graphically illustrate in the case of a single input
and a single output (an explanation for the case of multiple inputs is provided later). Each dot
represents a productive unit. A solid line is the constructed production function. The multiple
 in Figure (4.1b) shows the efficiency score of this white circle whose inputs are given by x.
This is our first method to compute the efficiency scores.
Next, by using the algorithm developed by Soleimani-Damaneh and Reshadi (2007), we ana-
lyzed returns to scale or inefficiencies associated with production scale.23
Regarding our method to estimate inefficiencies associated with scale, we note that the circled
dot A has the highest average product. The other black dots on the production function, such as
B and C, are efficient in terms of efficiency scores, unlike the white circles, but do not have the
highest average product. If the same technology and management skills of Firm A are available
for Firm C, and the underlying technology is constant returns to scale, Firm C could achieve
Firm A’s average product by adopting the production practices of Firm A, which is represented
by point C^. Otherwise, this indicates that there is some inefficiency associated with production
scales or decreasing returns to scale technology between A and C. Similar logic applies to
points A and B, although in this case, the technology may be increasing returns to scale, but
not decreasing returns to scale.
Conceptually, the above method is intended to assess the existence of some management in-
efficiency related to scales or decreasing returns to scale technology (or both), although the
method does not identify what percentage of the difference between Firm B and C’s and Firm
22To clarify, we did not impose any functional form on the estimation, and a production function was estimated
as a frontier of a production set.
23Diewert et al. (2011) used the following definition of returns to scale. If all inputs are multiplied by a positive
scaler, t, and the consequent output can be represented as ty, the value of  may be said to indicate the magnitude
of returns to scale. If  = 1, there are constant returns to scale; if  > 1, there are increasing returns to scale and
if  < 1, there are decreasing returns to scale. In the literature on productivity analysis, a production function is
constructed from the data, and we applied this definition to each firm’s production by comparing it to the production
of the firm with the highest average product among the set of firms with similar production scales. Applying this
definition to each firm’s production might be confusing, because in the classical production theory of economics,
returns to scale is a property of the production technology. Thus, we only used the term returns to scale when we
discussed production technology itself.
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A’s production levels is attributable to management inefficiency and the returns to scale tech-
nology. For instance, suppose that there are two firms, where Firm 1 uses 10 units of labor to
produce 5 units of goods and Firm 2 uses 15 units of labor to produce 7 units of goods. If the
technology used is constant returns to scale, then by simply extrapolating Firm 1’s production,
Firm 2 should be able to produce 7.5 units by using 15 units of labor. Then, comparing Firm
2’s production, the technology may be causing a decrease in returns to scale, or there may be
some inefficiency in managing the resources in Firm 2. 24 Merging data from multiple sectors
might mix these two features even further, and thus, we may not be able to identify a relation-
ship between management inefficiency and firm size. It is particularly important to study this
measure at the sectoral level, because the underlying technology in each sector would not be
much different in comparison with different sectors.25
Figure (4.1c) shows the intuition of our empirical findings in the case of one input and one
output, although our analysis with multiple inputs is more complicated. Large-sized firms pro-
duce closer to the production function than do middle-sized firms, although compared with the
highest average product firms, they tend to have lower average products (except for the sectors
24As pointed out by Feng and Zhang (2014), not considering the technological heterogeneity of an individual
firm even within a single sector can cause bias in measuring returns to scale. Attempting to separate the two factors
by measuring returns to scale considering technological heterogeneity for each firm might be an interesting and
promising research path to further investigate to what extent inefficiencies only associated with scale affect the
missing middle.
25Another way to approach this problem is by assuming that the basic natures of the technologies are not so
different between developed and developing nations, one may try to study this measure at the sectoral level in
developed nations and compare the outcomes with ours.
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with lower bimodality coefficients). In the case of multiple inputs, these lines can be thought of
as a cone. In contrast, the middle-sized firms tend to be further away from efficient production
and have lower average products.
The following summarizes our findings.
 In all the sectors, many firms have low efficiency scores, smaller than 0.5, across different
firm sizes.
 Except in some sectors whose bimodality coefficients are low, the relationship between
firm size and efficiency score tends to be U-shaped, which indicates that smaller-sized
firms and larger-sized firms produce efficiently compared to middle-sized firms.
 Firm size at the bottom of the U-shape differs across sectors.
 The large-sized firms are likely to exhibit inefficiencies associated with scale.
In the following sections, we describe in detail our methodologies and findings.
4.2.4 Efficiency Score and Results
Suppose that there are L industrial sectors in the economy. Take a sector l 2 f1;    ; Lg (we
repeat the same procedure for each sector) where inputs x 2 IR3+ are used to produce an output
y 2 IR+. Let N l denote the number of firms in sector l of the data set. Firm i’s input and output
combination is called a productive unit, denoted by (xi; yi) with xi 2 IR3+ and yi 2 IR+.26 As
stated above, for firm i, we formally define
	li = f(x; y) : x  xi; y  yig: (1)
Further, we define 	lFDH =
S
i	
l
i, and the convex hull of 	
l
FDH is defined as 	
l
DEA. The
efficiency score for a productive unit (xi; yi) is defined by
E(xi; yi) = inf

f : (xi; yi) 2 	lg; (2)
26To keep the notation simple, we did not explicitly denote a period and an industry for each productive unit.
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for each	l =	lFDH under free disposal hull (hereafter, FDH), or	
l
DEA under data envelopment
analysis (hereafter DEA), respectively. Further, the PS 	l is assumed to satisfy the regularity
conditions; namely, boundedness, closedness, no free-lunch27, and free disposability28. We say
that 	l exhibits convexity if for every (x1; y1), (x2; y2) 2 	l, and any  2 [0; 1], (x1; y1) +
(1  )(x2; y2) 2 	l holds.
The efficiency score29 lies between 0 and 1, and represents the minimal proportional reduction
of all inputs while maintaining the same output level within the production set (hereafter, PS).
Solving Problem 2 requires constructing the PS, using linear programming. In this analysis, we
used two different methods, the FDH and DEA methods as defined above. The PS for the FDH
method is different from the PS for the DEA method, and the difference between the two scores
indicates the existence of nonconvexity in the production technologies.
Figure 7.4 is a scatter-plot of efficiency scores for the FDH method in our sample industries
for the entire nine-year period, and the curve represents the smooth trend line of the efficiency
scores for every 0:1 interval of log(size).30 The x-axis represents the logarithm of firm size.
In our analysis, we also present the ratios of the two efficiency scores obtained from the DEA
and the FDH methods in Figure 7.5. The ratio of the two scores indicates the existence of
nonconvexity in the production technology.
Insert Figure 7.4, and Figure 7.5
According to Figure 7.4, except in sector 14 (Other mining and quarrying), sector26 (Nonmetal-
lic mineral products), and sector 29 (Machinery and equipment, etc.), the relationship between
firm size and efficiency score is clearly U-shaped, which indicates that smaller firms and larger
firms produce efficiently compared to middle-sized firms. In contrast, Figure 7.4 for sectors 14,
26, and 29, displays the low BCs in Table 2, showing that the smooth trend lines of the efficiency
scores are mostly decreasing as the size increases. In sector 29,a spike is shown in the trend line
for very large-sized firms, although this seems to be caused by a few efficient large-sized firms.
Moreover, firm size at the bottom of the U-shape—that is, the lowest efficiency score—differs
27A positive amount of production cannot occur without a positive amount of inputs.
28The increase in inputs must lead to increased or constant outputs, and a smaller output vector than a feasible
vector is also feasible.
29This is called the “input-oriented” efficiency score. There is another definition called the “output-oriented”
efficiency score. In this analysis, we used the input-oriented efficiency score because we have computed output-
oriented scores for some sectors, which did not change substantially.
30 We used Matlab’s command smooth. This inserts a smooth trend line by using the local regression method.
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across sectors. The heterogeneity of firm size at the bottom of the U-shape across industries
indicates the importance of sector-level analysis in investigating the missing middle.
Finally, the ratios between the DEA scores and the FDH scores are less than one for most of the
firms, which indicates nonconvexity in the production technologies, and the shapes of the trend
lines are quite different across sectors. This shows that the nonconvexity of the technologies is
also significantly different across sectors.
4.2.5 Inefficiency Associated with Scale and Results
In this section, we discuss the relationship between production scale and average product at the
firm level in each industry. Figure 7.5 in the previous section indicates the existence of some
nonconvexities in production technologies.31 Thus, we used an FDH estimate, which does not
require the assumption of convex technology.
Similar to the process described in the previous section, we consider manufacturing sector l.
LetDl denote a set of all the observations in sector l. Then, we consider the following problem
for each productive unit (xi; yi) 2 Dl,
Minimize 
subject to
P
j2N l jxj  xi;
P
j2N l jyj  yi; j = wj;
wj 2 f0; 1g for every j 2 N l;   0;
P
j2N l wj = 1:
(3)
The aimwas first to compute each firm’s hypothetically best productive unit by projecting it onto
the line of the highest average products. To illustrate, let us consider the inefficiency associated
with scaleC in Figure 4.1b. In Figure 4.1b, B^ and C^ correspond to the projected points ofB and
C, respectively. Note that here, only one j is nonzero, but it does not equal 1. The algorithm
finds some nonzero values of (jxj; jyj), which are associated with (ixi; yi) for each i. In
Figure 4.1b, A has the highest average product. To obtain (CxA; CyA) = (CxC ; yC), which
is represented by C^, it must be the case that C > 1. This implies that if the same technology
and management skills of Firm A are available for Firm C, and the underlying technology is
31Farrell (1957) emphasized indivisibilities and economies of scale as important sources of nonconvexity and
emphasized that convexity can only be justified in terms of time divisibility (ignoring not only any setup times but
also indivisibilities, increasing returns to scale, positive or negative production externalities, etc., that can lead to
nonconvexity). For some recent theoretical or empirical studies, see Brown (1991) or (Ramey, 1991).
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constant returns to scale, Firm C could achieve Firm A’s production efficiency by adopting
the production processes of Firm A. Otherwise, it indicates that there is some inefficiency
associated with production scales or decreasing returns to scale technology between firms A
and C. A similar argument applies to points A and B.
Now, let i denote the solution  associated with observation i, and let +i and 
 
i denote the
maximal and the minimal of the solutions
P
j2N l j to Problem 3 for each i, respectively.
32
When +i is smaller than 1, it indicates that there is a firm with higher average products whose
scale is larger than firm i.
Figure 7.6 presents the bar graphs indicating how many percentages of firms have +i < 1
(dark color),  i > 1 (light color), and else (white) in each group of firm sizes. To facilitate
understanding, we group the samples by number of employees into five groups, where groups
1 through 5 include firms with 1  10, 11  50, 51  100, 101  200, and 201 or more
employees, respectively.33 The white portions are the groups of firms with the highest average
products; in Figure 4.1a they are shown as the circled dots. According to the categorization
defined above, we calculated how many firms belonged to each group and then divided these
numbers by the total number of firms in each group, so that we could obtain the percentages of
firms in each category of each group. We repeated this procedure for all sectors.
Insert Figure 7.6
Figure 7.6 shows that in most of the sectors, the proportion of firms with the property +i < 1 is
highest in Group 1. This is understandable, because their size is small and thus their production
perhaps tends to be small compared with the optimal scale. Interestingly, we observed that
in many sectors, the large-sized firm category included the most firms with the property of
 i > 1, particularly in sectors 22 (Publishing, printing, etc.) through sector 25 (Rubber and
plastic products). This finding contrasted with the results seen in sector 14 (Other mining and
quarrying), sector 26 (Nonmetallic mineral products), and sector29 (Machinery and equipment,
etc.), which were the sectors with the low BCs in Table 2. The profiles of the production
functions revealed by the analysis are typical of firms using large quantities of inputs because
they show decreasing returns to scale, and many large-sized firms are located in this region. As
32A more detailed description of the numerical algorithm to calculate + and   is found in the Appendix. In
the productivity analysis literature, a firm with +i < 1 is said to be operating under Increasing Returns to Scale
and a firm with  i > 1 is said to be operating under Decreasing Returns to Scale.
33This set of cutoff sizes ensured that we had enough firms in each group.
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Figure 7.5 shows, at larger scales, the production sets in most of the sectors are more convex.
This implies that the production functions in the regions of larger quantities of inputs show
concavity. From the analysis shown in Figure 7.4, we can see that many large-sized firms
operate close to the function. This may indicate that even though the large-sized firms can
produce in a relatively efficient manner, they may not be able to take full advantage of scale.
Finally, we should note that we have also computed the annual efficiency scores, +i and 
 
i ,
for each sector. In this analysis of annualized data, because the number of observations for each
sector decreases dramatically, it becomes more difficult to obtain a general trend. As described
in Daraio and Simar (2007), under both the FDH and DEA method, larger quantities of data
provide more sensible estimates.34 Still, similar to the analysis including all the years for each
sector, the analysis of the annualized data shows that the middle-sized firms tend to have low
efficiency scores. On the other hand, as also mentioned in footnote 18, the BCs of sectors 14,
26, and 29 tend to increase and the annual bar graphs of these three sectors are similar to those
of other sectors. Finally, we also observe that there are still many low-efficiency firms, as shown
in Figure 7.4.
4.3 Bribes and Firm Size
4.3.1 Corruption in Vietnam
Since the initiation of the “Doimoi” process in 1986, Vietnam has shifted from a centrally
planned economy to a market-based economy and thus can be categorized as a transition econ-
omy, although the government still maintains a central role in the economy (see Gainsborough,
2006). The level of corruption in Vietnam is still quite high. In Transparancy International
(2007), Vietnam was ranked 118 out of 163 countries and corruption accounted for 3% - 4%
of lost GDP annually. Governmental efforts against corruption did not achieve significant im-
provement. The 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index of Vietnam was around 2.9 on a scale of
0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). A 2010 World bank report (see Anderson et al., 2010)
also stated that the control of corruption indicator of Vietnam only increased from 22.9 in 2004
to 33 in 2010 on a 0 to 100 scale.
34The detailed results are available from the authors.
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According to CIEM (2006), the major causes of corruption in Vietnam include: “(a) abuse
of power by public officials; (b) arbitrary decisions related to policies and administration; (c)
weak accountability of officials and government agencies; and (d) weak state implementation
and monitoring”. Also, Maitland (2012) specified two major forms of corruption in Vietnam.
The first type is petty and bureaucratic corruption which refers to low-level, small scale cor-
ruption practices. This includes the “greasing the wheel” money that firms pay to officials to
obtain licenses, permits, or to escape from other government regulatory requirements, taxes and
fees. The primary victims of this kind of corruption are mostly small and middle-sized private
enterprises. Another target of bribery is the foreign sector. Maitland (2012) claimed that foreign
enterprises in Vietnam could be targeted by rent-seeking activities of civil servants who handle
taxes, customs, and export/import licensing.
The last common type of corruption is grand payment, in which bribed officials use their au-
thority to secure contracts for bribers. This type of corruption is largely observed among large
state-owned enterprises, especially in public procurements for infrastructure projects and land
transactions. In 2009, the annual value of public procurement was around USD S20.47 billion,
consisting of more than 22% of the national GDP (see Anti-Corruption Center, 2012). More-
over, according to Thang et al. (2011), the number of competitive tenders in the total value of
government procurement contracts decreased dramatically in 2009. Only 53% of procurement
contracts followed a competitive bidding process in 2009, compared to more than 72% in 2008.
In our study, we focus mainly on petty corruption, because our analysis focuses on small- and
medium-sized enterprises. Although we do not have an estimates of the proportion of this type
of corruption relative to the nation’s entire economy, many have argued that petty corruption is
not so “petty” when taken as a whole. Recently Centre for Community Support and Develop-
ment Studies, Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front, and United
Nations Development Programme (2015) co-authored a report based on the survey of experi-
ences and assessments of the state’s governance and public administration performance using
data collected from 13,552 randomly selected citizens across various locations in Vietnam. The
authors of the report claimed that 42% of respondents said they had to pay unofficial fees for
services at district-level hospitals, and 30% agreed that corruption existed when people applied
for land-use licenses.
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4.3.2 Data Description
We used the Small and Medium Manufacturing Enterprise (SME) to analyze the relationship
between bribes and firm size. The SME survey was conducted by the Central Institute for Eco-
nomic Management (CIEM) in collaboration with the Vietnamese Institute of Labor Science
and Social Affairs (ILSSA), the Department of Economics (DoE) of the University of Copen-
hagen, and UNU-WIDER in conjunction with the Royal Embassy of Denmark in Vietnam.
We excluded joint ventures from the sample because of the high degree of governmental and
foreign involvement in ownership structures. Unlike the first data set, this survey only deals
with nonstate manufacturing enterprises. It excludes all state-owned firms as well as firms in
other sectors such as the service sector. Third, firms in the survey include both formally reg-
istered ones (enterprises with a business registration license and/or a tax code) and informal
households. All informal firms included in the survey operate alongside the officially registered
enterprises. These informal household establishments (firms without a business registration li-
cense or a tax code and not registered with District authorities) are included in the surveys based
on the on-site identification process. The inclusion of unregistered firms is another important
contribution of the survey.
Our initial sample contains 9567 observations, collected from all firms in the SME survey cov-
ering four years: 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. We excluded all firms for which we did not have
information on firm size, wages and total assets. We also discarded firms for which we did not
have information on firm age. The final sample consisted of 8; 421 non-state manufacturing
firms in 10 provinces of Vietnam. Employees in our analysis included both regular full-time
and casual workers.
4.3.3 Snapshots
We used the SME survey data to create Table 3, which is a matrix of employment transitions
showing what percentage of firms that shift from one group to another.35 A micro group was
defined as firms with one to nine employees. A small group consists of firms with 10 to 49
employees. A medium firm-size group consists of firms with 50 to 300 employees.36 Few firms
35For a data description, refer to Section 4.3.2.
36This is the definition of small and medium enterprises given in Vietnamese law (Decree no. 90/2001/CP-ND
on “Supporting for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises”).
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shifted from the micro category to the small or medium category, or from the Small category
to the Medium category. Most firms remain in the same category. Another feature is that there
are not many firms who shift down from Medium to Small. This matrix indicates that, in these
years, very few firms shifted upward from Micro to another category, and on the other hand,
very few firms shift downward from medium to micro group.
Table 3: Employment Transition Matrix (2005–2011)
PPPPPPP’05
’07 Micro Small Medium
Micro
1,436 144 1
(90.0%) (10.0%) (0.0%)
Small
134 490 52
(19.8%) (72.5%) (7.3%)
Medium
3 47 134
(1.6%) (25.5%) (72.8%)
PPPPPPP’07
’09 Micro Small Medium
Micro
1053 109 5
(90.2%) 9.3%) (0.4%)
Small
121 390 35
(22.2%) (71.4%) (6.4%)
Medium
3 35 101
(2.2%) (25.2%) (72.7%)
PPPPPPP’09
’11 Micro Small Medium
Micro
1,193 96 5
(92.2%) (7.4%) (0.4%)
Small
152 416 32
(25.3%) (69.3%) (5.3%)
Medium
5 48 131
(2.7%) (26.1%) (71.2%)
Further, in the survey, firm owners were asked whether they had paid bribes in the surveyed
year. Table 4 shows the number of firms that bribed or did not bribe in each group. It is clear
that the proportion of firms paying bribes was much higher in the last three groups, compared
to the proportion in the first or second groups.
Table 4: The Number of Firms Bribing/Not Bribing in Each Group
group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5
Not Bribe 3184 1449 171 91 54
Bribe 1383 1605 304 186 60
In this section, we presented Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8, which are based on a classification by
a relative ranking.37 We ranked firms in ascending orders of size and partitioned them.38 In
Figure 7.7, each group contains 20 firms, and in Figure 7.8, each group represents 10 firms.
Each dot shows how many firms paid bribes in each group. For example, the first dot shows the
proportion of the smallest 20 firms that paid bribes, out of the 20 firms in this group.
Moreover, in Figure 7.8, we separate the firms into two groups, depending on whether each
firm had a tax code. We called those with tax codes formal firms and the rest informal firms.
37Figures based on a classification by the absolute number of employees are also available upon request. The
figures show that the likelihood of paying bribes increases with size based on a relative ranking.
38If there were some firms of the same size, we used a computer program to permutate them randomly. We
repeated this procedure several times to see whether the feature of increasing likelihood of bribes as size increased
still helds.
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In Figure 7.8, we selected firms having fewer than 200 employees. Informal firms tended to be
smaller, and for a good comparison, we selected 200 firms instead of 500, unlike Figure 7.7.
Insert Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8
From Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8, it appears that larger-sized firms were more likely to pay
bribes, and formal firms were more likely to pay bribes than informal firms in each size group,
particularly in 2005 and 2007.
4.3.4 Logit Regression on Bribes
As a preliminary investigation, we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the cate-
gorized samples, as shown in Table 4. Let Yij denote the portion of firms bribing out of the
total number of firms in each group i 2 f1;    ; 5g for the year j 2 f05; 07; 09; 11g. Then, the
ANOVA model is represented by:
Yij = + j + ij;
where  is the overall average, j is the treatment effect for group j, and the error terms, ij ,
are assumed to be independent and normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation .
To expand our study of the relationship between the probability of paying bribes and the firm
sizes, we conducted a logit regression on bribes and assessed whether paying bribes was related
to firm sizes. Assets included both short-term and long-term assets of the firm. Tax code
(denoted by TAX) is a dummy that represents the formality of firms. This variable was given
the value of 1 if a firm acquired both a business registration certificate (BRC) and a tax code
and otherwise the value was 0.39 The 10 dummies for firms’ location are represented by PROj
for each district j. Finally, TY Pk represents the five firm-type dummies for each k. The firms’
39There are two ways to define a formal firm in the survey: (i) a firm that holds a BRC, and (ii) a firm that holds
both a BRC and a tax code. A firm can have a BRC without a tax code, but it is not possible to have a tax code
without a BRC, because the tax authorities require a BRC before issuing a tax code. The two definitions differ in
the level of commitment to formalization and thus the extent to which firms are visible to civil servants. Further
investigation using the transition matrix of formal incidence using the first definition provides some contradictions.
For example, about 10.7% of firms obtained BRCs in 2007, while about 13.1% of registered firms lost their BRCs
in that year. This may indicate some misreporting. Therefore, we used the second definition in the analysis.
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dummies include five types: a household business, a limited liability company (hereafter Ltd),
a private enterprise, a joint stock, and a cooperative.40
Unregistered firms usually have restricted access to credit, infrastructure, public services and
markets. Such firms, therefore, may try to become formal to overcome such limitations. On the
other hand, remaining informal enables firms to escape the heavy burdens of regulations such
as taxes or labor-related requirements. It is, therefore, of interest to see which force is dominant
in the Vietnamese case.
Let Y kij denote whether firm i of type k in district j paid bribes. If the firm paid bribes, Y
k
ij
equals 1, and otherwise 0. Then, we considered the following formulation
Y kij = 0+1  log(sizei)+2  log(agei)+3  log(asseti)+4 TAXi+j5 PROj+k6 TY Pk+kij:
To estimate the logit regression, we used the dummy of household business from the set of firm
type dummies and the dummy of Province 10 from the set of province dummies for normaliza-
tion.
Finally, we estimated two sets of regressions in order to check the robustness of our regression
results. The first one was a fixed-effects regression that used each firm’s ID recorded in the
survey, because there might have been some reverse causality between bribes and firm size.
The second one took differences in formality into account using a mixed-effect regression, and
we assume a fixed effect over the formality, and random effects over age and location.41
40A household business is a business that is not registered as an enterprise under Vietnam’s Enterprise Law.
Many businesses operate as a household business, both informally (i.e.,without a license) and formally (i.e., with
a license). An Ltd is established by member capital contribution to the company. An Ltd is “a legal entity separate
from the owner(s), the owner’s liability for the firm’s debts and obligations is limited to his capital contribution”
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2005). A private enterprise is “a firm owned by an individual, who is its legal
representative. The owner has total discretion in making business decisions and is liable for its operations because
he owns all firm assets. Each individual can only establish one private enterprise” (Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
2005). A joint stock company is “a company whose capital is divided into shares, and the liability of each share-
holder is limited to the par value of the shares held by him/her.” (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2005). A coop-
erative is a collective economic organization that is founded by individuals, households or legal entities who have
common demands and benefits, and who volunteer to contribute capital and labor (Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
2003).
41We estimated various combinations of fixed and random effects over these variables and used Akaike Infor-
mation Criteria (AIC) to choose this particular combination.
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4.3.5 Empirical Findings on Bribes
Our regression results from the logit regression are summarized in Table 12. The results from
the fixed-effect and mixed-effect regressions are presented in Table 13. Table 14 shows the
odds ratio and the 95% confidence interval. The odds ratios computed from the results of these
regressions are also presented in Table 14. Finally, Table 15 shows that the p-value from the
ANOVA, conducted for a preliminary study of the data, was 0.0039; thus, we rejected the null
hypothesis that the proportion of firms paying bribes came from the same distribution across
different groups at the 5 % significance level.
Insert Table 12, Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15.
Table 14 indicates that firm Size has some positive association with the likelihood of paying
bribes, and further, that the likelihood of bribing compared to not bribing increased by 1.68 if
a firm had a tax code, compared to a firm not having a tax code. Further, observing a negative
effect of firm age may appear to be counterintuitive, because the longer a firm has operated, the
greater the firm’s visibility is likely to be, which may lead to an increased likelihood of paying
bribes. Our interpretation of this result is that a firm is perhaps more likely to need to pay bribes
at the start of business.42 Comparing the odds ratio from the ordinal OLS and the one from the
fixed-effect regression, we see that age had a negative effect in the ordinal OLS, whereas age
had a positive effect in the fixed-effect regression. We can conclude that if a firm pays bribes at
the start of business, then the likelihood of paying bribes increases over time.
Table 14 also indicates that firms’ location is important to the likelihood of paying bribes. Com-
pared to being located in Province 10, being located in Province 9 resulted in the highest like-
lihood of paying bribes. Province 7 had the second highest likelihood of paying bribes. Firm
type also had an interesting effect on the likelihood of paying bribes. Ltd and Private firms had
higher likelihoods of paying bribes than did cooperative or joint stock firms.
Finally, Figure 7.8 shows that the formality of firms was an important determinant of the likeli-
hood of paying bribes. It is well known that the informal sector plays an important role in many
developing economies. According to Schneider and Enste (2002), the informal sector gener-
ates from 10% to 20% of the aggregate output in developed countries and more than 30% for
42Another interpretation could be that firms paying bribes might be less competitive and thus exit rates for these
firms might be higher, which lead to lower survival rates for those firms.
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developing countries, with some reaching more than 50%. Our analysis indicates that corrup-
tion could be one possible explanation for the dominance of the informal sector in a developing
country.
It is also known that corruption is one of the most significant barriers to economic growth. Many
studies have provided evidence that corruption reduces human capital, discourages investment,
leads to a mis-allocation of resources, and slows down economic development. However, few
studies have analyzed possible causes of corruption, and most of them have used cross-country
data on corruption perception(Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda, 2006, Mo, 2001b), rather than firm-level
data from one nation. Our analysis provides insights on the dynamics of bribery at the firm
level.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we used Vietnamese data to examine the relationship between firm size and
production efficiency, as well as the relationship between firm size and the likelihood of paying
bribes. We presented results indicating that middle-sized firms tend to produce less efficiently
relative to small-sized or large-sized firms; and that the likelihood of paying bribes is corre-
lated with firm size. Thus, our study fills in the gap in the literature by analyzing firms in a
developing country in which small firms dominate the economy and exhibit higher efficiency
levels, compared to their middle-sized counterparts.43 Moreover, the heterogeneity of firm size
at the bottom of the U-shape across industries indicates the importance of sector level analysis
in investigating the missing middle. Our analysis also contributes in this point.
One might question whether our findings from a transition economy—Vietnam—provide a suf-
ficient basis for generalization, particularly because much of the missing middle literature has
concerned Africa. The business environment and its features vary substantially from country to
country. It would be interesting to see if we observe a similar feature in a different country.
Several interesting future research paths follow from our analysis. A next step is to conduct a
43In the literature, there has been an increasing interest in the relationship between firm sizes and their char-
acteristics such as innovation and market structure (see Acs and Audretsch, 1987), growth and productivity (see
Bentzen et al., 2011) or job creation (see Dalton et al., 2011). There are, however, few empirical studies on the
relationship between firm size and efficiency level, and studies of a developing country are particularly rare. Also,
in preceding works, large firms have been found most efficient (see Angelini and Generate, 2008, Leung et al.,
2008).
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similar analysis on production efficiency with data from developed countries and to compare
the results for Vietnam. If we observe lower productivity for middle-sized firms, we could
then consider the cause. If we only observe this U-shaped pattern in developing countries, we
could examine the reasons that this pattern exists in developing countries but not in developed
countries.
Finally, it would be interesting and important to study the causes of these differences in produc-
tivity across different firm sizes in developing countries. OECD Publishing (2013) reported two
main reasons among OECD countries for the differences in productivity across different firm
sizes: (a) firm size matters for productivity, and (b) structural differences at the industrial level
of an economy affect the relative performance of firms with different scales across countries.
First, in most countries, it has been shown that there is possibility for improving production
efficiency by increasing firm size. Larger firms are on average more productive than are smaller
ones. In large-scale industrial sectors in relatively low income countries, large firms are, on av-
erage, 2–3 time more productive than smaller firms. However, large services sectors in relatively
high income countries, small firms are usually more productive than are large firms. It would
be interesting to investigate whether these factors are also important in developing nations.
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CHAPTER 5
INDUSTRY INEFFICIENCIES AND FIRM SIZE
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we investigated empirically the relationship between firm size and pro-
duction efficiency at the firm level. We showed that middle-sized firms’ production efficiencies
tend to be lower than the efficiencies of small-sized or large-sized firms in most manufacturing
industries in Vietnam. The result, however, was based on a firm-level efficiency analysis. Be-
cause the missing middle in firm size distribution represents a macro phenomenon, summarized
these scores into a few industry-level efficiency score and investigated those in relation to firm
size.
The problem of aggregation has been studied in various fields of economics, such as consump-
tion, production, and investment. Klein (1946) opened the discussion on the consistent ag-
gregation of individual economic relations. Later, Debreu (1951) introduced the coefficient of
resource utilization (CRU) to measure the overall efficiency of an economy.
In efficiency analysis, the aggregation problem is more complicated, compared to firm-level
analysis because the analysis can be carried out at many levels of aggregation, for example,
at the plant, firm, industry or economy levels. Moreover, in a multi-input, multi-output analy-
sis, the level of input and/or output aggregation significantly affects the accuracy of efficiency
measurements.
The inefficiency of an industry (or a group of firms or production plants) is defined as the differ-
ence between the observed production of the industry and the potential production that would
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be possible if all resources were allocated and used efficiently. To the best of our knowledge,
the first paper to address industry inefficiency explicitly in a linear programming framework
was presented by Ray and Hu (1997). Ray and Hu introduced a basic model in a primal con-
text, in which only input and output quantities were observed. Later, Lozano et al. (2004)
introduced the so called centralized resource allocation model which used the same idea (and
it is in fact a special case of Ray and Hu (1997)’s model in which the number of firms is fixed
to the observed one). Ray and Hu interpreted the same optimization model from the point of
view of a central planner who must allocate resources efficiently. After these attempts, other
researchers developed models to accommodate alternative empirical settings (see Aparicio et
al., 2013, Aparicio and Pastor, 2012, Asmild et al., 2009, 2012, Fang, 2013, Fang and Zhang,
2008, Gime´nez-Garcı´a et al., 2007, Lotfi et al., 2010, Lozano and Villa, 2004, 2005, Lozano et
al., 2004, 2009, 2011, Mar-Molinero et al., 2012, Ray, 2007, Ray and Mukherjee, 1998). Ray
et al. (2008) extended the industry efficiency model using a cost function approach with input
prices varying across locations. Following this idea, Peyrache (2015) introduced an indirect
characterization of the problem, which involved solving a mixed-integer non-linear program.
Similar to the definition for the inefficiency at the firm level, the definition of the inefficiency
of an industry normally depends on the underlying assumptions of the production possibility
set. Convexity, thus, is normally considered a critical assumption. In this chapter, we provide
an approximation theorem to report all the different specifications introduced in the literature
applied to the same basic optimization program. This program is linear and can be solved using
standard simplex methods. This process introduces advantages in terms of both computation
and interpretation. The computational advantage is obvious. The interpretational advantage
comes from the fact that we now need to discuss a very simple basic model to which we can
refer for any type of aggregate analysis. Thus, this model is a unifying tool for a body of
literature that has been fragmented and dispersed on this topic. Essentially, in our analysis,
we prove that the industry inefficiency is approximately the same if measured under different
technology, and the convexity and scale assumptions made regarding the firm-level technology
become irrelevant when we consider the overall inefficiency of the industry. The theorem is
of particular importance in our case. As indicated in the previous chapter, evidence shows the
existence of non-convexity in firm production technology, and efficiency score obtained from a
convex frontier such as DEA may be biased. In contrast, with the theorem, the discussion on
industry inefficiency is independent of the convexity of the production technology.
Moreover, to investigate the relationship between aggregate efficiencies and the missing mid-
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dle further, we extended the proposed framework to the meta-technology approach pioneered
by Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004) and to the group-wise efficiency proposed in
Nesterenko (2007). In particular, we segmented the input and output matrices of Vietnamese
manufacturing industries into groups of different size and investigated the differences in ef-
ficiencies between size groups and the meta-estimates. We found differences between the
group-frontiers and the meta-frontiers. In addition, the meta-technology efficiencies (MTE)
were highest for the small-sized group, and in particular for groups of firms with fewer than 50
employees. This finding confirms the differences in the characteristics of the firms’ operating
environments across size groups.
Thus, the chapter contributes to the literature on meta-frontier analysis. Hayami (1969) first pro-
posed a meta-production function to measure the difference in productivity in the agricultural
sector across differences among countries. Hayami and Ruttan (1970), subsequently, developed
a meta-frontier concept based on the meta-production function to compare efficiencies across
groups of firms/units. The meta-production function is, thus, defined as the boundary of an
unrestricted technology set. Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004) were first to intro-
duce the concept of the meta-frontier for measuring the technical efficiency and technology gap
effects separately, using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Later, O’Donnell et al. (2008) intro-
duced the analytical framework necessary for a metafrontier. They also show that a metafrontier
can be estimated either by non-parametric or parametric methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we define the firm (or plant) and the
industry (or aggregate) technologies and present our approximation results. Section 3 provides
a decomposition of this inefficiency into sources components. In section 4, we discuss, for
the sake of completeness, the extension to the dynamic case. Section 5 provides an empirical
application based on a number of manufacturing industries of the Vietnamese economy to shed
light on the missing middle phenomenon. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
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5.2 Technology definition
5.2.1 Firm level technology and inefficiency
In the previous chapter, the production set of a firm was defined in the one-output, three-input
space. In the following analysis, we extend the terminology is to a multiple-input and -output
case. In particular, we consider an industry that produces y = (y1; :::; yM) 2 IRM+ outputs using
x = (x1; :::; xN) 2 IRN+ inputs. Data are observed for a group ofK firms. We consider (possibly
unbalanced) panel data settings by assuming that there are T periods (each period is denoted by
t = 1; :::; T ). We can collect all the observations at time t into input and output matrices which
represent our dataset:  
Xt;Yt

; 8t = 1; : : : ; T
These matrices show the observations on the rows. The data-generated production possibilities
set is defined as
	t =
n
(x;y) : x  Xt ; y  Yt ;
X
 = 1
o
: (1)
The production possibilities set 	t is similar to 	i defined in the previous chapter, and satisfies
all regularity conditions as 	i. The inclusion of the intensity vector  and the scale variable ,
however, enable us to represent different technology specifications in one formula.
Assumptions about the intensity variables (; ) are crucial for the definition of alternative
production sets because they define the convexity and scale properties of the technology 1. The
scale properties can be easily characterized using the parameter :
 constant returns to scale (CRS): if   0;
1We note that in principle it is possible to nest the meta-technology approach pioneered by Battese and Rao
(2002), Battese et al. (2004). To do so we segmented the input and output matrices into groups and imposed
additional restrictions on the intensity vectors. Because this does not change the main result of this paper, we
omitted the consideration of group specific technologies to economize on notation. The group technologies are
inherited from our definition by imposing constraints on the intensity variable ; in particular:
 lTl = 1 ; p = 0 8p 6= l defines group specific technologies and a meta-technology which is the union
of these group specific sets (	t = [l	tl);
 T = 1 defines a meta-technology which is the convex hull of these group technologies;
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 variable returns to scale (VRS): if  = 1;
 non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS): if   1;
 non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS): if   1;
The intensity variables,  characterize the convexity properties of the technology:
   0 implies convex technologies;
 j 2 f0; 1g ; 8j = 1; : : : ; K implies non-convex technologies;
All the previous assumptions obout the intensity variables can be used in any mix to produce
alternative technology specifications. Though this definition incorporates most of the specifica-
tions discussed in the literature (see Banker et al., 1984, Charnes and Rhodes, 1978), we focus
on the following:
(i) DEA-BCC (	BCC): obtained assuming convexity and VRS;
(ii) DEA-CCR (	CCR): obtained assuming convexity and CRS;
(iii) Free Disposal Hull (FDH) (	FDH): obtained assuming non-convexity and VRS;
The advantage of this formulation is that it provides a unified definition of all basic technologies
under different returns to scale and convexity assumptions2. In the following discussion, we
consider the previous three technologies because of their widespread use and because they pose
bounds on all the other alternative specifications. It is easily be seen that
	CCR  	BCC  	FDH :
The definition of technology as presented in Equation 1 corresponds to the firm-level benchmark
technology, which we will use to assess the technical efficiency of firms.
2The definition of firm technology allows also to nest the definition of a non-convex CRS hull. This is obtained
assuming   0 and  2 f0; 1g. We decided to focus our discussion only on the BCC, CCR and FDH models
because of their popularity. This is without loss of generality because as shown in the later section, the bounds that
we derive for the inefficiency measures, are based on the CCR and FDH models: these two models produce the
most and the least conservative sets. All the other sets are included between these two.
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In this analysis, in contrast to the work in the previous chapter, we used the directional distance
function (DDF) (Chambers et al., 1996, 1998) to measure technical inefficiency because we are
interested in a measure of aggregate inefficiency, and the additive nature of DDF allows for the
summation of individual firm inefficiencies3. The DDF is defined as:
D(x;y;g) = maxf : (y + gy;x  gx) 2 	tg: (2)
where g = (gx; gy) specifies the direction in which inputs are to be contracted and outputs are
to be expanded to reach the efficient boundary4. D(x; y; g) satisfies some important properties
including:
(i) homogeneous of degree  1 in the directional vector (g): D(x; y;g) = 1

D(x; y; g);
(ii) translation: D(x  gx;y + gy; g) = D(x; y; g)  ; 8 2 IR;
(iii) if the technology exhibits CRS, then, D(x; y; g) = D(x; y; g);  > 0.
The DDF can be computed with respect to any of the technologies we defined earlier. In order
to obtain a measure of inefficiency at the firm-level, one can compute the DDF with respect to
the firm level technologies. Thus, we obtained a measure of firm technical inefficiency for each
of the firm technology definitions (focusing on the CCR, BCC, and FDH models for the reasons
explained above):
 BCC (Convex, VRS): DBCC (x; y; g) = D (x; y; g j 	BCC);
 CCR (Convex, CRS): DCCR (x; y; g) = D (x; y; g j 	CCR);
 FDH (Non-convex, VRS): DFDH (x; y; g) = D (x; y; g j 	FDH);
For the way the firm technologies are constructed, it holds that:
DCCR (x; y; g)  DBCC (x; y; g)  DFDH (x; y; g) :
3Readers should also note that the DDF basically generalizes the traditional Shephard distance function defined
in the previous chapter.
4We can retrieve the Shephard distance function with a radial direction of DDF out of the origin.
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In other words, the CCR model provides the least conservative estimate of technical efficiency,
and the FDH model provides the most conservative estimate of technical efficiency within the
class of technologies considered by definition 1.
5.2.2 Industry technology
In the previous section, we introduced the representation of the firm technology. The definition
of technology explicitly allows for alternative specifications of the scale and convexity proper-
ties of the technology. In this section, we extend these notions to the industry level. We assumed
that any number of firms can operate in the industry (entry and exit of firms is allowed) and all
the firms in the industry face the same technology set 	t5. The peculiar characteristic of an
industry technology definition (as opposed to the firm technology definition) is that we allow
for free replicability of production plans. A technology set is said to satisfy free replicability if
8 (x; y) ; (x0; y0) 2 	t ; then (x+ x0; y+ y0) 2 	t:
In other words, free replicability allows for any replication or any addition of existing produc-
tion plans. It should be noted that free replicability does not, in general, imply additivity of the
industry or firm technology, although it excludes the possibility of sub-additivity of the industry
technology (see Fa¨re, 1986, for a definition of additivity). Sub-additivity of the technology can
be excluded by assuming that the production set is convex. This means that free replicability is
the same as additivity in a DEA model, but it is weaker than additivity in a non-convex (FDH)
model. We can think of a sub-additive industry technology in cases where the addition of new
production plants or firms produces negative externalities; but this topic is outside the scope of
this chapter.
An alternative interpretation of the industry technology comes from a management perspective,
where we rename firms as “production plants” and the industry as a “company”. Our definition
of the company technology, then, implies that the company can activate as many production
5If one insists in considering the meta-technology approach, then the industry technology will be either the
union or the convex hull of the group specific technologies. Our assumption is then that every firm can choose
any of the available group technologies (i.e. firms face the same meta-technology). We should also emphasize
that once allowance for free replicability is made, the distinction between the meta-technology and the group
technologies becomes much less relevant. In fact, the free replicability assumption implies that the industry can
pick any production plan from any group technology and in any combination.
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plants as desired.
At the industry level, it is possible for a specific production plan to be replicated many times
within the industry. In other words, free replicability allows for the replication of any individual
firm as well as the combination of proportional production plans in the industry. With this
assumption in place, we can define the industry technology as an enlargement of the firm-level
technology. The industry production possibilities set will be the union of all the possible sums
of production plans of the firm technology (see Peyrache, 2013):
	tI =
1[
S=1
SX
s=1
	t: (3)
In this definition, S is the number of replicates and these replicates can come from the sum of
any allowable production plans at the firm level. It is easy to see that the firm technology is a
subset of the industry technology. It should be noted that in general
PS
s=1	
t 6= S	t, unless the
technology is convex (see Fa¨re et al., 2008, Li and Ng, 1995, Zelenyuk, 2006, for a proof of this
result). Because we allowed for non-convex technologies, we maintained the general definition
of free replicability contained in equation 3. Applying this definition to our data-generated
technology model (model 1) returns the following explicit definition of industry technology:
	tI =
(
(x; y) : x  Xt ; y  Y t ;
X
k
k = S ; S 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g
)
: (4)
The industry technology represents an enlargement of the firm-level production technology. We
note that in the CRS convex case the industry technology definition is trivially satisfied by the
firm-level production set (i.e., a CRS convex firm-level technology is equivalent to the asso-
ciated industry technology enlargement). In all other cases, the free replicability assumption
enlarges the firm production possibilities set. Alternative assumptions on the intensity vector
return different industry-level technologies. We shall consider the following ones (in which the
parameter S is free)6:
 the convex, VRS, free replicable set (	BCCI ):  = 1;
6We are once again only focusing on the free replicable enlargement of the BCC, CCR and FDH technologies.
This is without loss of generality.
90
5.2. TECHNOLOGY DEFINITION
 the convex, CRS free replicable set (	CCRI = 	CCR): as mentioned before, this is a
trivial case in which the firm technology definition actually satisfies free replicability;
 the non-convex, VRS, free replicable set (	FDHI = 	FRH):  = 1 and  2 f0; 1g. This
industry technology is equivalent to the free replicability hull (FRH) proposed in Tulkens
(1993), which allows for integer replications of all observations and sum of observations.
From the previous definitions, we can make the following conclusion about the relationship
among different industry technology sets:
	CCRI  	BCCI  	FRHI :
In other words, all the industry technologies we consider were contained in the convex CRS in-
dustry technology and contained the non-convex VRS industry technology (the free replicable
set). To measure inefficiency at the industry level, we benchmarked any input-output combina-
tion against an industry technology set. The industry-level DDF was then calculated by solving
either a linear or a mixed-integer linear program. The result of such a program returned the
optimal intensity vector (), the optimal value of the DDF and the optimal value for the param-
eter S. The parameter S is interpreted as the optimal number of firms that should populate the
industry in order to reach a fully efficient configuration. At this point, it is relevant to present
the optimization program explicitly. Thus, we write the program for the FRH because this is
the set for which we have the highest number of restrictions on the intensity variables (the other
sets can be obtained by relaxing these restrictions):
DFRHI (x; y; g) = max
;;S

st x  gx  Xt
y + gy  Y tX
k
k = S
k 2 f0; 1g 8 k = 1; : : : ; K
S 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g :
In accordance with the three types of industry level technologies, three different types of ineffi-
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ciency scores can be obtained:
 Convex, VRS: DBCCI (x; y; g);
 Convex, CRS: DCCRI (x; y; g);
 Non-convex, VRS: DFRHI (x; y; g);
All these measures of industry inefficiency are based on alternative convexity and scale assump-
tions of the underlying firm-level production technology. From the definition of industry-level
technology, we can conclude that:
DCCRI (x; y; g)  DBCCI (x; y; g)  DFRHI (x; y; g) :
Therefore, all the industry inefficiency measures are bounded from the convex CRS technology
and the free replicability hull. In the next proposition, we clarify the connection between these
two fundamental industry inefficiency measures.
Proposition 5.1. If the industry is large enough, then:
DFRHI (x; y; g) ' DCCRI (x; y; g) : (5)
Proof. From our definitions, we have
DFRHI (x; y; g) +  = D
CCR
I (x; y; g) :
where the residual difference   0 is clearly bounded. Without loss of generality, we can write
any input-output combination as (x; y) = 1
K
(x; y) where (x; y) is the average input-output
bundle and K is the number of replicates (number of firms). Applying property (iii) of the DDF
we can write:
DFRHI (x; y; g) +  = D
FRH
I (Kx; Ky; g) +  = KD
CCR
I (x; y; g)
By dividing both sides by K, we have
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1
K
DFRHI (Kx; Ky; g) +

K
= DCCRI (x; y; g)
The right-hand side DCCRI (x; y; g) is independent of the number of firms K. We have,  is
bounded. Moreover, since replicability implies super-additivity (Bogetoft andWang, 2005)7, we
have 
K
converges to zero and the left hand side of the above equation converges toDCCRI (x; y; g)
as K ! 1. In other words, when industry production expands because the number of firms
producing the average input-output vector increases, we have
1
K
DFRHI (Kx; Ky; g)! DCCRI (x; y; g)
A more direct interpretation of this result can be achieved when we consider a largeK:
1
K
DFRHI (K:x; K:y; g) ' DCCRI (x; y; g)
in which case we obtain the statement of the proposition (after re-arranging terms).
This proposition shows that the industry inefficiency is approximately the same if measured
under a convex CRS technology or a free replicable hull. In other words, the convexity and
scale assumptions made on the firm-level technology become irrelevant when we consider the
overall inefficiency of the industry! This is further clarified in the next corollary.
Corollary 5.2. If the industry is large enough, then
DFRHI (x; y; g) ' DBBCI (x; y; g) ' DCCRI (x; y; g) :
This corollary follows immediately from the fact that the FRH inefficiency is converging to
the convex CRS inefficiency, and the BCC distance is bounded by these two. To restate the
result, the industry inefficiencies are approximately the same regardless of the underlying con-
vexity and scale assumptions imposed on the firm-level technology. As a result, the industry
inefficiency of any technology in the class defined by equation 3 can be approximated by the
7(xA; yA); (xB ; yB) are called super-additive if we have: f(xA + xB ; yA + yB ; g)  f(xA; yA; g) +
f(xB ; yB ; g).
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efficiency of a convex CRS technology. This bears some important computational and analyt-
ical advantages because we no longer have to solve complex optimization programs (integer,
mixed-integer or non-linear mixed integer) for measuring industry inefficiency. In fact, all the
industry inefficiency notions proposed in the literature can be re-constructed to a basic case
that can be solved via a simple linear program. In addition, the discussion regarding whether
to impose convexity and different scale assumptions onto the technology becomes irrelevant at
the industry level. To simplify notation, in the next two sections, we omitted references to the
convexity and scale assumptions of the industry model, and just use IEt = DI (x; y; g) to refer
to the industry inefficiency (as approximated by the CRS convex hull).
5.3 Industry Inefficiency Decomposition
In the previous section, we showed that the industry inefficiency is approximately the same, re-
gardless of the assumptions on returns to scale and convexity of the underlying firm technology.
In this section, we discuss the components of such an industry inefficiency measure. An aggre-
gate indicator of firm technical inefficiency was obtained by summing the DDF scores for all the
firms in the sample (see Briec et al., 2003, Fa¨re and Zelenyuk, 2003, Fa¨re et al., 2008, Fa¨re and
Primont, 2003). Because we have three alternative definitions of firm-level inefficiency (CCR,
BCC, FDH) we will obtain three alternative measures of aggregate performance:
ITEtBCC =
X
k
DBCC (xk; yk; g) :
ITEtCCR =
X
k
DCCR (xk; yk; g) :
ITEtFDH =
X
k
DFDH (xk; yk; g) :
where it holds that:
ITEtCCR  ITEtBCC  ITEtFDH :
It should be noted from the above equation that the free disposal hull and the CRS hull pose
bounds on the movements of the aggregate firm technical inefficiency. This is not surpris-
ing, considering the fact that the FDH results in the most conservative estimate of technical
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inefficiency, and the CRS results in the least conservative estimate of technical inefficiency. Be-
cause we know from the theorem in the previous section that the industry inefficiency for each
time period can be approximated by the convex CRS technology (irrespective of the underlying
assumptions on scale and convexity), we obtain the following decomposition of the industry
inefficiency:
IEt = ITEt + IREt: (6)
where the ITEt component is one of the previous technical efficiency measures (and clearly
IEt  ITEt). IEt is the overall industry inefficiency, which is a measure of aggregate loss in
outputs or waste in inputs at the industry level; IREt is a reallocation effect, that measures the
contribution to the overall industry inefficiency, arising because of a mis-allocation of resources
across production units. As it stands, the left-hand side of this equation remains approximately
unchanged if one changes the convexity and scale assumptions on the firm-level technology.
In contrast, the decomposition of the equation on the right-hand side depends on the assump-
tions one is willing to make regarding the technology. The convex CRS firm technology returns
the most conservative estimate of the reallocation effect; in contrast, the FDH firm technology
returns the most conservative estimate of the technical efficiency effect. The FDH and CRS in-
efficiencies set bounds for the values that this decomposition can take. Therefore, the difference
between the two gives insight into on the stability of the decomposition relative to alternative
convexity and scale specifications of the firm technology. An alternative way of looking at the
result contained in our theorem is in terms of this decomposition. Because the left-hand side is
approximately invariant to the specification of the firm-level technology, choosing the most con-
servative estimate of firm-level inefficiency (the FDH) implicitly means that one is assigning the
least conservative weight to the reallocation component in the decomposition (and vice versa).
In other words, trying to build a benefit-of-the-doubt indicator for the firm-level inefficiency
returns the highest possible value of the reallocation component!
A simple interpretation of the previous decomposition can be given in terms of the percentage
contribution of each component:
%ITEt +%IREt = 1:
where %ITE = ITEt=IEt and %REt = REt=IEt. Showing the percentage contribution of
each component makes the decomposition easier to understand.
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5.4 Industry productivity change
In this section, for the sake of completeness, we briefly consider a comparison of the industry
between two time periods. The industry inefficiency change (IEC) is defined as the difference
of the industry inefficiencies at the two time periods:
IEC = IEt   IEt+1: (7)
IEC has a positive (negative) value if the industry performance deteriorates (improves) over
time. Because the measure of industry inefficiency is approximately equal for alternative con-
vexity and scale assumptions, so is its change in time. The change in inefficiency is only one
component of productivity change, the other one being the shift of the production frontier itself.
A measure of technical change, which captures the shift of the production frontier can be cal-
culated using the Malmquist-Luenberger method as the average of industry technical change at
the base (ITCt) and comparison (ITCt+1) periods. More explicitly,
ITC =
1
2

Dt+1I (x
t+1; yt+1; g) DtI(xt+1; yt+1; g) +Dt+1I (xt; yt; g) DtI(xt; yt; g)

:
(8)
ITC has a positive (negative) value if the industry production frontier shifts inwards (outwards).
Putting the previous two definitions together, we obtain a measure of industry productivity
change (IP):
IP = IEC + ITC:
We note, once again, that these measures of technical change and efficiency change at the in-
dustry level are approximately invariant to the choice of the scale and convexity properties of
the underlying firm technology set. Therefore, when it comes to measuring productivity change
at the industry level, the underlying convexity and scale assumptions on the firm level tech-
nology become essentially irrelevant. This very strong result stems from our approximation
theorem. This result also justifies the common practice of using CRS technologies to measure
productivity change at the industry level.
We can decompose industry productivity change further by noting that the industry inefficiency
change component itself can be decomposed. Taking into account the efficiency decomposition
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introduced in the previous section, productivity change can thus be further decomposed into
IP = ITC + ITEC + IREC; (9)
where ITEC = ITEt   ITEt+1 and IREC = IREt   IREt+1. The first component on
the right-hand side (ITC) is invariant to the choice of the convexity and scale properties of the
technology. The other two components depend on the bounds we identified earlier.
5.5 An empirical illustration
5.5.1 Data
In this chapter, to be consistent with the analysis presented in the third chapter, we continued to
analyze the Census Enterprise Survey collected by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. We
focused on the nine-year period from 2000 to 2008 and included 14 sectors of the manufacturing
industry that had at least 200 observations for each year. The number of observations ranged
from approximately 3,350 to 32,000 per industry (Details of the dataset can be found in Chapter
3).
Next, we considered the situation in which a firm uses capital, labor, and intermediate materials
to produce goods, which are measured in monetary terms labor is measured by the total income
of employees in a firm. Real revenue was used as a proxy for output. Three inputs were included
in our estimation: intermediate inputs, labor, and capital. The intermediate material included
costs such as fuel and the value of other materials. Labor was measured by the total income
of employees in a firm. This included total wages and other employee labor-related costs such
as social security, insurance and other benefits. Capital was measured as assets to be used in
production. All input values were adjusted to account for inflation to obtain a real value.
Empirical Results
We applied our previous models to the dataset of Vietnam. For simplicity and to save space,
we report only results derived from the static decomposition which focused on industry ineffi-
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ciency, rather than on productivity change8. This choice was dictated by the fact that our main
result was based on the static decomposition rather than on the productivity decomposition (the
approximate invariance of the productivity decomposition hinges on its static version). Table
16 shows the results for each sector of the Vietnamese economy. For each sector, we report two
tables: the first table displays the industry inefficiency (IE) and the aggregate firm inefficiency
(ITE) for each year. These quantities are reported for each of the technology specifications con-
sidered in the previous sections (CCR, BCC, and FDH). The second table shows the percentage
contribution of the ITE and IRE components to the overall inefficiency of the industry. The
numbers were calculated for each year and each model. All the inefficiency values reported in
these tables are computed using the following directional vector: gx = 1 and gy = 0.
First, it should be noted that for all sectors, the industry inefficiency (IE) value (as computed
using the directional distance function) was approximately the same under alternative convexity
and scale properties of the underlying firm level technology. For example, if we look at sector
14 in table 16, the industry inefficiency shows large variation across different years, but it is
largely the same under different model specifications. In year 2000, it was 450,200 for the
CCR and BCC models and 450,194 for the FRH model. At the end of the period in 2008, these
figures weremore than three times higher but still very similar to each other: 1,466,380 for CCR
and BCC and 1,466,340 for FRH. If we look at the aggregate firm inefficiency (ITE) numbers
in the same table, it is possible to appreciate the impact of the scale and convexity assumptions
on the firm technical efficiency scores. For example, in year 2000, the scores were 250,567,
189,358 and 147,479 for the CCR, BCC and FDH models respectively. These are quite large
variations, considering that the ITE-CCR inefficiency for 2000 was almost double the one from
the ITE-FDH model. Another interesting feature of these numbers is that the ITE-CCR did
not grow as much as the industry inefficiency, being less than double the initial value in year
2008 (474,055). In contrast, the ITE-FDH inefficiency measure grew almost proportionally
to the inefficiency of the industry (414,499 in year 2008). Moreover, the difference between
alternative models in the first time period is much larger than it was in the last time period in
the sector.
The differences between alternative models are more evident if we look at the percentage results
for the sectors shown in Table 16. In particular, in year 2000, the CCR model shows that
55.7% of the industry inefficiency can be attributed to aggregate firm inefficiency and 44.3% to
8We used Matlab functions to solve the linear and integer-mix programs associated with our efficiency mea-
sures under CCR, BCC and FDH technologies. The code is available upon request.
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reallocation of resources. These numbers are quite different for the FDH model, with aggregate
firm inefficiency accounting for 32.8% of industry inefficiency and the reallocation component
accounting for about 67.2% of the industry inefficiency. It should be noted that although the
overall inefficiency of the industry remains unchanged thanks to our theorem, the underlying
components changed quite a lot.
If we look at the other sectors, our main story is similar. As noted, the industry inefficiency is
approximately invariant to the choice of the underlying convexity and scale assumptions on the
firm-level technology. The components of this industry inefficiency, however, depend quite cru-
cially on these assumptions. Sector 17 in table 16 is a good example. The industry inefficiency
in year 2000 was 1,232,733 and about double at the end of the period at 2,432,830. If we now
look at the decomposition of this overall inefficiency, it is possible to appreciate the differences
in the decomposition. In most years, with the exception of year 2008, the ITE-CCR accounted
for about 90% of this inefficiency. On the contrary, according to the FDH model, aggregate
firm-level inefficiency was only about a third of the total inefficiency. Interestingly, the results
from these two models indicate quite opposite policy implications. In contrast, according to
the CCR model, the central planner should focus on improving technical inefficiency, while ac-
cording to the FDH model the main problem is the reallocation of resources across production
plants.
As noted in chapter 3, the DEA and FDH ratios of firm technical efficiency scores in each sector
have prevailed over the existence of non-convexity in production technology of manufacturing
firms. The above discussion justifies the use of non-convex technology to investigate efficiency
scores in the dataset. Moreover, we emphasize the importance of the reallocative effect or
inefficiencies arising because of a mis-allocation of resources across production units in each
sector.
In the next step, to analyze further the missing middle in relation to industry efficiencies, we
extended the proposed framework to the meta-technology approach pioneered by Battese and
Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004). The meta-frontier framework, first, evaluates each observa-
tion relative to its own group’s best-practice frontier (where the units of the group are assumed
to face homogeneous environmental factors and share a common technology) and, second, to
the overall meta-frontier constituted from the best practices of all groups. The meta technology,
therefore, is the union of group-specific technologies, and firms in the sector can choose any
of the available group technologies. The comparison of these two efficiency scores, then, re-
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veals the technology gap or the meta-technology efficiency (MTE) (see Battese and Rao, 2002,
Battese et al., 2004)
In this analysis, we segmented firms in each sector according to their size differences in size9.
In manufacturing industries, firms of different sizes tend to be exposed to different production
environments and technologies. The choice of manufacturing plant scale may prevent manu-
facturers from taking advantage of productive techniques associated with different plant con-
figurations. Small firms, especially informal ones, for example, usually have restricted access
to credit, infrastructure, public services and markets and are subjected to different technology
compared to their larger peers. It is also known that corruption is one of the most significant
barriers to economic growth. Many studies have provided evidence that corruption reduces
human capital, discourages investment, leads to a mis-allocation of resources, and slows down
economic development. Moreover, as shown from our result in Chapter 3, as firm size increases,
the likelihood of paying bribes also increases. Further, formality of firms matters in the sense
that the likelihood of paying bribes is higher for formal firms, which tend to be larger in size.
Table 17 shows the meta frontier estimates for each of the sectors of Vietnamese economy in
each year . For each sector, we grouped firms into five different categories according to size
(1 to 9 employees, 10 to 49 employees, 50 to 99 employees, 100 to 199 employees and more
than 200 employees)10. For each group, we reported the industry efficiency scores (IE) under
both group technology and meta-technology and the meta technology ratio (MTR) which is
the ratio between the two industry efficiency scores11l. All the inefficiency values reported in
these tables were input-oriented to be consistent with the firm level analysis in Chapter 3. In
particular, the scores are computed using the following directional vector: gx = x and gy = 0.
The key findings from the table are discussed in the following paragraphs
First, for the years examined, the industry efficiencies were low under both group and meta
frontiers. This indicates that at the aggregate level, there was much room for efficiency im-
provement in all analyzed manufacturing sectors.
9In the meta frontier literature, most studies divided firms into groups of different industries, regions and/or
countries. According to Simar and Zelenyuk (2007), firms can be grouped as they are “operating under different
regulatory regimes, or different ownership structures (private vs. public, domestic vs. foreign, etc.), or operating
in different regions, or efficiencies of countries at different stages of economic development or transition”.
10To ensure the robustness of the analysis, we also tried other grouping which returned similar results. The
details of the analysis are available upon request.
11We calculated the industry inefficiency (IE) under all three different model (CCR, BCC, and FRH). The all
three models returned similar results as predicted by our theorem. We, therefore, only report the result of CCR
mode.
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Second, a difference exists between the group-frontiers and the meta-frontiers. Except for some
particular years in the small-sized firm group, the majority of efficiencies were lower under meta
technology (i.e. MTRs were smaller than 1). This indicates that the results may be distorted
with the group-frontier.
Third, among different firm-size groups, small - sized firms (from 1 to 9 employees and from 10
to 49 employees) tended to have much higher values for MTR. SinceMTR captures the distance,
and hence, the relative ability of a group to catch up with rest of the firms in the sample, it is
evident that small firms tended to operate closer to the industrial potential. Meanwhile, large
sized groups (firms with 100 to 199 employees and firms with more than 200 employees) tended
to have lower MTRs ( the average level was lower than 50%). These firms operated at much
lower levels, compared to the industry potential. Another interpretation for the obtained result
is that because MTR represents the restrictive nature of the production environment, large-sized
firms tended to have a more restrictive production environment. Interestingly, the empirical
results in Chapter 3 also showed the larger burden of corruption was borne by larger-sized firms
in Vietnam.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provided an approximation theorem that simplifies the computation of in-
dustry inefficiency scores. The industry inefficiency (IE) value is approximately the same under
alternative convexity and scale properties of the underlying firm-level technology. Thus, the
theorem bears some important computational and analytical advantages. First, we no longer
must solve complex optimization programs for measuring industry inefficiency. In fact, all the
industry inefficiency notions proposed in the literature were de-constructed to a basic case that
can be solved with a simple linear program. In addition, the discussion regarding whether to
impose convexity and CRS onto the technology becomes irrelevant at the industry level. We
provided a discussion on the decomposition of the industry inefficiency, which depends on the
assumptions one is willing to make about the technology. In particular, the convex CRS firm
technology will return the most conservative estimate of the reallocation effect, and the FDH
firm technology will return the most conservative estimate of the technical efficiency effect.
The proposition was, then, illustrated using data from a number of different industries in the
Vietnamese economy. We showed that the industry inefficiency measure is approximately in-
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variant to alternative convexity and scale properties of the underlying technology. Moreover,
the proposed framework was extended to the group and meta-frontier approach. The presence
of significant levels of MTR confirmed differences existed across size groups in all analyzed
sectors. This finding implies that there is, indeed, a potential to improve the efficiencies of
Vietnamese firms, even using the current technology. Moreover, the results also imply that it
would be challenging to eliminate the existing inefficiencies in Vietnamese manufacturing sec-
tors because policies and programs for efficiency improvement must target both firms and the
firm’s operating environment.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
Cross-country differences between firms’ output levels and growth are large and persistent (Hall
and Jones, 1999; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare,1997). In the literature, many approaches have
been explored in an attempt to explain such differences. In this thesis, we focused on firm
size distribution (FSD) as the manifestation of firm dynamics. In particular, we analyzed the
missing middle phenomenon in a developing country, Vietnam. The missing middle refers to
the empirical fact that most employment in developing countries is located in either small-sized
or large-sized firms. In view of the fact that the missing middle is more evident in developing
nations, we surmised that there were some reasons that particularly applied to developing na-
tions, but not so much to developed nations. Thus, understanding the mechanism behind the
phenomenon could shed light on cross-country differences in outputs.
In this thesis, we focused on two factors: productivity and corruption. These two factors may
seem unrelated. However, productivity and corruption may represent the distortions driving the
mis-allocation of resources of firms in the economy. We argue that small firms may be reluctant
to become formal to avoid a rise in expected corruption costs. Small firms can then substitute
capital for labor to scale-up production and wait for a productivity shock that will offset the
cost of growth. Another explanation could involve differences in technology or productivity
between firm-size groups.
In this conclusion chapter, we summarize the main results and contributions presented in each
chapter. In general, the results we obtained adequately fulfill the objectives of the study, which
103
6.2. CHAPTER SUMMARIES
were to investigate the missing middle phenomenon and to provide some initial evidence of the
underlying mechanism behind the phenomenon.
In this chapter, we first present a brief summary of all the results described in preceding chap-
ters. The third section highlights the main contributions of the thesis, followed by discussion of
their implications. In the fourth section, we embrace a slightly broader perspective, highlight
some short-comings of the thesis and note analyses we did not try (but might have if not for
time constraints). We also propose lines of research that we believe are of great interest for
future projects.
6.2 Chapter summaries
6.2.1 Chapter 2 - Literature review
The aim of the second chapter was to review the literature. The main content of the chapter was
divided into two parts. The first part presented an overview of the major concepts in the thesis.
In the second part, we examined the FSD-related literature, both empirically and theoretically.
In addition, we analyzed both the definition of a firm and different measures of firm size.
The definition of a firm has been mentioned in many recent theoretical approaches, including
transaction cost theory, property rights theory, knowledge-based view theory, and evolutionary
theory, among others. In this thesis, we adopted the definition of a firm as a collection of assets
that includes both physical and human capital. This definition of a firm was an extension of the
definition used in property rights theory because our definition included labor as a part of the
firm operation process.
The choice of measure for firm size can have a significant impact on the analysis. The size of
a firm can be represented by many proxies, and variables capture the internal process of a firm
differently. Among the possible measures used so far, the number of employees of a firm has
been the most widely used indicator of organizational complexity and seemed the most suitable
measure for distribution analysis. Thus, in this thesis, we used the number of employees of a
firm as the measure of firm size and described the distribution of firms according to this size
measure.
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The second section of Chapter 2 was devoted to providing an overview of the FSD literature.
FSD is a complex issue that requires an integrated analysis of various factors, and this section
showed the difficulty of determining the major factors that affect the distribution of firms in
the market. First, we presented some features of the FSD, mainly of developed countries. In
particular, firm density has been found to be leptokurtic, stable and highly skewed to the right.
Moreover, many studies have shown that FSD tends to follow the Gibrat’s law whereby firm
size is dependent of random shocks that are independent of each other and of the initial size of
the firm. Related to the shape of the FSD, the literature provided evidence supporting both the
log-normal and Pareto distributions in developed countries.
Factors that have important effects on firm growth and FSD formulation were also presented.
These factors were (a) productivity, (b) economies of scale, (c) mergers and acquisition, (d)
policy-related factors and (e) the stochastic factor. The next part focused on analyzing these
factors under different theories. These included stochastic models, learning and selection mod-
els, and behaviorism models. In general, these models differed in their implications for the
distribution of firms. Thus, researchers have tended to adopt one approach or another and jus-
tify their preference.
These models, however, are based mainly on studies of developed economies. Moreover, it
is also a well-known fact that profound differences exist between developed and developing
economies in the business environment . As a result, a sharp empirical contrast has been iden-
tified between FSDs in developed and developing economies. Although the size distribution in
developed countries can be approximated by either the log-normal distribution or the Pareto law,
or a combination of the two, the FSDs in developing countries are characterized by the miss-
ing middle where middle-sized firms account for the smallest proportion of the total number of
firms. The third part of the chapter was, therefore, devoted to summarizing the literature on the
missing middle. We acknowledged various explanations that mainly focused on the differences
in the business environments of developing countries. These included capital constraints, high
corruption levels, differences in regulatory structure, and firms’ access to infrastructure, among
others. Nevertheless, there is no unified agreement on the factors that can satisfactorily ex-
plain such an empirical finding. Given this lack of agreement, the thesis focused on examining
the missing middle phenomenon in a developing country - Vietnam, focusing on two factors:
corruption and productivity.
Vietnam represented an interesting case. Vietnam is a transitional, developing country. Over
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the last two decades, with the emergence of the “Doi moi” (Renovation) process, Vietnam has
experienced a period of continuously high economic growth. However, Vietnam has failed to
become a tiger in Asia as expected. One of the possible explanation for this failure might be
the under-representation of medium-sized firms which are commonly the most dynamic and
growth-oriented firms. Thus, serious considerations of the missing middle phenomenon was
needed to understand the mechanism behind such a bias in FSD because it underpins the mis-
allocation of resources and hinders firm growth.
6.2.2 Chapter 3 - Theoretical model
In Chapter 3, we extended the model presented in Luttmer (2007), which captured the increasing
costs of large-sized firm groups, compared to the smaller ones. This phenomenon has lead to
the concentration of a continuum of infinitesimal firms in the market. Luttmer noted that the
model was more applicable to a developed economy such as the U.S. economy. With our model,
in contrast, we attempted to consider the specific characteristics of a developing economy. The
model describes firm dynamics - in terms of entry, exit, and growth consistent with empirical
evidence in developing countries, while still allowing for heterogeneity in the characteristics of
firms.
In the model, the economy we analyzed was a monopolistic competitive market. Time was
assumed to be continuous. On the consumption side, there was a continuum of infinitely-lived
consumers and each one inelastically supplied one unit of labor at every point of time. The
consumer faced a standard prevent-value budget constraint in which the income consisted of
claims from firms and labor wages. On the production side, firms were monopolistic competi-
tors. There were many producers, each with a certain market power, but the free-entry condition
limited profit opportunities to a certain extent. Firms produced differentiated goods using linear,
constant return to scale technologies. Firms had heterogeneous productivity which evolved over
time stochastically. Potential entrepreneurs had to pay certain costs to enter the market whereas
incumbents needed to pay a fixed cost per unit of time to continue. All costs were measured by
labor.
Active firms in the market were subject to firm-specific and permanent shocks to both produc-
tivity and demand for their differentiated commodities. In particular, the states of consumers’
tastes and firm productivity were assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion which had a
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mean and variance growth rate independent of size. In the model, firms face with the non-linear
cost of corruption and thus tend to stay small. Meanwhile, active firms in the market are subject
to firm-specific, permanent shocks to both productivity and demand for their differentiated com-
modities. In particular, the states of consumers’ tastes and firms’ productivities are assumed to
follow a geometric Brownian motion which has a mean and variance growth rate independent
of size. Therefore, firms can achieve a bigger scale to medium or large-scale groups if they
experience a large enough positive productivity shocks.
Relating to the case of Vietnam, different from other countries, Vietnam experienced a particu-
lar development path. Large-scale firms in Vietnam are mainly State-owned Enterprises which
were established during the period that the economy followed the center planning mechanism1.
Another source of large-scale firms is foreign invested enterprises (FIEs). Since the establish-
ment of the Foreign Investment Law in 1987, there has been a surge in the number of foreign
registered firms2. Among those, the most popular form of investment was joint-venture with
the principle partners being SOEs (98% of joint ventures). These enterprises mainly operated
in heavy industries or strategic sectors such as the extraction of oil and natural gas, chemicals
and automotive with large scale production.
Later, these processes translated into the selection mechanism of firm productivity over time.
This mechanism was crucial for the development of the stationary FSD in the economy. Tech-
nologies available to entrants were assumed to develop at an exogenous rate, which later deter-
mined the economic growth rate. A stationary FSD arose as productivity and demand shocks
improved the productivity of existing firms at an average rate that was not too high, compared
to those that was available among potential entrants.
In the model, we assumed that fixed cost represented the level of corruption and regulatory
burdens that firms of different groups faced in the market. In contrast to Luttmer (2007), fixed
cost in our model was a function of size. As fixed cost increased with the size of the firm,
the value of the firm decreased and the exit barrier increased. This process decreased the size
density for larger firms. As such, changes in fixed cost caused a change in the shape of the FSD
given the variation was not uniform across different size groups in the FSD. In other words, the
increase in fixed cost implied a smaller number of firms in the large-sized firm group, which
1After the war against French in 1954, the state sector of Vietnam was quickly formed by nationalizing exiting
private enterprises and establishing new ones. By 1960, 100% of industrial establishments, 99.4% commercial
firms and 99% of transport facilities were transformed into SOEs (Vu, 2002)
2By 1995, the registered foreign capital was over 2 billion USD annually (a higher level compared to those of
other Asian neighbors like Thailand, South Korea or Taiwan in the same period).
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was in accordance with empirical fact in many developing countries.
This study addressed a limited area of research within the domains of corruption, firm size,
and distribution of firms. The importance of the findings lies in the asymmetry of the growth
opportunities for small firms and large firms in a developing market. This work is one of the few
to offer evidence for the inverse relationship between growth and initial firm size (i.e., violation
of Gibrats law). Evidence for this violation is cited as justification for differential treatment for
small businesses, an issue that has gained attention with both academics and policymakers.
6.2.3 Chapter 4- Empirical Analysis - Corruption and Productivity
The objective of Chapter 4 was to examine the FSD of a developing country, Vietnam and to
explore the driving forces behind the skew distribution of firm size in Vietnam. In accordance
with the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, we focused on two factors:
corruption and productivity.
First, we sought to determine whether any evidence of the missing middle phenomenon existed
in Vietnamese data. We presented a comprehensive analysis of the FSD in Vietnam in which
the hypothesis of bimodality was not rejected. The bi-modality statistics for the overall sample
of the manufacturing industry rejected the hypothesis of unimodality although the statistics for
each sector indicated that firm size distribution in some sectors rejected bimodality. This finding
confirmed the importance of examining the FSD and the underlying mechanism at the sectoral
level.
Next, using firm-level data, we examined different explanations for the existence of the missing
middle in Vietnam. We focused on the relationship between firm size and production efficiency,
as well as on the relationship between firm size and the likelihood of paying bribes in Vietnam.
More particularly, we analyzed production efficiency in each sector of the manufacturing in-
dustry by using the frontier approach within a nonparametric model. Our analysis showed that
in most of the manufacturing industries studied, middle-sized firms’ production efficiencies
tended to be lower than those of small-sized or large-sized firms. In addition, we found the
scale at which minimum efficiency occurred as well as the level of this efficiency were different
across industries. This finding showed the importance of studying the FSD and productivity at
the sectoral level. Together with our result related to the corruption issue, this finding provided
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evidence that the middle-sized firms were disadvantaged in Vietnam.
Further, we analyzed the inefficiencies associated with scale for each firm in each sector. Our
analysis indicated that large-sized firms and small-sized firms tended to produce closer to the
production function, although, compared to the highest average products’ firms, they tended
to have lower average products. In contrast, the middle-sized firms tend to be further from
the efficient production level, and had lower average products. Firms in manufacturing sectors
of Vietnam experienced size inefficiencies in the sense that they can achieve higher average
product if they increase their size. In other words, most firms choose to operate in the smaller
than optimal scales in the analyzed period. One possible explanation is that there are certain
barriers to development, for example, corruption or financial constraints and firms choose not
to produce at the optimal scale or cannot achieve the optimal scale because of those burdens.
In addition, firms in Vietnam enter the market with different sizes. State-owned Enterprises or
Foreign join-ventures tend to be big while private firms are small. Once entering the market,
firms are facing with different burdens depending on their initial sizes. Small or micro firms can
avoid attention of officials and thus pay a smaller corruption cost, compared to their medium
and large peers. The large firms, on the other hand, can utilize effectively corrupted officials
to avoid taxes and other legal requirements. As a result, medium-sized firms are those who are
mostly affected by corruption.
To the best of our knowledge, this analysis was the very first work to connect the missing middle
and production efficiencies across different firm sizes at the sectoral level in a developing coun-
try. Moreover, the results of the analysis indicated the necessity of sector-by-sector analyses to
study the underlying mechanisms of the missing middle phenomena.
Next, we conducted a logit regression to study the relationship between firm size and the likeli-
hood of paying bribes. In this analysis, we used the SME survey, which provided comprehensive
information on all forms of small-sized and medium-sized firms. We analyzed the important
factors involved in firms’ bribing activities, in particular the relationship between firm size and
the likelihood of paying bribes. Our results about corruption indicated that as firm size in-
creased, the likelihood of paying bribes also increased. The formality of firms also mattered
in the sense that the likelihood of paying bribes was higher for formal firms, which tended to
be larger. We also analyzed the relationship between the likelihood of paying bribes and firm
age. Our analysis showed that firms’ ownership types and locations were also important deter-
minants of bribing activities. Interestingly, our analysis also showed that firms perhaps needed
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to pay bribes at the beginning of operation, and if a firm paid bribes at the beginning, then the
likelihood of paying bribes increased over time.
6.2.4 Chapter 5 - Productivity at the industry level
In the previous chapter, we investigated empirically the relationship between firm size and pro-
duction efficiency at the firm level. The result, however, was based on the firm-level efficiency
analysis. Because the missing middle in firm size distribution represented a macro phenomenon,
we summarized the scores into a few efficiency scores at the industry level and investigated
those in relation to firm size.
In Chapter 5, we provided an approximation theorem that encompassed all the different spec-
ifications of industry efficiency introduced in the literature and applied them to a same basic
optimization program. This program was linear and could be solved using standard simplex
methods. This introduced advantages in terms of both computation and interpretation. The
computational advantage was obvious. The interpretational advantage came from the devel-
opment of a simple, basic model to which we could refer for any type of aggregate analysis.
This model served as a unifying tool for a body of literature that has become fragmented and
dispersed on this topic. Essentially, we proved that the industry inefficiency was approximately
the same if measured under different technology and in fact, the convexity and scale assump-
tions made on the firm-level technology became irrelevant when we considered the overall
inefficiency of the industry. We also discussed the components of such an industry inefficiency
measure as the sum of firm technical efficiency and the reallocation efficiency. Although the
industry efficiency remained approximately unchanged if one changed the convexity and scale
assumptions on the firm-level technology, its decomposition depended on the assumptions one
was willing to make about the technology. In addition, for the sake of completeness, we also
briefly considered the industry productivity change.
Finally, to investigate the relationship between aggregate efficiencies and the missing middle
further, we extended the proposed framework to the meta-technology approach pioneered by
Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004)) and to the group-wise efficiency proposed in
Nesterenko (2007). In particular, we segmented the input and output matrices into different
sized groups and then, investigated the differences in efficiencies between size groups and the
meta estimates. We found differences between the group-frontiers and the meta-frontiers. In
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addition,the meta-technology efficiencies (MTE) were highest for the small-sized firm group,
in particular, for groups of firms with fewer than 50 employees. This confirmed the existence
of differences in the characteristics of the firm’s operating environments across size groups.
6.3 Limitations and future research questions
Before closing this thesis we note that this work presented some limitations. These limitations
should not be regarded as failures but as opportunities to further knowledge about this topic.
These limitation are summarized in the following paragraphs:
First, among the many possible factors that could affect the missing middle, the thesis focused
on only two factors: productivity and corruption. Other plausible explanations for the missing
middle phenomenon, such as the financial constraint, should be considered in future studies.
Second, because the missing middle is a common phenomenon discussed in the context of
many developing countries, a similar analysis with developed economies is needed to highlight
possible differences between the two types of economies. The analysis could shed light on the
mechanism behind the missing middle. Moreover, similar analysis using other developing coun-
tries’ data is crucial to generalize the conclusions of our study to settings in other developing
countries. Such an exercise is still open because of the limited data currently available.
Third, related to the empirical study, particularly to the productivity analysis, as pointed out
by Feng and Zhang (2014), choosing to exclude technological heterogeneity of an individual
firm even within a single sector can cause bias in measuring efficiencies and returns to scale.
Measuring returns to scale considering technological heterogeneity for each firm represents an
interesting and promising research path to investigate further the impacts on the missing middle
of inefficiencies associated with scale.
Fourth, relating the theoretical model, we note that the evolution of FSD in different industries
is presumably more complex than the FSD evolution discussed in our study. In particular, many
studies on the dynamics of the FSD have provided evidence on the complexity of forces that
can affect the FSD (see Geroski, 1999, for a survey of growth of forces influencing in certain
stages of the industry life cycle). In addition, the main force operating in the formulation of the
FSD in our model - the decision of bribery was assumed to be exogenous to firms.
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Taking into account all the above-mentioned limitations of the study, one outcome of this the-
sis is that we can propose the basis for an ambitious and diversified research agenda. Future
research should include the following:
- Similar analyses to be conducted using the bribery data to directly investigate the linkage if
any between bribery and the inefficiencies of firms.
- Further investigation on the source of inefficiencies at the firm level and the relationship be-
tween the inefficiencies and both the level and the growth rate of output.
- Similar analyses should be conducted on production efficiency using data from other devel-
oped and developing countries and compare the findings to the results for Vietnam. If lower
productivity for middle-sized firms in developed economies is observed, researchers could then
consider the causes. If we observe this U-shaped pattern only in developing countries, we could
examine the reasons that this pattern exists in developing countries but not in developed coun-
tries.
- The causes of these differences in productivity should be examined across different firm sizes
in developing countries. OECD Publishing (2013) reported two main reasons for differences
in productivity across different firm sizes among OECD countries: (a) firm size matters for
productivity, and (b) structural differences in the industrial composition of economies affect
the relative performance of large and small firms across countries. It would be interesting to
investigate whether these factors are also important in the productivity of developing nations.
- A more comprehensive theoretical framework should be developed that could generate a miss-
ing middle in FSD. In particular, a potential future study could involve endogenizing the bribery
decision of firms in the interaction with governmental officials and political elites.
In general, the main contributions of this study are relevant both empirically and theoretically.
Many questions raised in this thesis could help to improve knowledge about the Vietnamese
case and could be extended to other developing countries. The analysis of firm size distribution
in general and of the missing middle phenomenon in particular was a first step in an interesting
field of research that deserves further investigation. The crucial implications of this study for
policy, market structure and the economic evolution of regions are sufficient justifications for
why this process should be taken into account in economic research.
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CHAPTER 7
APPENDIX
Gibrat’s law
In 1931, a French engineer, Robert Gibrat observed that French manufacturing firms exhibited
a highly right-skew distribution. Such an observation leads to a simple dynamic model predict-
ing that all firms grow at a same proportionate rate, irrespective of their initial sizes. Such a
law is later known as Gibrat’s law or the law of Proportionate Effect. In general, the Law of
Proportionate Effect can be derived from a simple dynamic model in the discrete time. Let st
be the size of a firm at time t, the growth rate of a firm is:
st   st 1
st 1
= "t: (1)
Solving for st by using the recursion formula we have:
st = (1 + "t)(1 + "t 1):::(1 + "1)s0: (2)
Taking logarithm of both size:
log st = "t + "t  1 + :::+ "1 + log s0
=
Pt
i=1 "i + log s0:
(3)
We see that the logarithm of firm size at time t is just the accumulation of random shocks " and
the initial condition s0. These unexpected shocks occur as we do not know what will happen
and when it will happen. As a result, the process is unpredictable. In addition, these shocks are
130
assumed to have permanent impacts on firm size in Gibrat’s model.
From equation (3) and according to the central limit theorem, the logarithm of firm size, once
normalized, can be approximated by the normal distribution since random shocks follow the
normal distribution as time goes to infinity. Gibrat’s law, thus, implies that firm size follows
a random walk. In other words, firms with initial endowments (human resource, technology,
financial capacity, etc.) evolve over time through the accumulation of independent draws from
a Gaussian distribution.
As summarized in Carrizosa (2007), Gibrat’s law implies the identically independent distri-
bution (i.i.d.) of the sequence of random shocks which have finite means and variances. In
particular, Gibrat’s law also implies:
 the independence of firm growth rate from the initial size or the expected firm growth rate
and variance are similar irrespective of the initial size;
 no serial correlation as the previous growth rate has no impacts on current growth;
 the increase with time of firm size diversification or the market concentration will increase
if the number of firms is constant;
 the equalization of variances of firm growth rates as small firms grow as fast as large
firms;
 no optimum size of firms and thus no stationary distribution and the variance of size
approaches infinity as time goes to infinity.
In addition, the continuous version of Gibrats law is closely connected to the Geometric Brow-
nian motion (GBM).
To see this, we have the logarithm of firm size, once normalized by the initial value, implies a
Wiener process with drift and the size is proportional to the exponential of Wiener process with
drift - the GBM, which has the form of:
s(t) = s0e
at+bW (t); (4)
where s(t) is the size of firm at time t, s0 is the initial size and eat+bW (t) is the GBM which does
not depend on the initial value of firms.
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Another way to see the relationship between Gibrat’s law and the GBM is to consider the
stochastic differential equation of the Wiener process with drift. Using the Ito formula, we
have:
ds(t) = a:s(t)dt+ b:s(t)dW (t): (5)
Then the growth rate of a firm is:
ds(t)
S(t)
= a:dt+ b:dW (t); (6)
which is independent of current firm size.
Power law, the Pareto distribution and Zipf’s law
Power law is a profound property of the size distribution1. If variable si follows Power law, let
p(si)ds be the fraction between si and si + ds, then the histogram in log-log scale is a straight
line and we have:
log p(si) =   log si + c; (7)
or
p(si) = Cs
 
i ; (8)
where  is the exponent of the power law and the constant C is of minor importance because
once  is fixed, C can be determined by normalizing p(si).
A number of properties of the power law can be listed here.
 In the log-log scale, the cdf of the law can be approximated by a straight line;
 The tail index  of the distribution implies the level of market concentration, which rep-
resents the relative difference in size among firms (Simon and Bonini, 1958).
 Power law is scale-independent. The industrial structure, if following the power law,
depends only on the interaction among its components rather than any external effect or
individual behaviors.
1Power law governs the asymptotic distributions of many statistics which (i) take values as positive numbers;
(ii) range over many different orders of magnitude; (iii) arise from a complicated combination of largely indepen-
dent factors; and (iv) have not been artificially rounded, truncated, or otherwise constrained in size (Tao, 2009).
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 The slope of power law is relatively stable over time, which in many cases, has the value
of unity in the rank - size scale.
In the literature, there are various mechanisms to generate the power law for a distribution. As
summarized in Newman (2004), these include, but not exclusively, the combination of expo-
nentials, the inverses of quantities, the random walk, the Yule process, the phase transitions and
critical phenomena or the self organized criticality, among others.
Next, we represent two alternatives of looking at the power law: the Pareto distribution and
Zipf’s law.
First, Pareto distribution is defined for a continuous variable. It is the continuous version of the
power law2. The Pareto law is normally expressed in terms of a cdf function.
Considering an economy with n firms, each has s employees, we start by asking “What is the
size of the ith largest firm? The Pareto distribution says, the number of firms with size greater
than or equal to s follows:
i = Cs
 (1=)
i ; (9)
where i is the frequency or the rank of size.
On the other hand, Zipf law - named after George Kingsley Zipf, an American linguist- can be
viewed as a discrete Pareto distribution, a “flipped” counterpart of the Pareto distribution. Zipfs
Law appears when the Pareto distribution exponent is equal to unity. Zipf’s law implies that the
probability of a firm size being greater than a given level decays with the growth of size and the
size s of the ith largest firm follows:
s = C i : (10)
This is exactly the definition of the Pareto distribution, except the two axes are flipped. In a
plot, Zipf’s law plots the relevant variables on the horizontal axis and the cdf on the vertical one
while the Pareto distribution does vice versa.
2The distribution is named after Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist, who first used this distribution to de-
scribe the distribution of income.
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The derivation of Eq. (11)
Proof. We have:
Rt;a   wt+aLt;a = (Zt;a
wt+a
)=(1 )Ct+a   (Zt;a
wt+a
)=(1 )Ct+a (11)
= (1  )(Zt;a
wt+a
)=(1 )Ct+a: (12)
Also, we have:
wt+a exp(Sa) = wt+a exp(S[Z] +

1  [ln(
Zt;a
Zt;0
)  Ea])
= wt+a exp(S[Z]): exp(

1  [ln(
Zt;a
Zt;0
)  Ea])
= wt+a(1  ) Cwt+a (
Zt;a
wt+a
)=(1 ) exp( 
1  [ln(
Zt;a
Zt;0
)  Ea])
= (1  )(Zt;a
wt+a
)=(1 )Ct+a[
(Zt;a)=(1 )
(Zt;a exp(Et))=(1 )
][ 1
exp(Ea)
]=(1 )
= (1  )(Zt;a
wt+a
)=(1 )Ct+a
(Zt;a)=(1 )
(Zt;a)=(1 )
:
(13)
The derivation of Eq. (14) and Eq. (15)
Proof. The size of firm evolves with age according to dsa = da + dWt;a. Apply the Ito
formula for sa we have:
dsa =
@sa
@a
da+ @sa
@Wt;a
dWt;a
= 
1 
@sa
@a
[lnZ exp(Et+Ia+ZWt;a)
Z exp(Et)
+ Ea]da+

1 ZdWt;a
= 
1  (I   E)da+ 1 ZdWt;a:
(14)
Moreover, we see that exp(sa) is a geometric Brownian motion and can be presented by:
exp(sa) = exp(t+ ZdWt;a): (15)
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Let us consider exp(t+ ZdWt;a) = Xt. Applying the Ito formula, we can obtain:
dXt = (+
1
2
2Z)Xtdt+ ZXtdWt: (16)
Then, the drift of the Geometric Brownian Motion or the mean of firm size is  + 1
2
2Z . The
GBM satisfies the Gibrat law which states that the growth rate of firm size is independent of the
current state (current size).
According to Proposition 3.3.1 in “The Theory of Zipf’s law and Beyond,” under all assumption
mentioned so far and also if firm size follows the GBM, provided that the intensity of firm birth
is constant, (Gibrat’s law holds) there exists a steady state mean density of firm size for any
s > 0.
The solution of Eq. (19)
Proof. The first equation of (19) is a linear, second order non-homogeneous differential equa-
tion of the type:
ay00(s) + by0(s) + cy(s) = g(s): (17)
Let the associated homogeneous differential equation be:
ay00(s) + by0(s) + cy(s) = 0: (18)
If Y1(s); Y2(s) is the two solutions for the non-homogeneous differential equation (17) and
y1(s) and y2(s) is the set of fundamental solutions for the associated homogeneous differential
equation (18), then Y1(s)  Y2(s) is also a solution of equation (18) and can be written as:
Y1(s)  Y2(s) = n1y1(s) + n2y2(s): (19)
Proof. Let us plug Y1(s)  Y2(s) into the homogeneous equation (18) we have:
a(Y1   Y2)00 + b(Y1   Y2)0 + c(Y1   Y2) = 0
aY 001 + bY
0
1 + cY1   (aY 002 + bY 02 + cY2) = 0
g(s)  g(s) = 0:
(20)
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So Y1   Y2 is the solution of (18).
Also, since y1(s) and y2(s) is the fundamental set of solutions for the associated homogeneous
differential equation, they form a general solution and any solution of (18) can be written as:
y(s) = n1y1(s) + n2y2(s): (21)
As Y1   Y2 is the solution of equation (18) so we can write:
Y1(s)  Y2(s) = n1y1(s) + n2y2(s):
We use this fact to get the general solution for the non-homogeneous equation (17).
Let y(s) be the general solution for (17) and YN(s) a particular solution for (17) that we can
get, then we can have:
y(s)  YN(s) = n1y1(s) + n2y2(s)
y(s) = n1y1(s) + n2y2(s) + YN(s):
(22)
If we define YH(s) = n1y1(s) + n2y2(s) as the complementary solution, the general solution of
the differential equation can be written as:
y(s) = YH(s) + YN(s): (23)
In other words, the solution of the ordinary differential equation is the sum of the solution of
the corresponding homogeneous equation, equation (18) and the particular solution to (17).
Considering our case, we have:
 (r   )V (s) + V 0(s)+ 1
2
V 00(s)2 =   exp(s) + F (sa):
To find the solution, we first need to find the complementary solution for the associated homo-
geneous equation:
  (r   )V (s) + 1
2
2V 00(s) + V 0(s) = 0: (24)
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The general solution for the homogeneous dynamic equation can be calculated by solving the
associated quadratic polynomial 1
2
2X2+X   (r ). Then, the complementary solution is:
c1 exp(s) + c2 exp(s) where ;  is the two roots of the quadratic polynomial.
 =    
p
2 + 2(r   )2
2
=   
2
 
r
(

2
)2 +
r   
2=2
; (25)
and
 =
 +p2 + 2(r   )2
2
=   
2
+
r
(

2
)2 +
r   
2=2
: (26)
We have  < 0 and  > 0. The homogeneous equation represents the value of option to exit.
Since the probability of the firm with high productivity to exit is small, the value of exit option
goes to zero as productivity goes to infinity. And since  > 0, we expect to have c2 = 0 and
thus the solution for the homogeneous ODE is:
YH(s) = c1 exp(s): (27)
We now need to find the particular solution for the non-homogeneous ODE. We utilize the
fact that if Y1(s) is the particular solution for ay00 + by0 + cy = g1(s) and Y2(s) is the particular
solution for ay00+by0+cy = g2(s) then Y1(s)+Y2(s) is the particular solution for ay00+by0+cy =
g1(s) + g2(s).
First, we can write:
g(s) =   exp(s) + F (s) = g1(s) + g2(s): (28)
Now, consider:
V 0(s)+
1
2
V 00(s)2   (r   )V (s) =   exp(s) = g1(s): (29)
We use the “Undetermined Coefficient” method to solve the equation. In particular we look into
the function form of g1(s) and guess the form of Y1(s), leaving the coefficient undetermined.
Then, we plug the guess into the differential equation and try to determine the value of the
coefficient. If we can determine the value of the coefficients then the guess is correct.
For g1(s), we can guess the solution since the forcing term has the form of A exp(s). By
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plugging the solution into the non-homogeneous ODE, we have:
V 0(s) + 1
2
2V 00(s)  (r   )V (s) =   exp(s)
Aes + 1
2
2Aes   (r   )Aes =   exp(s)
A =  1
1=22+ (r ) :
(30)
Then, the particular solution for the non-homogeneous differential equation with g1(s) = exp(s)
is:
Y1(s) =   1
2 +   (r   ) exp(s): (31)
Therefore,
y(s) = c1 exp(s)  1
1=22 +   (r   ) exp(s) + Y2(s): (32)
Now, utilizing the two boundary conditions: V (b) = 0 and V 0(b) = 0, we can calculate c1 and
b.
We have:
V (b) = 0 (33)
c1 exp(b)  1
1=22 +   (r   ) exp(b) + Y2(s) = 0: (34)
Then,
c1 = exp( b)[ 1
1=22 +   (r   ) exp(b)  Y2(s)]: (35)
Also, since V 0(b) = 0, we have
c1 exp(b)  1
1=22 +   (r   ) exp(b) = 0: (36)
By combing the solution from (35) into (36), we can obtain:
exp( b)[ 1
1=22+ (r ) exp(b)  Y2(s)] exp(b)  11=22+ (r ) exp(b) = 0
[ 1
1=22+ (r ) exp(b)  Y2(s)]  11=22+ (r ) exp(b) = 0
exp(b)( 1)
1=22+ (r )   Y2(s)1=22+ (r ) = 0:
(37)
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The exit barrier is then,
exp(b) =

   1 + Y2(s): (38)
Now if we assume a certain function form for g2(s) and use the same “Undetermined Coeffi-
cient” method we can have exact form of Y2(s). Then using the boundary conditions (V (b) = 0
and V 0(b) = 0) we can solve for c1 and value of b to find the value of the firm V (s) and the exit
threshold b. In particular, the value of firm size V (s) and the exit threshold are, respectively:
V (s) = 1
r (

1+
)(exp(s  b)  1  1 exp( (s b))

) for s  b
exp(b) = ( 
1+
)(1  +2=2
r  ):
(39)
The derivation of Eq. (26) to (28)
Given the initial density and the lower bound b, the Kolmogorov equation of firms with initial
size x provides the transition probability density of the Brownian Motion process zt;a (the pro-
ductivity of the firm). We can see that this represents the absorbed Brownian Motion with drift
where the absorbing barrier is b.
Following Taylor and Karlin (1998), a standard Brownian Motion without drift with the absorb-
ing barrier being zero and the variance being unity has the transition distribution, which can be
calculated using the reflection principle as:
Pr(S(a) > sjS(0) = x) = (s+ xp
a
)  (s  xp
a
); (40)
where (:) is the cdf of the normal distribution function
If the absorbing barrier equals b 6= 0, using the reflection principle again, the transition distri-
bution will be:
Pr(S(a) > sjS(0) = x) = (s+ x  2bp
a
)  (s  xp
a
): (41)
The next step is to calculate the distribution for the Brownian motion with drift. To construct the
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(; ) Brownian Motion with time domain [0; T ], we keep the origin process X and change the
probability measure. In other words, we replace the probability measure P (
; F; P ) with the
other probability measure P (
; F; P ) such that X is a Brownian Motion on P . Following
the Change of Measure Theorem as in Harrison (1985)3, we define P  the new probability as:
dP  = dP = exp[

2
(s  x)  
2a
22
]dP: (42)
We can derive the transition distribution of the Brownian motion with drift with absorbing
barrier equals b, which is:
 (a; sjx) = 1

p
a
[(
s  x  a

p
a
)  exp[ 2(x  b)=(2)](s+ x  2b  a

p
a
)]; (43)
where (:) represents the normal density function
To find the firm marginal, we integratem(a; s) over all ages:
m(s) =
R1
0
exp( a) (a; sjx)da
=
R1
0
[ exp( a)

p
a
( s x a

p
a
)]  exp[ 2(x  b)=(2)[ exp( a)

p
a
( s+x 2b a

p
a
)]da:
= A1   exp[ 2(x  b)=(2)]A2;
(44)
where: A1 =
exp( a)

p
a
( s x a

p
a
) and A2 =
exp( a)

p
a
( s+x 2b a

p
a
):
Now consider A1, we have:
A1 =
Z 1
0
exp( a)

p
a
(
s  x  a

p
a
)da:
Since the standard normal density function of a random variable z, (z), has the form of (z) =
1p
2
exp( 1=2z2), we have:
3The Change of Measure Theorem: Given  2 R, let ; P be defined as: (i)  = V(T ) = exp[Xt   ( +
1=222)] where  = 2 ; (ii)P
(A) =
R
A
(!)Pd(!) where A 2 F or dP  = dP .Then X is a ( + ; )
Brownian Motion on (
; F; P ):
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A1 =
1

R1
0
exp( a)p
2a
exp( 1
2
( s x a

p
a
)2)da
= 1

R1
0
[ 1p
2a
exp[  1
22a
(s2 + x2 + 2a2   2sx  2sa+ 2xa)  a]]da
= 1

R1
0
1p
2a
exp(  
2
(s  x)  1
22a
[(s  x)2 + (22 + 2)a2])da:
(45)
Solving the integral, we have:
A1 =
1

exp( (s x)
2
) 1q
2+22
2
exp(  js xj

q
2+22
2
)
= 1p
2+22
exp( 1
2
[(s  x)  js  xjp2 + 22])
= min(exp((s x));exp( (s x)))p
2+22
:
(46)
where  =  
2
+
q
( 
2
)2 + 
2=2
and  = 2 +
q
( 
2
)2 + 
2=2
.
Now consider A2, we have:
A2 =
Z 1
0
exp( a)

p
a
(
s+ x  2b  a

p
a
)da:
Since (:) is also the standard normal density function, we have:
A2 =
Z 1
0
exp( a)

p
2a
exp( 1
2
(
(s  b) + (x  b)  a

p
a
)2))da: (47)
Following the similar steps as in equation (45) and solve for the integral, we have:
A2 =
1

exp(
[(s  b) + (x  b)]
2
)
1q
2+22
2
exp( j(s  b) + (x  b)j

r
+ 22
2
): (48)
Since s > b and x > b, we have:
A2 =
1p
2+22
exp[(s+ x  2b)( 
2
 
q
( 
2
)2 + 
2=2
]
= 1p
2+22
exp[(s+ x  2b)( ): (49)
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From equation (46) and (49), the density of firm size can be written as:
m(s) = min(exp[(s x)];exp[ (s x)])p
2+22
  exp[ 2(x b)
2
] 1p
2+22
exp[(s+ x  2b)( )
= 1p
2+22
[M   exp( 2(x b)
2
  (s+ x  2b)( )];
(50)
whereM = min(exp[(s  x)]; exp[ (s  x)]).
Since    =  22 , we have:
exp( 2(x b)
2
  [(s+ x  2b)( )]) = exp[(  )(x  b) + (x  b+ s  b)]
= exp[( (x  b)] exp[ (s  b)]:
(51)
Then,
m(s) =
1p
2 + 22
[M   exp[ (x  b)] exp[ (s  b)]]: (52)
Also, since  +  = 22
p
2 + 22, 1p
2+22
=   1

 
+ and then,
m(s) =   1

  
 + 
[M   1
exp[(x  b)] exp[(s  b)] ]: (53)
ReplaceM = min(exp[(s  x)]; exp[ (s  x) and rearrange, we have:
m(s) =   1

 
+ [
min(exp[(s b)] exp[(s b)];exp[(x b)] exp[(x b)]) 1
exp[(x b)] exp[(s b)] ]
=   1

 
+ [
min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1
exp[(x b)] exp[(s b)] ]
=   1

 
+G;
(54)
where G = [min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1
exp[(x b)] exp[(s b)] ]
Then the probability density can be derived from m(s) by integrating m(s) over s to find the
corresponding normalizing constant.
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R1
b
m(s)ds =   1

 
+
R1
b
[min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1
exp[(x b)] exp[(s b)] ]ds
=   1
 exp[(x b)]
 
+ [
R1
b
min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1
exp[(s b)] ]ds
=   1
 exp[(x b)]
 
+F;
(55)
where F =
R1
b
min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1
exp[(s b)] ds.
Since for b < s < x, we have s   b < x   b while for s > x we have s   b > x   b, then
rearrange the integral we have:
F =
Z x
b
exp[( + )(s  b)]
exp[(s  b)] ds+
Z 1
x
exp[( + )(x  b)]
exp[(s  b)] ds 
Z 1
b
1
exp[(s  b)]ds:
(56)
Solving the integrals, we have:
 Z x
b
exp[( + )(s  b)]
exp[(s  b)] ds =
Z x
b
exp[(s  b)]ds = exp[(x  b)]

  1

:
 R1
x
exp[(+)(x b)]
exp[(s b)] ds = exp[( + )(x  b)]
R1
x
1
exp[(s b)]
= exp[( + )(x  b)] 1 exp[(x b)]
= exp[(x b)]

:
 Z 1
b
1
exp[(s  b)]ds =
1

:
Then,
F = exp[(x b)]
   1 +
exp[(x b)]

  1

= +
 [exp[(x  b)]  1]:
(57)
Moreover, we have     =  22 and  = 22 . By replacing into the above equation, we
have: R1
b
m(s)ds =   1

 2
2
[1  exp[ (x  b)]]
= 1 exp[ (x b)]

:
(58)
Then, the firm size density is the weighted average of the density (sjx) of size, conditional on
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the initial size. For any x > b, we have:
(sjx) = m(s)R1
b
m(s)ds
: (59)
Substituting equation (58) and (54), we have:
(sjx) =   1

   
+ 
G]  [  1

   

 [1  1
exp[(x  b)] ]
 1: (60)
Because
  1

   
 + 


  1

   

 [1  1
exp[(x  b)] ]
 1
=

 + 
 exp((x  b)
exp((x  b))  1 ;
Rearranging (sjx) we have:
(sjx) = [min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1
exp[(x b)] exp[(s b)] ] + 
exp((x b))
exp((x b)) 1 :
= [min(exp[(+)(s b)];exp[(+)(x b)]) 1
exp[(s b)] ] [+  (exp((x  b))  1)] 1
= ( exp[(x b) 1]

exp[(s b)]

) 1min[ exp[[+](s b)] 1
+ ;
exp[(+)(x b)] 1
+ ]:
(61)
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The derivation of Equation (30)
The total labor hours available in the market are divided into (i) LE: the number of hours to set
up new firms (covering the entry cost E), (ii) LF : the number of hours to maintain the existing
firms (covering the fixed cost F ) and (iii) L: the number of hours to produce goods.
In addition, the measure of existing firms in the market, defined on the set of possible ages (a)
and sizes (s), grows at the rate of  . This has the density at time t of m(s)I exp(t) where
I exp(t) is the number of new firms attempting to enter the market per unit of time.
Then the total amount of labor used to cover entry cost E is:
LE = EI: (62)
The total labor to create new entrants equals entry cost multiplies with the measure of potential
entrants.
Since in the balance growth path, the measure of firms in the market is (M), the firm density
(m(s)), then, has the measure of M=M 0, where M 0 capture the measure of potential firms
that are trying to enter the market per unit of time. Then, the measure of active firms can be
represented as F (s):I
R1
b
m(s)ds. In other words, the total amount of labor to cover fixed cost
F (s) is:
LF = F (s):I
Z 1
b
m(s)ds: (63)
The, amount of labor to cover production of a firm is determined through profit maximization
condition through Eq. (10) to (13):
From (10) we can write:
Rt =
wtLt

:
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Substituting Rt into (11) we have:
wtLt
   wt(Lt + F (s)) = wt(exp(s)  F (s))
Lt   (Lt + F (s)) = (exp(s)  F (s))
Lt =
 exp(s) F (s)( 1)
1  :
(64)
Thus, the total amount of labor to cover production is:
L =
I
1  
Z 1
b
[ exp(s)  F (s)(   1)]ds: (65)
Calibration
Entry and exit and the heterogeneity of firms have been proved to be important factors that
contribute to firm growth in the literature. In chapter 3, we have developed the model in which
growth is the result of the increase in variety, technology progress and selection. In this section,
using the firm data from Vietnam in 2005, we will measure the magnitude of each factor’s
impact to firm growth.
Following Luttmer (2007),  parameter in the monopolistic competitive market is set to be close
to unity, which is 0:9. This implies that in the economy, goods produced by different firms are
close substitutes and hence introducing another variety only moderately increases the utility.
The demand curve faced by firms is nearly perfectly elastic. We now try to decompose the
growth rate of per capita consumption, . From Equation (16), we have:
 = E + (
1 

)
= I + (E   I) + (1  ):
(66)
The per capita consumption growth rate can be decomposed into within-firm growth rate (I),
the selection component (E   I) and the increase of variety of goods (1  ).
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First, the contribution of increase in variety is then:
1  

 = :00133:
The proportion of increase due to changes in variety in per capita consumption growth rate is
minor given the fact that goods are close substitute and the population growth rate in Vietnam
is about 1.17% in 20054.
To calculate the within firm growth rate (I) and the selection component (E   I), we need to
calculate ; 2 and Z .
First, from the definition of  in Equation (15), assuming  is minor, we have:
    
2
2
; (67)
where  is the tail index of the firm size distribution and  represents the variation of firm size.
The variance 2 can be calculated from the entry rate (&) - the rate of new firm successfully
enter the market per unit of time over the total number of firms. This, in turn, equals population
growth rate plus the exit rate in the equilibrium.
Also, following Luttmer (2007), we have & = +22=2, we can now calculate for the variance
2 and the drift .
In particular, we have
 =  
2 = 2 2 :
(68)
In addition, Z can be calculated using:
Z =
(1  )

: (69)
Now, considering Vietnam economy in 2005, we have the entry rate of firms in Vietnam to be
4The results for other years are available upon request.
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17.8% (GSO, 2006) and the population growth rate to be 1.3%.
The tail indexes  is the slopes of the distribution line. In this chapter, we follow (Axtell, 2001)
to estimate the value of the distribution tail index of firm size by regressing the logarithm of
frequency of firm appearance in a certain size group against the logarithm of that size, allowing
for an error term in the deterministic specification. The results of tail index of Vietnam in
different years as well we across size groups in 2005 is presented in the tables below.
Table 1: Values of the tail index - , 2000-2005
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 -1.07 -1.1 -1.14 -1.14 -1.16 -1.18
P -value < 0:0001 < 0:0001 < 0:0001 < 0:0001 < 0:0001 < 0:0001
R2 .79 .79 .8 .8 .8 .79
Note:  is the tail index of the FSD. R2 is the coefficient of determination.
Table 2: Values of  across size groups in 2005
Size group 1-100 100-200 >200
 -1.31 -1.03 -0.8
P -value < 0:0001 < 0:0001 < 0:0001
Here, we group the samples into three group which include firms with 1-100, 100-200 and over
200 employees5.
5We use these size cutoffs when grouping the sample to ensure that we have enough firms in each group to
ensure the characteristics of size distribution. We have also tried some other different cutoffs, of which results are
not substantially different from the presented result.
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Table 3: Value of  and 2
size group    2 Z
mean 1.18 0.14 (0:487)2 0.054
1 - 100 1.31 0.12 (0:439)2 0.048
100 - 200 1.03 0.15 (0:532)2 0.06
>200 0.85 0.19 (0:676)2 0.08
Different from developed economies as specified in Luttmer (2007), the tail index of the FSD of
Vietnam is significantly different from unity. In the literature, Zipf’s law (i.e. the tail index of
the firm size distribution equals unity) has been confirmed in many countries including United
State, Denmark or many European countries. However, among developing economies, the de-
viation from Zipf’s law is not uncommon. The tail index of FSD can be found to be greater than
unity in countries like Cambodia with  = 1:33 (Tanaka and Hatsukano, 2010), or Ghana with
 = 1:6 (Giovanni and Goyette, 2009). This, therefore, also contributes to the scare literature
of FSD research by providing relatively significant evidence of the rejection of Zipf’s law in the
distribution of firm size in developing economies.
The calculations of , 2 and Z are presented in Table (3).
From the Table 3, we can see that, compared to US economy, Vietnamese economy is charac-
terized with higher variance in productivity growth of small and large firms. This supports the
empirical evidence so far that the degree of heterogeneity across firms is greater for developing
countries than for the developed ones.
Now we can decompose . According to the General Statistic Office of Vietnam, the growth
rate of GDP per capita of Vietnam in 2005 is 8.4%, increasing by 80 USD per person, compared
to 2004. This number can be used to approximate the per capita consumption growth rate. The
detailed decomposition is illustrated as in Table 4.
In such an economy where goods are close substitutes and the population growth rate is small
as above, the contribution of variety improvement is minor, only 0.0015 in the total of 8.4%.
The majority of growth rate stems from the increase in productivity of incumbent firms. One
different point from Luttmer’s economy is that, the contribution of selection is relatively small,
compared to the productivity growth part of incumbents.
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Table 4:  decomposition
size group  I E   I (1  )
 (1 

)
mean 0.14 0.067 0.0155 0.0015
1 - 100 0.13 0.070 0.014 0.0015
100 - 200 0.15 0.066 0.017 0.0015
>200 0.19 0.061 0.021 0.0015
Illustration of the Algorithm in Chapter 5
We use the FDH algorithm developed by Soleimani-Damaneh and Reshadi (2007) (see also
Soleimani-Damaneh and Mostafaee, 2009). The algorithm is as follows:
Step 1. Denote by D, a set of observations (xj; yj) for all j 2 N . Compute ij for all i; j 2 N
by ij = yi
yj
where yi; yj 2 D.
Step 2. Compute ji for all i; j 2 N by ji = maxs2Sfxjs 
ij
xis
: (xi; yi) 2 Dg.
Step 3. Compute i and Ai for all i 2 N by i = minj2N ji and Ai = fj 2 N : ji = ig.
Step 4. Compute +i and 
 
i for all i 2 N by +i = maxj2Ai ij and  i = minj2Ai ij .
Soleimani-Damaneh and Mostafaee (2009) proves that +i and 
 
i are equivalent to the ones
defined in Problem 3. The next simple example demonstrates the algorithm. The original
version of the following example is found in Soleimani-Damaneh and Mostafaee (2009).
Table 5: Example for the Algorithm
Firm i Labor Capital Output Output
Labor
Output
Capital 
i3 Average Products i1(Labor) (Capital)
Firm 1 1 1 4 4 4 1/2 2/3 1/2 -
Firm 2 2 1 3 3/2 3 3/8 16/9 2/3 3/4
Firm 3 3 4 8 8/3 2 - - - 2
Suppose that labor and capital are used to produce one output and our data includes three firms’
production. We consider Firm 3’s production. By Table 5, we can compute 3 = 13 = 2=3, and
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A3 = f1g. Firm 1 is the most “efficient”. Because 31 = 2, +3 =  3 = 2. This implies that
if a same technology and management skills of Firm 1 are available for Firm 3, Firm 3 could
achieve Firm 1’s production efficiency by reducing its production scale. Otherwise, it indicates
that there is some problem for Firm 3 to achieve Firm 1’s efficiency. The above algorithm
extends an idea of this simple example to the case of multiple inputs.
151
List of Tables
Table 6: ISIC Codes and Industry Description
ISIC Industry Description ISIC Industry Description
14 Other mining and quarrying 15 Food products and beverages
17 Textiles 18 Wearing apparel etc.
19 Tanning and dressing leather 20 Wood and wood products
21 Paper and paper products 22 Publishing, printing etc.
24 Chemical products etc. 25 Rubber and plastic products
26 Nonmetallic mineral products 28 Fabricated metal products
29 Machinery and equipment etc. 36 Furniture
Table 7: Summary of Enterprise Census Data Statistics (Firm Size)
Size Capital Material
Sector # Observations Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev.
Sector 14 9369 480.00 308.00 669.40 340.63 123.50 702.11 262.50 17.00 702.11
Sector 15 29713 268.63 27.50 699.80 292.63 35.50 683.13 505.75 309.50 683.13
Sector 17 6251 385.00 76.00 697.90 294.13 24.00 2716.69 2303.00 1753.50 2716.69
Sector 18 10177 427.00 224.50 663.52 275.50 19.50 689.05 358.88 73.50 689.05
Sector 19 3347 8918.63 4925.00 12172.47 362.63 31.50 2526.35 2263.63 2015.50 2526.35
Sector 20 11096 283.75 24.50 694.98 712.88 230.00 684.00 316.88 80.00 684.00
Sector 21 6986 309.75 61.00 686.64 337.88 149.50 1087.30 642.75 84.00 1087.30
Sector 22 8435 287.88 13.00 696.97 308.13 57.00 691.28 305.50 33.50 691.28
Sector 24 6927 330.63 94.00 680.31 298.75 57.00 693.97 360.13 72.00 693.97
Sector 25 9457 300.50 42.00 689.49 329.63 51.00 699.46 270.50 16.00 699.46
Sector 26 11813 276.63 22.00 697.41 283.50 40.50 698.78 388.63 73.50 698.78
Sector 28 15853 354.50 110.00 676.98 297.88 53.50 705.04 416.13 106.00 705.04
Sector 29 4203 526.00 39.00 926.41 5114.63 1129.50 690.35 321.75 33.50 690.35
Sector 36 10387 301.25 16.50 694.92 286.88 54.50 1156.72 1087.25 862.00 1156.72
1 Size is measured by the number of employees.
2 Capital and Material are measured in home currency (not inflation adjusted).
3 St. Dev. is standard deviation.
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Table 8: Summary of Enterprise Census Data Statistics (Number of Observations)
Year Total Sec 14 Sec 15 Sec 17 Sec 18 Sec 19 Sec 20 Sec 21 Sec 22 Sec 24 Sec 25 Sec 26 Sec 28 Sec 29 Sec 36
2000 8020 476 2276 336 474 221 735 355 239 369 420 988 514 201 416
2001 9282 577 2462 381 585 253 662 483 343 442 523 1046 691 267 567
2002 11287 755 2724 500 726 288 845 560 485 556 693 1106 1013 329 707
2003 12989 833 2833 549 872 318 1086 616 620 633 805 1185 1302 395 942
2004 15834 965 3316 662 1168 398 1175 779 894 756 1008 1367 1696 482 1168
2005 17915 976 3632 794 1278 444 1309 914 1068 857 1221 1465 2023 554 1380
2006 19461 926 3859 934 1351 392 1597 920 1476 990 1336 1421 2252 569 1438
2007 24149 1140 4587 1086 1849 492 1907 1158 1729 1139 1726 1705 3066 733 1832
2008 25077 2721 4024 1009 1874 541 1780 1201 1581 1185 1725 1530 3296 673 1937
Note: Each number shows the number of observations in each sector of each industry.
Table 9: Summary Statistics (Number of Employees)
2005 2007 2009 2011
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Min. 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1
Max. 1929 90 1300 120 2561 65 496 321
Median 15 5 11 5 11 5 8 8
Mean 37.72 8.13 30.57 7.92 27.01 8.07 20.02 21.62
Standard Deviation 87.89 8.54 70.13 10.40 78.23 9.56 37.11 40.10
# Observations 1083 494 1530 597 1568 446 1364 614
Total 1577 2127 2014 1978
1 All entries are measured in terms of the number of employees, except for the number of observations.
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Table 10: Shapiro–Wilk Test for Normality
Year # Observation W 1 Z Pr(> jZj)
2000 8020 0.28 21.28 < 0:0001
2001 9282 0.26 21.78 < 0:0001
2002 11287 0.21 22.52 < 0:0001
2003 12989 0.18 22.99 < 0:0001
2004 15834 0.18 23.59 < 0:0001
2005 17915 0.14 24.05 < 0:0001
2006 19461 0.14 24.29 < 0:0001
2007 24149 0.15 24.88 < 0:0001
2008 25077 0.11 25.10 < 0:0001
Asterisks correspond to the following p-values:p < 0:001.
1 The test statistic W is given by W = (
Pn
i=1 aix(i))
2Pn
i=1(xi x)2
, where x(i) are the ordered sample values, and ai are constants
generated from the means, variances, and covariances of the order statistics of a sample of size n from a normal
distribution, and x is the mean of the samples xis.
2 In general, the statistic is positive and less than or equal to one; being close to one indicates normality.
Note: A more detailed description about the test is found at Shapiro and Wilk (1965).
Table 11: Dip Test for Unimodality
Year # Observation Dip1 Pr(> jZj)2
2000 8020 0.021 < 0:0001
2001 9282 0.024 < 0:0001
2002 11287 0.022 < 0:0001
2003 12989 0.022 < 0:0001
2004 15834 0.023 < 0:0001
2005 17915 0.023 < 0:0001
2006 19461 0.041 < 0:0001
2007 24149 0.026 < 0:0001
2008 25077 0.027 < 0:0001
Asterisks correspond to the following p-values: p < 0:001.
1 The Dip statistics measures the departure from unimodality, by computing the maximum distance between the sample
distribution and the best fitting unimodal distribution function.
2 The p-value is calculated by comparing the Dip statistics obtained from the data, and the one from random resam-
plings.
Note: A more detailed description of the test is found at Hartigan and Hartigan (1985).
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Table 12: Logit Regression: Results and Statistics
Model likelihood
ratio test
Discrimination
indexes
Rank discrim.
indexes
# Observations 7696 LR 2 1296.86 R2 0.209 6C 0.732
# 0 4457 d.f. 17 2g 1.054 7Dxy 0.465
# 1 3239 Pr(> 2) < 0.0001 3gr 2.870 8gamma 0.466
1max jderivj 3.00E-12 4gp 0.226 9tau-a 0.226
5Brier 0.205
’s S.E. 10dF/dX S.E. Wald Z Pr(> jZj)
(’s) (dF/dX)
(Intercept) -2.99 0.27 -11.21 < 0:0001
log(size) 0.36 0.03 0.09 0.01 11.53 < 0:0001
log(age) -0.19 0.04 -0.05 0.01 -5.38 < 0:0001
log(asset) 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.01 5.38 < 0:0001
Tax code 0.52 0.07 0.12 0.02 7.65 < 0:0001
Province 1 0.85 0.08 0.21 0.02 10.31 < 0:0001
Province 2 0.70 0.11 0.17 0.03 6.28 < 0:0001
Province 3 -0.27 0.09 -0.06 0.02 -2.83 0:0046
Province 4 0.69 0.10 0.17 0.02 7.30 < 0:0001
Province 5 0.41 0.10 0.10 0.02 4.23 < 0:0001
Province 6 -0.11 0.12 -0.03 0.03 -0.88 0:3787
Province 7 1.15 0.13 -0.026 0.03 9.00 < 0:0001
Province 8 0.84 0.14 0.21 0.03 5.89 < 0:0001
Province 9 1.23 0.13 0.30 0.03 9.67 < 0:0001
Ltd 0.36 0.10 0.09 0.02 3.66 0:0002
Cooperative -0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.53 0:5964
Private 0.38 0.10 0.09 0.03 3.70 0:0002
Joint stock -0.34 0.06 -0.08 0.01 -5.60 < 0:0001
1 This is the maximum absolute value of the first derivative of the log likelihood function.
2 The value g is Gini’s mean difference ofXi^.
3 The value gr is the exponential of g.
4 In logit regressions, dependent variables (Y s in this case) can be transformed into a probability estimate, and the value gp is Gini’s mean
difference of these probabilities (those for paying the bribes in this case).
5 The Brier score is 1
N
nP
t=1
(ft   ot)2, where ft is the probability that was forecast, ot is the actual outcome of the event at instance t (0 if
it does not happen and 1 if it does happen), and n is the number of forecasts.
6 C denotes the c-index, and a c-index of 0:5 denotes random splitting, whereas a c-index of 1 denotes perfect prediction.
7 Dxy represents Somers’ Dxy rank correlation between the predicted probabilities and the observed responses. Between Dxy and the c-
index,Dxy = 2(c 0:5) holds. A Dxy of 0 occurs when the model’s predictions are random, and when it equals 1, the model is perfectly
discriminating. The definition is taken from Somers (1962).
8 Gamma is Goodman Kruskal’s , which measures the similarity of the orderings of the data when ranked by each of the quantities. The
values range from  1:0 (no association) to 1:0 (perfect association). The definition is taken from Kruskal (1958).
9 Tau-a is Kendall’s a rank correlations between predicted probabilities and observed responses. The definition is taken from Kendall
(1938).
10 The value dF/dX stands for Averaged Marginal Effects.
Note: A detailed description of these indexes is taken from Harrell (2014) and Harrell (2001). Asterisks correspond to the following
p-values: p < 0:001, p < 0:01, p < 0:05. Because our study is about corruption, which may be a delicate issue, we do not
disclose each province’s name here.
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Table 13: Fixed-Effect and Mixed-Effect Regressions
Fixed-effect 1dF/dx(FE) Mixed-effect 2dF/dx(ME)
(Intercept) 0.21 -2.88
(0.25) (0.29)
Tax code 0.05 0.02 0.54 0.14
(0.02) (1.55) (0.07) (0.01)
log(size) 0.07 0.03 0.37 0.08
(0.02) (2.27) (0.03) (0.01)
log(age) 0.01 0.01 – –
(0.01) (0.45) – –
log(asset) 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.02
(0.01) (0.38) (0.02) (0.00)
Ltd 0.14 0.82 0.34 0.10
(0.03) (5.59) (0.10) (0.02)
Cooperative -0.00 0.0 -0.06 0.02
(0.03) (0.09) (0.10) (0.02)
Private 0.07 0.03 0.39 0.13
(0.03) (2.49) (0.10) (0.02)
Joint stock -0.07 -0.03 -0.36 -0.09
(0.01) (2.37) (0.06) (0.01)
Residual standard error 0.4466
d.f. 4294
Multiple R2 0.54
Adjusted R2 0.18
F-statistic 1.50
p-value <0.0001
AIC 9265.45
BIC 9334.93
Log likelihood -4622.72
Num. groups: age 62
Num. groups: Firm ID 10
Variance: age.(Intercept) 0.02
Variance: Firm ID.(Intercept) 0.23
Variance: Residual 1.00
# Observations 7696
Asterisks correspond to the following p-values: p < 0:001.
1 The variable 1dF/dx(FE) stands for Averaged Marginal Effects in the Fixed-effect regression.
2 The variable 2dF/dx(ME) stands for Averaged Marginal Effects in the Mixed-effect regression.
The variables in () are S.E.
Note: In the survey a firm can change its type. For example, among 1516 households in 2005, 35
became private firms, 8 became cooperatives and another 35 became ltd. companies in 2007. We
can see that because each firm is assigned with each firm’s ID.
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Table 14: Odds Ratio (OR) and 95 % Confidence Interval
OR 2.50% 97.50% OR (FE)1 OR (ME)2
(Intercept) 0.05 0.03 0.08 1.24 0.06
log(size) 1.44 1.35 1.53 1.07 1.44
log(age) 0.82 0.77 0.88 1.01 -
log(asset) 1.11 1.07 1.16 1.01 1.11
Tax code 1.68 1.47 1.93 1.05 1.71
Ltd 1.43 1.18 1.74 1.15 1.41
Cooperative 0.95 0.78 1.15 1.00 0.94
Private 1.46 1.20 1.78 1.07 1.48
Joint stock 0.71 0.63 0.80 0.93 0.70
Province 1 2.35 2.00 2.76
Province 2 2.01 1.62 2.50
Province 3 0.77 0.64 0.92
Province 4 2.00 1.66 2.41
Province 5 1.51 1.25 1.83
Province 6 0.90 0.70 1.14
Province 7 3.15 2.46 4.05
Province 8 2.31 1.75 3.05
Province 9 3.42 2.67 4.39
1 FE stands for fixed effect;
2 ME stands for mixed effect.
Table 15: ANOVA Table
Source SS d.f. MS F Pr(> F )
Columns 0.34 4 0.086 6.14 0.0039
Error 0.21 15 0.014
Total 0.55 19
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Table 16: Industry Inefficiency under Different Technologies
Sector 14
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 450,200 450,200 450,194 250,567 189,358 147,479
2001 568,825 568,825 568,814 312,644 311,653 289,330
2002 909,740 909,740 909,736 546,971 339,535 294,086
2003 886,702 886,702 886,695 478,871 371,054 312,766
2004 919,758 919,758 919,694 485,303 447,643 363,595
2005 1,133,556 1,133,556 1,133,524 592,853 554,010 465,290
2006 1,062,847 1,062,847 1,062,812 536,190 503,729 427,965
2007 1,413,173 1,413,173 1,413,102 746,582 649,698 527,867
2008 1,466,380 1,466,380 1,466,340 474,055 465,444 414,499
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 44.3% 57.9% 67.2% 55.7% 42.1% 32.8%
2001 45.0% 45.2% 49.1% 55.0% 54.8% 50.9%
2002 39.9% 62.7% 67.7% 60.1% 37.3% 32.3%
2003 46.0% 58.2% 64.7% 54.0% 41.8% 35.3%
2004 47.2% 51.3% 60.5% 52.8% 48.7% 39.5%
2005 47.7% 51.1% 59.0% 52.3% 48.9% 41.0%
2006 49.6% 52.6% 59.7% 50.4% 47.4% 40.3%
2007 47.2% 54.0% 62.6% 52.8% 46.0% 37.4%
2008 67.7% 68.3% 71.7% 32.3% 31.7% 28.3%
Sector 15
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 2,795,785 2,795,785 2,795,772 2,473,833 1,942,119 1,615,494
2001 2,827,905 2,827,905 2,827,894 2,567,829 1,986,499 1,711,333
2002 4,167,794 4,167,794 4,167,793 3,705,992 2,831,759 2,393,708
2003 4,863,678 4,863,678 4,863,662 4,349,722 3,539,044 2,769,763
2004 5,881,124 5,881,124 5,881,103 5,374,355 4,488,779 3,475,055
2005 9,283,240 9,283,240 9,283,236 8,279,640 7,310,842 6,233,288
2006 7,006,265 7,006,265 7,006,234 5,867,712 5,057,528 4,363,323
2007 9,968,261 9,968,261 9,968,172 8,943,700 7,797,767 7,525,065
2008 5,174,270 5,174,270 5,174,270 1,852,910 1,815,343 1,647,793
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 11.5% 30.5% 42.2% 88.5% 69.5% 57.8%
2001 9.2% 29.8% 39.5% 90.8% 70.2% 60.5%
2002 11.1% 32.1% 42.6% 88.9% 67.9% 57.4%
2003 10.6% 27.2% 43.1% 89.4% 72.8% 56.9%
2004 8.6% 23.7% 40.9% 91.4% 76.3% 59.1%
2005 10.8% 21.2% 32.9% 89.2% 78.8% 67.1%
2006 16.3% 27.8% 37.7% 83.7% 72.2% 62.3%
2007 10.3% 21.8% 24.5% 89.7% 78.2% 75.5%
2008 64.2% 64.9% 68.2% 35.8% 35.1% 31.8%
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Sector 17
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 1,232,733 1,232,733 1,232,733 1,152,041 798,814 345,466
2001 1,352,347 1,352,347 1,352,345 1,229,991 953,602 510,754
2002 1,553,679 1,553,679 1,553,679 1,379,762 955,453 509,951
2003 1,758,460 1,758,460 1,758,401 1,545,745 933,341 494,006
2004 2,075,899 2,075,899 2,075,730 1,814,785 1,172,900 736,749
2005 2,382,890 2,382,890 2,382,890 2,068,459 1,506,184 1,070,898
2006 2,584,485 2,584,485 2,578,623 2,099,165 2,012,548 1,165,578
2007 3,271,739 3,271,739 3,271,685 2,756,154 2,106,401 1,270,284
2008 2,432,830 2,432,830 2,432,823 1,018,397 901,889 709,514
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 6.5% 35.2% 72.0% 93.5% 64.8% 28.0%
2001 9.0% 29.5% 62.2% 91.0% 70.5% 37.8%
2002 11.2% 38.5% 67.2% 88.8% 61.5% 32.8%
2003 12.1% 46.9% 71.9% 87.9% 53.1% 28.1%
2004 12.6% 43.5% 64.5% 87.4% 56.5% 35.5%
2005 13.2% 36.8% 55.1% 86.8% 63.2% 44.9%
2006 18.8% 22.1% 54.9% 81.2% 77.9% 45.1%
2007 15.8% 35.6% 61.2% 84.2% 64.4% 38.8%
2008 58.1% 62.9% 70.8% 41.9% 37.1% 29.2%
Sector 18
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 1,609,537 1,609,537 1,609,509 966,742 896,416 631,053
2001 1,990,064 1,990,064 1,989,782 1,142,087 881,421 596,483
2002 2,601,091 2,601,091 2,601,079 1,596,220 1,244,740 798,273
2003 3,245,427 3,245,427 3,245,411 1,937,086 1,404,561 859,380
2004 3,898,903 3,898,903 3,898,884 2,421,947 1,935,818 1,366,802
2005 4,747,615 4,747,615 4,747,598 2,762,608 2,479,491 2,132,878
2006 4,431,012 4,431,012 4,431,008 2,839,387 2,437,618 1,976,884
2007 6,760,280 6,760,280 6,760,271 4,338,372 4,171,741 2,878,362
2008 2,862,363 2,862,363 2,862,359 1,889,052 1,839,795 1,562,675
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 39.9% 44.3% 60.8% 60.1% 55.7% 39.2%
2001 42.6% 55.7% 70.0% 57.4% 44.3% 30.0%
2002 38.6% 52.1% 69.3% 61.4% 47.9% 30.7%
2003 40.3% 56.7% 73.5% 59.7% 43.3% 26.5%
2004 37.9% 50.3% 64.9% 62.1% 49.7% 35.1%
2005 41.8% 47.8% 55.1% 58.2% 52.2% 44.9%
2006 35.9% 45.0% 55.4% 64.1% 55.0% 44.6%
2007 35.8% 38.3% 57.4% 64.2% 61.7% 42.6%
2008 34.0% 35.7% 45.4% 66.0% 64.3% 54.6%
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Sector 19
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 1,723,046 1,723,046 1,722,871 1,052,374 657,414 372,040
2001 2,069,534 2,069,534 2,069,380 1,350,336 940,332 496,109
2002 3,233,257 3,233,257 3,233,183 1,765,929 774,927 364,248
2003 3,332,415 3,332,415 3,331,806 2,168,962 1,139,856 653,867
2004 4,583,984 4,583,984 4,583,958 3,154,510 1,645,475 1,243,728
2005 4,909,407 4,909,407 4,909,362 3,124,981 1,528,588 816,719
2006 4,545,504 4,545,504 4,545,497 3,439,618 1,417,372 752,771
2007 7,244,754 7,244,754 7,244,753 4,381,782 2,650,839 1,239,791
2008 896,159 896,159 896,153 658,957 643,016 457,059
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 38.9% 61.8% 78.4% 61.1% 38.2% 21.6%
2001 34.8% 54.6% 76.0% 65.2% 45.4% 24.0%
2002 45.4% 76.0% 88.7% 54.6% 24.0% 11.3%
2003 34.9% 65.8% 80.4% 65.1% 34.2% 19.6%
2004 31.2% 64.1% 72.9% 68.8% 35.9% 27.1%
2005 36.3% 68.9% 83.4% 63.7% 31.1% 16.6%
2006 24.3% 68.8% 83.4% 75.7% 31.2% 16.6%
2007 39.5% 63.4% 82.9% 60.5% 36.6% 17.1%
2008 26.5% 28.2% 49.0% 73.5% 71.8% 51.0%
Sector 20
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 620,967 620,967 620,953 474,746 377,710 289,578
2001 454,745 454,745 454,737 353,815 328,981 246,499
2002 665,085 665,085 665,083 662,996 571,019 491,041
2003 963,952 963,952 963,948 662,996 571,019 491,041
2004 998,401 998,401 998,393 740,503 578,739 465,936
2005 1,262,835 1,262,835 1,262,823 980,534 895,411 778,176
2006 1,297,974 1,297,974 1,297,928 916,900 810,267 629,802
2007 1,710,745 1,710,745 1,710,732 1,253,302 1,196,393 1,057,054
2008 1,566,028 1,566,028 1,565,952 1,225,817 631,687 472,771
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 23.5% 39.2% 53.4% 76.5% 60.8% 46.6%
2001 22.2% 27.7% 45.8% 77.8% 72.3% 54.2%
2002 0.3% 14.1% 26.2% 99.7% 85.9% 73.8%
2003 31.2% 40.8% 49.1% 68.8% 59.2% 50.9%
2004 25.8% 42.0% 53.3% 74.2% 58.0% 46.7%
2005 22.4% 29.1% 38.4% 77.6% 70.9% 61.6%
2006 29.4% 37.6% 51.5% 70.6% 62.4% 48.5%
2007 26.7% 30.1% 38.2% 73.3% 69.9% 61.8%
2008 21.7% 59.7% 69.8% 78.3% 40.3% 30.2%
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Sector 21
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 275,949 275,949 275,906 249,714 163,305 81,016
2001 866,620 866,620 866,582 719,448 503,266 358,461
2002 667,688 667,688 667,650 595,300 465,184 399,245
2003 684,708 684,708 684,699 590,669 452,706 319,644
2004 934,962 934,962 934,961 805,878 622,088 438,397
2005 1,172,592 1,172,592 1,172,585 931,899 755,517 534,074
2006 1,148,496 1,148,496 1,148,483 1,012,439 666,444 472,115
2007 1,792,724 1,792,724 1,792,722 1,584,801 1,196,132 836,709
2008 1,810,194 1,810,194 1,810,044 521,861 506,632 405,337
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 9.5% 40.8% 70.6% 90.5% 59.2% 29.4%
2001 17.0% 41.9% 58.6% 83.0% 58.1% 41.4%
2002 10.8% 30.3% 40.2% 89.2% 69.7% 59.8%
2003 13.7% 33.9% 53.3% 86.3% 66.1% 46.7%
2004 13.8% 33.5% 53.1% 86.2% 66.5% 46.9%
2005 20.5% 35.6% 54.5% 79.5% 64.4% 45.5%
2006 11.8% 42.0% 58.9% 88.2% 58.0% 41.1%
2007 11.6% 33.3% 53.3% 88.4% 66.7% 46.7%
2008 71.2% 72.0% 77.6% 28.8% 28.0% 22.4%
Sector 22
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 363,483 363,483 363,179 272,303 226,042 162,045
2001 866,620 866,620 866,582 719,448 503,288 358,461
2002 555,926 555,926 555,924 412,651 314,734 193,726
2003 653,265 653,265 653,213 470,702 384,400 201,186
2004 861,945 861,945 861,940 620,751 400,675 230,405
2005 999,619 999,619 999,585 689,778 498,861 275,950
2006 1,063,161 1,063,161 1,063,123 734,019 505,146 260,905
2007 1,469,579 1,469,579 1,469,557 1,037,098 799,527 491,775
2008 1,418,072 1,418,072 1,417,389 720,503 681,855 484,049
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 25.1% 37.8% 55.4% 74.9% 62.2% 44.6%
2001 17.0% 41.9% 58.6% 83.0% 58.1% 41.4%
2002 25.8% 43.4% 65.2% 74.2% 56.6% 34.8%
2003 27.9% 41.2% 69.2% 72.1% 58.8% 30.8%
2004 28.0% 53.5% 73.3% 72.0% 46.5% 26.7%
2005 31.0% 50.1% 72.4% 69.0% 49.9% 27.6%
2006 31.0% 52.5% 75.5% 69.0% 47.5% 24.5%
2007 29.4% 45.6% 66.5% 70.6% 54.4% 33.5%
2008 49.2% 51.9% 65.9% 50.8% 48.1% 34.1%
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Sector 24
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 1,043,362 1,043,362 1,043,207 953,475 796,035 373,694
2001 1,199,894 1,199,894 1,199,882 1,107,747 894,181 364,924
2002 1,473,325 1,473,325 1,473,263 1,365,624 1,121,583 605,902
2003 1,805,189 1,805,189 1,805,114 1,689,185 1,397,499 980,284
2004 2,214,746 2,214,746 2,214,564 2,114,002 1,639,794 1,167,968
2005 2,522,780 2,522,780 2,522,663 2,347,241 1,941,652 1,182,457
2006 3,193,722 3,193,722 3,193,663 2,754,149 2,305,881 1,451,798
2007 4,176,795 4,176,795 4,176,767 3,689,089 3,109,457 2,256,897
2008 3,528,423 3,528,423 3,528,395 1,311,296 1,058,691 944,156
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 8.6% 23.7% 64.2% 91.4% 76.3% 35.8%
2001 7.7% 25.5% 69.6% 92.3% 74.5% 30.4%
2002 7.3% 23.9% 58.9% 92.7% 76.1% 41.1%
2003 6.4% 22.6% 45.7% 93.6% 77.4% 54.3%
2004 4.5% 26.0% 47.3% 95.5% 74.0% 52.7%
2005 7.0% 23.0% 53.1% 93.0% 77.0% 46.9%
2006 13.8% 27.8% 54.5% 86.2% 72.2% 45.5%
2007 11.7% 25.6% 46.0% 88.3% 74.4% 54.0%
2008 62.8% 70.0% 73.2% 37.2% 30.0% 26.8%
Sector 25
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 702,582 702,582 702,524 634,638 500,896 372,773
2001 794,182 794,182 793,697 656,864 575,234 390,059
2002 1,067,721 1,067,721 1,067,655 932,873 839,961 584,302
2003 1,324,802 1,324,802 1,324,781 1,175,224 1,059,756 825,065
2004 1,799,233 1,799,233 1,799,203 1,474,138 1,381,306 1,180,810
2005 1,938,479 1,938,479 1,938,455 1,729,687 1,557,975 1,236,305
2006 2,088,962 2,088,962 2,088,739 1,725,314 1,587,974 1,230,578
2007 3,396,017 3,396,017 3,395,987 2,847,712 2,567,580 1,965,269
2008 3,213,015 3,213,015 3,212,973 1,105,827 1,066,805 885,205
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 9.7% 28.7% 46.9% 90.3% 71.3% 53.1%
2001 17.3% 27.6% 50.9% 82.7% 72.4% 49.1%
2002 12.6% 21.3% 45.3% 87.4% 78.7% 54.7%
2003 11.3% 20.0% 37.7% 88.7% 80.0% 62.3%
2004 18.1% 23.2% 34.4% 81.9% 76.8% 65.6%
2005 10.8% 19.6% 36.2% 89.2% 80.4% 63.8%
2006 17.4% 24.0% 41.1% 82.6% 76.0% 58.9%
2007 16.1% 24.4% 42.1% 83.9% 75.6% 57.9%
2008 65.6% 66.8% 72.4% 34.4% 33.2% 27.6%
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Sector 26
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 1,023,969 1,023,969 1,023,960 902,121 537,918 361,425
2001 2,699,898 2,699,898 2,699,747 2,287,799 2,165,294 2,158,565
2002 2,343,688 2,343,688 2,343,665 1,900,576 1,341,054 867,103
2003 2,870,755 2,870,755 2,870,732 2,405,928 1,716,030 1,202,725
2004 3,260,433 3,260,433 3,260,422 2,725,620 2,121,944 1,554,532
2005 3,688,750 3,688,750 3,688,733 3,225,023 2,438,392 1,685,106
2006 3,942,767 3,942,767 3,942,709 3,317,028 2,397,356 1,592,043
2007 5,628,143 5,628,143 5,628,121 4,814,733 3,569,596 2,293,592
2008 4,514,757 4,514,757 4,514,729 1,807,430 1,184,187 950,330
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 11.9% 47.5% 64.7% 88.1% 52.5% 35.3%
2001 15.3% 19.8% 20.1% 84.7% 80.2% 79.9%
2002 18.9% 42.8% 63.0% 81.1% 57.2% 37.0%
2003 16.2% 40.2% 58.1% 83.8% 59.8% 41.9%
2004 16.4% 34.9% 52.3% 83.6% 65.1% 47.7%
2005 12.6% 33.9% 54.3% 87.4% 66.1% 45.7%
2006 15.9% 39.2% 59.6% 84.1% 60.8% 40.4%
2007 14.5% 36.6% 59.2% 85.5% 63.4% 40.8%
2008 60.0% 73.8% 79.0% 40.0% 26.2% 21.0%
Sector 28
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 592,360 592,360 592,322 468,590 400,596 286,661
2001 728,255 728,255 728,242 615,008 568,666 480,336
2002 968,831 968,831 968,814 796,283 708,368 569,902
2003 1,274,720 1,274,720 1,274,691 1,048,464 993,766 745,781
2004 1,644,522 1,644,522 1,644,489 1,415,197 1,331,489 1,141,884
2005 2,090,754 2,090,754 2,090,708 1,833,183 1,675,839 1,377,487
2006 2,212,301 2,212,301 2,212,192 1,919,283 1,728,415 1,212,578
2007 3,962,633 3,962,633 3,962,582 3,389,447 3,215,927 2,558,114
2008 4,010,076 4,010,076 4,009,628 1,601,675 1,566,777 1,368,258
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 20.9% 32.4% 51.6% 79.1% 67.6% 48.4%
2001 15.6% 21.9% 34.0% 84.4% 78.1% 66.0%
2002 17.8% 26.9% 41.2% 82.2% 73.1% 58.8%
2003 17.7% 22.0% 41.5% 82.3% 78.0% 58.5%
2004 13.9% 19.0% 30.6% 86.1% 81.0% 69.4%
2005 12.3% 19.8% 34.1% 87.7% 80.2% 65.9%
2006 13.2% 21.9% 45.2% 86.8% 78.1% 54.8%
2007 14.5% 18.8% 35.4% 85.5% 81.2% 64.6%
2008 60.1% 60.9% 65.9% 39.9% 39.1% 34.1%
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Sector 29
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 340,888 340,888 340,883 322,552 245,344 170,261
2001 516,117 516,117 515,719 453,876 435,310 283,387
2002 549,155 549,155 549,028 484,170 456,443 347,997
2003 710,986 710,986 710,873 636,840 613,963 439,994
2004 796,296 796,296 796,279 753,330 653,735 460,323
2005 858,203 858,203 858,137 795,110 649,884 407,551
2006 771,883 771,883 769,954 677,986 640,279 385,880
2007 1,451,512 1,451,512 1,451,475 1,357,057 1,308,876 1,137,727
2008 1,380,017 1,380,017 1,379,244 493,107 476,435 327,708
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 5.4% 28.0% 50.1% 94.6% 72.0% 49.9%
2001 12.1% 15.7% 45.1% 87.9% 84.3% 54.9%
2002 11.8% 16.9% 36.6% 88.2% 83.1% 63.4%
2003 10.4% 13.6% 38.1% 89.6% 86.4% 61.9%
2004 5.4% 17.9% 42.2% 94.6% 82.1% 57.8%
2005 7.4% 24.3% 52.5% 92.6% 75.7% 47.5%
2006 12.2% 17.0% 50.0% 87.8% 83.0% 50.0%
2007 6.5% 9.8% 21.6% 93.5% 90.2% 78.4%
2008 64.3% 65.5% 76.3% 35.7% 34.5% 23.7%
Sector 36
Industry Inefficiency (IE) Aggregate Firm Inefficiency (ITE)
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 599,217 599,217 599,045 403,033 341,076 194,012
2001 849,157 849,157 849,146 699,817 593,546 421,311
2002 1,317,998 1,317,998 1,317,929 1,063,913 921,845 697,726
2003 1,903,470 1,903,470 1,903,301 1,521,766 1,264,369 984,206
2004 2,833,088 2,833,088 2,833,070 2,403,746 2,146,593 1,857,009
2005 3,758,619 3,758,619 3,758,613 3,270,593 2,986,408 2,183,026
2006 3,730,984 3,730,984 3,730,895 3,072,099 2,693,170 1,811,452
2007 6,648,357 6,648,357 6,648,274 5,419,674 4,612,549 3,567,689
2008 3,330,249 3,330,249 3,330,249 1,568,096 1,500,188 1,273,723
Industry Reallocation Inefficiency Aggregate Firm Inefficiency
Year CCR BCC FRH CCR BCC FDH
2000 32.7% 43.1% 67.6% 67.3% 56.9% 32.4%
2001 17.6% 30.1% 50.4% 82.4% 69.9% 49.6%
2002 19.3% 30.1% 47.1% 80.7% 69.9% 52.9%
2003 20.1% 33.6% 48.3% 79.9% 66.4% 51.7%
2004 15.2% 24.2% 34.5% 84.8% 75.8% 65.5%
2005 13.0% 20.5% 41.9% 87.0% 79.5% 58.1%
2006 17.7% 27.8% 51.4% 82.3% 72.2% 48.6%
2007 18.5% 30.6% 46.3% 81.5% 69.4% 53.7%
2008 52.9% 55.0% 61.8% 47.1% 45.0% 38.2%
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Table 17: Industry Inefficiency - Meta Estimates
Sector 14
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.471 0.092 0.19 0.058 0.051 0.88 0.140 0.064 0.45 0.291 0.037 0.13 0.451 0.054 0.12
2001 0.299 0.104 0.35 0.025 0.025 1.00 0.232 0.010 0.04 0.230 0.005 0.02 0.073 0.014 0.20
2002 0.191 0.072 0.38 0.097 0.054 0.56 0.179 0.055 0.31 0.176 0.046 0.26 0.286 0.043 0.15
2003 0.262 0.056 0.21 0.054 0.054 1.00 0.161 0.055 0.34 0.182 0.035 0.19 0.179 0.039 0.22
2004 0.154 0.151 0.98 0.132 0.115 0.87 0.174 0.142 0.82 0.143 0.095 0.67 0.186 0.096 0.52
2005 0.146 0.073 0.50 0.065 0.050 0.77 0.063 0.058 0.92 0.127 0.027 0.21 0.345 0.029 0.08
2006 0.188 0.120 0.64 0.081 0.078 0.97 0.130 0.107 0.83 0.180 0.051 0.28 0.295 0.054 0.18
2007 0.181 0.085 0.47 0.120 0.085 0.71 0.169 0.129 0.76 0.135 0.080 0.60 0.327 0.085 0.26
2008 0.109 0.050 0.46 0.061 0.059 0.97 0.213 0.062 0.29 0.145 0.062 0.43 0.217 0.068 0.32
Sector 15
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.108 0.107 0.99 0.061 0.061 0.99 0.098 0.044 0.44 0.099 0.033 0.34 0.192 0.031 0.16
2001 0.063 0.054 0.87 0.045 0.044 0.98 0.187 0.035 0.19 0.195 0.024 0.12 0.195 0.023 0.12
2002 0.089 0.068 0.76 0.045 0.043 0.96 0.147 0.036 0.24 0.146 0.027 0.18 0.250 0.025 0.10
2003 0.046 0.046 1.00 0.062 0.047 0.75 0.175 0.033 0.19 0.191 0.031 0.16 0.265 0.030 0.11
2004 0.032 0.027 0.85 0.033 0.028 0.84 0.099 0.021 0.21 0.127 0.016 0.13 0.099 0.017 0.17
2005 0.015 0.015 1.00 0.021 0.012 0.57 0.096 0.010 0.11 0.212 0.008 0.04 0.114 0.008 0.07
2006 0.085 0.074 0.87 0.088 0.080 0.91 0.091 0.061 0.67 0.072 0.055 0.76 0.226 0.054 0.24
2007 0.075 0.013 0.18 0.011 0.011 1.00 0.085 0.009 0.11 0.069 0.007 0.10 0.244 0.009 0.04
2008 0.076 0.061 0.80 0.024 0.024 1.00 0.139 0.020 0.15 0.132 0.019 0.15 0.184 0.020 0.11
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Sector 17
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.212 0.212 1.00 0.190 0.097 0.51 0.129 0.044 0.34 0.336 0.048 0.14 0.117 0.038 0.32
2001 0.289 0.188 0.65 0.158 0.158 1.00 0.221 0.111 0.50 0.308 0.124 0.40 0.297 0.103 0.35
2002 0.150 0.149 0.99 0.209 0.144 0.69 0.285 0.133 0.47 0.276 0.120 0.44 0.320 0.102 0.32
2003 0.349 0.270 0.77 0.188 0.188 1.00 0.263 0.120 0.46 0.281 0.160 0.57 0.336 0.128 0.38
2004 0.255 0.120 0.47 0.060 0.060 1.00 0.254 0.046 0.18 0.345 0.058 0.17 0.255 0.044 0.17
2005 0.069 0.031 0.44 0.047 0.047 1.00 0.238 0.037 0.16 0.203 0.036 0.18 0.265 0.039 0.15
2006 0.167 0.142 0.85 0.128 0.120 0.94 0.238 0.129 0.54 0.330 0.123 0.37 0.284 0.201 0.71
2007 0.165 0.160 0.97 0.134 0.126 0.94 0.171 0.111 0.65 0.233 0.126 0.54 0.362 0.134 0.37
2008 0.183 0.181 0.99 0.171 0.168 0.98 0.078 0.061 0.79 0.232 0.127 0.55 0.312 0.175 0.56
Sector 18
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.422 0.255 0.60 0.113 0.112 0.99 0.211 0.096 0.45 0.320 0.085 0.27 0.180 0.080 0.45
2001 0.414 0.300 0.73 0.181 0.131 0.72 0.199 0.165 0.83 0.304 0.129 0.42 0.166 0.129 0.78
2002 0.111 0.111 1.00 0.157 0.096 0.61 0.193 0.085 0.44 0.161 0.081 0.50 0.228 0.091 0.40
2003 0.229 0.151 0.66 0.124 0.116 0.93 0.371 0.078 0.21 0.101 0.091 0.91 0.223 0.107 0.48
2004 0.125 0.123 0.98 0.132 0.121 0.91 0.104 0.082 0.79 0.223 0.107 0.48 0.225 0.102 0.46
2005 0.105 0.103 0.98 0.139 0.094 0.68 0.251 0.033 0.13 0.192 0.033 0.17 0.044 0.040 0.91
2006 0.146 0.109 0.75 0.205 0.136 0.66 0.289 0.122 0.42 0.216 0.100 0.46 0.127 0.113 0.89
2007 0.184 0.131 0.71 0.132 0.101 0.76 0.206 0.092 0.45 0.248 0.089 0.36 0.179 0.120 0.67
2008 0.333 0.158 0.47 0.174 0.154 0.88 0.197 0.107 0.55 0.181 0.160 0.88 0.238 0.198 0.83
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Sector 19
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.638 0.413 0.65 0.241 0.241 1.00 0.403 0.228 0.57 0.496 0.239 0.48 0.317 0.105 0.33
2001 0.956 0.790 0.83 0.122 0.101 0.83 0.222 0.212 0.95 0.544 0.165 0.30 0.346 0.214 0.62
2002 0.166 0.166 1.00 0.086 0.086 1.00 0.512 0.097 0.19 0.494 0.097 0.20 0.388 0.100 0.26
2003 0.394 0.354 0.90 0.266 0.210 0.79 0.483 0.198 0.41 0.514 0.160 0.31 0.386 0.271 0.70
2004 0.511 0.233 0.45 0.141 0.141 1.00 0.361 0.022 0.06 0.608 0.033 0.05 0.225 0.063 0.28
2005 0.249 0.141 0.57 0.234 0.234 1.00 0.472 0.186 0.39 0.619 0.258 0.42 0.372 0.197 0.53
2006 0.148 0.121 0.81 0.173 0.142 0.82 0.266 0.143 0.54 0.586 0.142 0.24 0.316 0.119 0.38
2007 0.181 0.181 1.00 0.300 0.149 0.50 0.410 0.216 0.53 0.532 0.221 0.42 0.313 0.186 0.59
2008 0.414 0.207 0.50 0.193 0.182 0.94 0.219 0.191 0.87 0.350 0.175 0.50 0.292 0.180 0.62
Sector 20
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.087 0.087 1.00 0.088 0.044 0.50 0.166 0.026 0.16 0.302 0.029 0.09 0.205 0.061 0.30
2001 0.069 0.069 1.00 0.076 0.055 0.72 0.141 0.047 0.34 0.457 0.058 0.13 0.140 0.069 0.49
2002 0.057 0.057 1.00 0.118 0.093 0.79 0.260 0.052 0.20 0.194 0.045 0.23 0.278 0.052 0.19
2003 0.115 0.087 0.76 0.041 0.040 0.99 0.206 0.037 0.18 0.309 0.031 0.10 0.223 0.032 0.15
2004 0.106 0.106 1.00 0.089 0.058 0.65 0.149 0.050 0.34 0.179 0.047 0.26 0.332 0.052 0.16
2005 0.052 0.052 1.00 0.066 0.051 0.78 0.169 0.043 0.26 0.205 0.041 0.20 0.265 0.052 0.20
2006 0.100 0.088 0.89 0.081 0.062 0.76 0.254 0.067 0.27 0.201 0.057 0.28 0.423 0.062 0.15
2007 0.177 0.143 0.81 0.041 0.041 1.00 0.101 0.055 0.54 0.202 0.047 0.24 0.187 0.039 0.21
2008 0.176 0.113 0.64 0.084 0.075 0.89 0.181 0.083 0.46 0.261 0.086 0.33 0.136 0.051 0.38
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Sector 21
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.374 0.287 0.77 0.211 0.207 0.98 0.383 0.270 0.71 0.352 0.207 0.59 0.513 0.223 0.43
2001 0.195 0.120 0.62 0.204 0.158 0.77 0.076 0.074 0.98 0.283 0.070 0.25 0.506 0.056 0.11
2002 0.340 0.221 0.65 0.061 0.051 0.82 0.063 0.047 0.75 0.366 0.037 0.10 0.343 0.028 0.08
2003 0.104 0.104 1.00 0.160 0.094 0.59 0.296 0.053 0.18 0.512 0.054 0.11 0.175 0.042 0.24
2004 0.195 0.132 0.68 0.128 0.128 1.00 0.266 0.119 0.45 0.392 0.107 0.27 0.386 0.113 0.29
2005 0.145 0.084 0.58 0.122 0.095 0.78 0.290 0.081 0.28 0.387 0.066 0.17 0.365 0.081 0.22
2006 0.050 0.050 1.00 0.135 0.069 0.51 0.337 0.068 0.20 0.356 0.062 0.17 0.306 0.053 0.17
2007 0.208 0.172 0.83 0.090 0.068 0.76 0.283 0.054 0.19 0.214 0.068 0.32 0.059 0.057 0.97
2008 0.234 0.100 0.43 0.081 0.081 1.00 0.297 0.079 0.27 0.363 0.070 0.19 0.417 0.109 0.26
Sector 22
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.327 0.317 0.97 0.366 0.261 0.71 0.167 0.141 0.84 0.629 0.130 0.21 0.275 0.102 0.37
2001 0.195 0.120 0.62 0.204 0.158 0.77 0.076 0.074 0.98 0.283 0.070 0.25 0.506 0.056 0.11
2002 0.108 0.098 0.91 0.093 0.064 0.69 0.137 0.086 0.63 0.287 0.076 0.27 0.594 0.077 0.13
2003 0.168 0.169 1.00 0.285 0.145 0.51 0.314 0.163 0.52 0.507 0.139 0.27 0.586 0.138 0.24
2004 0.089 0.082 0.92 0.085 0.076 0.89 0.290 0.056 0.19 0.347 0.064 0.18 0.670 0.087 0.13
2005 0.077 0.077 1.00 0.204 0.167 0.82 0.415 0.056 0.14 0.463 0.068 0.15 0.533 0.081 0.15
2006 0.142 0.142 1.00 0.233 0.138 0.59 0.322 0.128 0.40 0.538 0.144 0.27 0.600 0.124 0.21
2007 0.128 0.127 0.99 0.111 0.099 0.89 0.362 0.101 0.28 0.528 0.110 0.21 0.504 0.119 0.24
2008 0.203 0.119 0.59 0.215 0.176 0.82 0.381 0.104 0.27 0.109 0.660 0.60 0.362 0.241 0.67
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Sector 24
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.403 0.212 0.53 0.265 0.232 0.88 0.305 0.209 0.69 0.372 0.261 0.70 0.561 0.260 0.46
2001 0.306 0.183 0.60 0.070 0.068 0.98 0.419 0.070 0.17 0.477 0.092 0.19 0.517 0.089 0.17
2002 0.180 0.103 0.57 0.153 0.153 1.00 0.365 0.185 0.51 0.464 0.126 0.27 0.455 0.172 0.38
2003 0.207 0.165 0.80 0.102 0.101 0.99 0.182 0.114 0.63 0.434 0.093 0.21 0.500 0.125 0.25
2004 0.158 0.094 0.60 0.092 0.092 1.00 0.146 0.088 0.60 0.428 0.113 0.27 0.409 0.094 0.23
2005 0.130 0.110 0.85 0.202 0.202 1.00 0.412 0.229 0.56 0.437 0.244 0.56 0.424 0.192 0.45
2006 0.103 0.082 0.80 0.186 0.181 0.97 0.354 0.089 0.25 0.521 0.095 0.18 0.457 0.072 0.16
2007 0.170 0.121 0.71 0.112 0.112 1.00 0.380 0.111 0.29 0.302 0.116 0.39 0.500 0.117 0.23
2008 0.211 0.149 0.70 0.092 0.090 0.98 0.213 0.094 0.44 0.489 0.099 0.20 0.470 0.119 0.25
Sector 25
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.153 0.150 0.98 0.131 0.125 0.95 0.206 0.107 0.52 0.474 0.093 0.20 0.436 0.088 0.20
2001 0.301 0.242 0.80 0.212 0.211 1.00 0.287 0.202 0.70 0.482 0.276 0.57 0.358 0.193 0.54
2002 0.232 0.177 0.77 0.102 0.102 1.00 0.267 0.090 0.34 0.354 0.118 0.33 0.431 0.109 0.25
2003 0.084 0.060 0.71 0.072 0.062 0.87 0.208 0.049 0.23 0.168 0.073 0.43 0.342 0.046 0.13
2004 0.215 0.151 0.70 0.077 0.077 0.99 0.158 0.074 0.46 0.113 0.078 0.69 0.336 0.075 0.22
2005 0.158 0.091 0.57 0.064 0.063 1.00 0.223 0.059 0.26 0.298 0.059 0.20 0.386 0.053 0.14
2006 0.265 0.182 0.69 0.088 0.088 1.00 0.261 0.082 0.31 0.229 0.112 0.49 0.384 0.098 0.25
2007 0.153 0.135 0.88 0.140 0.133 0.95 0.268 0.112 0.42 0.281 0.163 0.58 0.448 0.117 0.26
2008 0.200 0.155 0.78 0.164 0.132 0.81 0.127 0.125 0.98 0.276 0.143 0.52 0.361 0.110 0.30
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Sector 26
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.321 0.188 0.59 0.091 0.091 0.99 0.151 0.064 0.43 0.360 0.060 0.17 0.440 0.086 0.19
2001 0.145 0.121 0.83 0.003 0.003 1.00 0.235 0.101 0.43 0.320 0.001 0.00 0.271 0.000 0.00
2002 0.258 0.137 0.53 0.093 0.093 0.99 0.348 0.114 0.33 0.257 0.145 0.56 0.342 0.154 0.45
2003 0.258 0.158 0.61 0.215 0.144 0.67 0.203 0.195 0.96 0.249 0.210 0.84 0.340 0.147 0.43
2004 0.202 0.100 0.50 0.094 0.094 1.00 0.283 0.129 0.46 0.299 0.134 0.45 0.249 0.139 0.56
2005 0.074 0.058 0.78 0.100 0.072 0.72 0.158 0.081 0.51 0.270 0.091 0.33 0.305 0.082 0.27
2006 0.291 0.117 0.40 0.097 0.094 0.97 0.282 0.105 0.37 0.334 0.122 0.36 0.369 0.105 0.29
2007 0.033 0.032 0.96 0.081 0.045 0.56 0.192 0.019 0.10 0.240 0.020 0.08 0.381 0.025 0.07
2008 0.169 0.085 0.50 0.085 0.085 1.00 0.254 0.112 0.44 0.319 0.131 0.41 0.253 0.115 0.45
Sector 28
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.183 0.183 1.00 0.236 0.189 0.80 0.365 0.187 0.51 0.467 0.205 0.44 0.379 0.154 0.41
2001 0.255 0.242 0.95 0.177 0.165 0.93 0.254 0.170 0.67 0.445 0.147 0.33 0.199 0.115 0.57
2002 0.137 0.119 0.87 0.173 0.116 0.67 0.325 0.121 0.37 0.452 0.111 0.24 0.364 0.089 0.25
2003 0.158 0.119 0.75 0.112 0.100 0.90 0.254 0.101 0.40 0.465 0.109 0.23 0.215 0.091 0.42
2004 0.057 0.047 0.82 0.079 0.037 0.46 0.111 0.048 0.43 0.278 0.048 0.17 0.311 0.039 0.13
2005 0.087 0.063 0.73 0.068 0.067 0.98 0.265 0.063 0.24 0.350 0.068 0.20 0.146 0.060 0.41
2006 0.223 0.108 0.49 0.101 0.100 1.00 0.289 0.113 0.39 0.395 0.134 0.34 0.306 0.107 0.35
2007 0.167 0.101 0.60 0.127 0.124 0.98 0.226 0.130 0.58 0.271 0.142 0.52 0.190 0.116 0.61
2008 0.155 0.048 0.31 0.089 0.089 1.00 0.156 0.062 0.40 0.152 0.075 0.49 0.215 0.067 0.31
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Sector 29
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.229 0.209 0.91 0.145 0.142 0.98 0.493 0.179 0.36 0.435 0.156 0.36 0.582 0.167 0.29
2001 0.340 0.313 0.92 0.394 0.213 0.54 0.366 0.251 0.69 0.460 0.214 0.46 0.220 0.200 0.91
2002 0.371 0.295 0.80 0.235 0.223 0.95 0.334 0.293 0.88 0.396 0.208 0.52 0.213 0.196 0.92
2003 0.268 0.236 0.88 0.236 0.190 0.81 0.441 0.188 0.43 0.279 0.232 0.83 0.231 0.160 0.69
2004 0.172 0.135 0.79 0.207 0.139 0.67 0.346 0.148 0.43 0.396 0.208 0.53 0.312 0.178 0.57
2005 0.133 0.133 1.00 0.239 0.140 0.59 0.313 0.130 0.42 0.312 0.194 0.62 0.582 0.166 0.28
2006 0.185 0.166 0.90 0.246 0.231 0.94 0.355 0.247 0.70 0.491 0.437 0.89 0.386 0.241 0.62
2007 0.114 0.095 0.83 0.005 0.005 0.98 0.265 0.008 0.03 0.426 0.007 0.02 0.347 0.007 0.02
2008 0.138 0.128 0.93 0.223 0.121 0.54 0.300 0.130 0.43 0.424 0.142 0.33 0.362 0.145 0.40
Sector 36
Group 1-9 10-49 50-99 100-199 >200
Year IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR IE group IE Meta MTR
2000 0.173 0.144 0.83 0.177 0.168 0.95 0.305 0.166 0.55 0.395 0.238 0.60 0.489 0.150 0.31
2001 0.143 0.137 0.96 0.181 0.081 0.45 0.217 0.083 0.38 0.285 0.085 0.30 0.325 0.080 0.25
2002 0.181 0.136 0.75 0.102 0.091 0.89 0.120 0.107 0.89 0.394 0.185 0.47 0.293 0.103 0.35
2003 0.184 0.119 0.64 0.080 0.080 1.00 0.174 0.085 0.49 0.249 0.088 0.35 0.221 0.091 0.41
2004 0.157 0.134 0.85 0.043 0.043 1.00 0.314 0.042 0.13 0.222 0.055 0.25 0.121 0.054 0.45
2005 0.092 0.086 0.94 0.115 0.086 0.75 0.190 0.094 0.50 0.261 0.094 0.36 0.266 0.089 0.34
2006 0.148 0.094 0.64 0.123 0.122 1.00 0.291 0.163 0.56 0.226 0.147 0.65 0.343 0.159 0.46
2007 0.114 0.052 0.45 0.017 0.017 1.00 0.134 0.017 0.12 0.262 0.016 0.06 0.254 0.017 0.07
2008 0.163 0.078 0.48 0.074 0.062 0.84 0.145 0.063 0.43 0.077 0.065 0.85 0.269 0.058 0.21
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of Firm Size Measured by Number of Employees
 Year 2000
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
0 < Size  200
Firm size
10 < Size  200
Firm size
20 < Size  200
Firm size
50 < Size  200
Firm size
200 < Size  3000
Firm size
 Year 2004
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
0 < Size  200
Firm size
10 < Size  200
Firm size
20 < Size  200
Firm size
50 < Size  200
Firm size
200 < Size  3000
Firm size
 Year 2008
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
0 < Size  200
Firm size
10 < Size  200
Firm size
20 < Size  200
Firm size
50 < Size  200
Firm size
200 < Size  3000
Firm size
Note: The bin size is 10 employees. Each bin contains the upper bound and not the lower bound.
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of Employment Share by Firm Size
 Year 2000
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Note: The bin size is 10 employees. Each bin contains the upper bound and not the lower bound.
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Figure 7.3: Distribution of Average Products
Value Added to Capital
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Note: We take the maximums and the minimums of log(Value addedCapital ) (the first row), log(
Value added
Capital ) (the second row)
and log(RevenueMaterial ) (the third row), respectively and truncate the intervals into 50 bins. Each bin contains the upper
bound and not the lower bound.
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Figure 7.4: Efficiency Scores in Each Industry
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Figure 7.5: Ratio of the Two Efficiency Scores in Each Industry
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Figure 7.6: Inefficiency Associated with Scale in Each Industry
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Note: A light color represents a portion of firms for  i > 1, a dark color represents a portion of firms with 
+
i < 1 and a white color represents the rest
of firms which do not belong to either group. The x-axis represents each group, namely n is Group n for each n = 1;    ; 5.
177
Figure 7.7: Ratio of Bribing Firms for Every 20 Firms (Total)
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Note: The x-axis represents firms’ size groups. The n’s group is the n-th largest group for n = 1;    ; 100.
178
Figure 7.8: Ratio of Bribing Firms for Every 10 Firms (Formal and Informal)
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Note: The first row is the figures of formal firms who have tax codes. The second raw is the figures of informal firms who do not have tax codes. The
x-axis represents firms’ size groups. The n’s group is the n-th smallest group for n = 1;    ; 100. Each dot represents a ratio of firms paying bribes
compared to the total number of firms in each group.
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